Red Team Engagement Plan: [Engagement code name]
Plan for a threat-led red team engagement against live production systems: purpose, scope
of critical or important functions, roles of the control team (often called the white team),
threat intelligence and scenarios, rules of engagement, risk management, provider
selection, timeline, communication, closure with replay and purple teaming, remediation and
attestation. Structure follows the process of the TIBER-EU framework (European Central
Bank, edition of January 2025) and, for EU financial entities, the threat-led penetration
testing (TLPT) rules in Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Articles 26 and 27, and
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190. It works for voluntary engagements too.
Replace every [bracketed] value and every row marked Example. Worked examples use
Varnholt Bank, a fictional EU retail bank, and the code name OPAL HARBOUR. This is a
documentation format, not legal advice: check the current official texts and your TLPT
authority's national guidance, and involve qualified legal counsel.
Document control
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Document ID | [RTE-PLAN-001] |
| Version | [1.0] |
| Status | [Draft / In review / Approved / Superseded] |
| Owner (control team lead) | [@ctl] |
| Approvers / reviewers | [@management-body-sponsor], [@ciso], [@head-of-operational-risk], [@legal-counsel], [TLPT authority test manager, if applicable] |
| Last updated | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Classification | Secret, need-to-know (control team only) |
| Engagement code name | Example: OPAL HARBOUR |
| Engagement type | [TLPT under DORA / TIBER-EU test / CBEST assessment / voluntary threat-led red team] |
| Lead authority and test manager | [Authority name], [test manager], [alternate] |
| Notification received | Example: 2027-01-11 |
| Active testing window | Example: 2027-08-02 to 2027-11-01 (13 weeks) |
| Next review | Weekly during the engagement; final version at closure |
Approvals
| Role | Name | Decision | Date |
|---|
| Management body sponsor (approves scope) | [@name] | [Approved / Changes requested] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Control team lead | [@name] | [Decision] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Legal counsel (authorisation and social engineering limits) | [@name] | [Decision] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Test manager, TLPT authority (where applicable) | [Name] | [Validated / Comments] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Red team test lead | [Name, provider] | [Accepted rules of engagement] | YYYY-MM-DD |
Revision history
| Version | Date | Author | Change summary |
|---|
| 0.1 | YYYY-MM-DD | [@ctl] | First draft after notification |
| 0.9 | YYYY-MM-DD | [@ctl] | Example: Scope specification approved by management body; submitted to test manager |
| 1.0 | YYYY-MM-DD | [@ctl] | Example: Red team test plan approved; active testing authorised |
Contents
1. Purpose and engagement type
Purpose (Example): find out whether Varnholt Bank can prevent, detect and respond to
attacks by the threat actors most likely to target its retail payments, online banking and
customer data functions, using the tactics those actors use today, and turn the results
into funded improvements to protection, detection and response.
| Question | Answer |
|---|
| Why now? | Example: Notification from the TLPT authority dated 2027-01-11; last threat-led test in 2024 |
| What decision will the results inform? | Example: 2028 security investment plan; detection engineering roadmap; third-party oversight of the card processor |
| What type of engagement is this? | [Regulatory TLPT / framework test on request / voluntary] |
| Is the blue team informed? | No. Only the people listed in section 4 know about the engagement |
| Are live production systems in scope? | Yes, under the rules in section 7 and the risk measures in section 8 |
How this engagement differs from neighbouring activities:
| Activity | Main question | Blue team aware | Template |
|---|
| Threat-led red team (this document) | Can a realistic adversary reach business-critical objectives undetected? | No | This plan |
| Penetration test | Which vulnerabilities exist in a defined target? | Usually yes | security/pentest-report |
| AI red team | Can an AI system be misused or made to fail unsafely? | Varies | ai-data/ai-red-team |
| Threat hunt | Is an adversary already present? | Yes (hunters are defenders) | security/threat-hunting-plan |
| Tabletop exercise | Do decision makers know how to respond? | Yes | security/tabletop-exercise |
2. Regulatory and framework basis
| Basis | What it sets | Applies here? |
|---|
| Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Article 26 | Identified financial entities run TLPT at least every three years on live production systems supporting several or all critical or important functions; the competent authority may change the frequency | [Yes / No] |
| DORA Article 27 | Requirements for testers, including when internal testers may be used | [Yes / No] |
| Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190, adopted 13 February 2025, published in the Official Journal 18 June 2025, in force from 8 July 2025 | Identification criteria, control team and test manager roles, risk management, provider requirements, phase contents and deadlines, internal testers, mutual recognition. Annexes I to VIII list the contents of each deliverable | [Yes / No] |
| TIBER-EU framework, ECB, January 2025 edition, with its guidance documents (scope specification, targeted threat intelligence report, red team test plan and report, blue team report, purple teaming, remediation plan, test summary report, attestation) | Process, roles and deliverables of an intelligence-led red team test; designed so a TIBER-EU test can meet DORA TLPT requirements | [Yes / No] |
| National implementation of TIBER-EU, for example TIBER-[country] | National specifics added by the TIBER authority | [Name] |
| CBEST (Bank of England, implementation guide 2024 edition) | Intelligence-led testing for UK firms and financial market infrastructures named by the regulators | [Yes / No] |
| Voluntary engagement | Internal policy and contract only | [Yes / No] |
Outside regulated finance there is usually no legal obligation to run a threat-led red team.
The process here still works: replace the TLPT authority with an internal assurance function
(for example internal audit) that plays the independent oversight role, and keep every
other element. Wherever this plan quotes a deadline from the Delegated Regulation, a
voluntary engagement may set its own, but should record why.
3. Teams, roles and responsibilities
3.1 Teams
| Team or role | Who | Responsibility |
|---|
| Control team lead (CTL) | [@ctl] | Day-to-day management of the engagement and of the control team's decisions; single point of contact for the test manager and providers |
| Control team (white team) | Example: 5 people: CTL, deputy, head of payments operations, senior network engineer, operational risk officer | Plans, scopes, selects providers, manages risk, approves leg-ups, deconflicts detections, stops the test if needed |
| Management body sponsor | [@name] | Approves the scope specification; receives progress and risk updates |
| Threat intelligence provider (TIP) | [Provider] | Builds target and threat intelligence; proposes scenarios; writes the targeted threat intelligence report |
| Red team testers (RTT) | [Provider or internal team] | Write the red team test plan; execute scenarios; log every action; write the red team test report |
| Blue team (BT) | Security operations, incident response, IT operations, and any staff who would normally defend | Defend as usual, unaware of the test; after testing, write the blue team test report and take part in replay and purple teaming |
| Test manager (TM) and TIBER or TLPT cyber team (TCT) | [Authority] | Oversee the test for the authority; ensure the rules are met; validate key documents (regulatory tests only) |
| Legal counsel | [@name] | Authorisation letters, employment and privacy limits on social engineering, contracts and indemnities |
| ICT third-party service providers in scope | [Provider names] | Agree to take part, appoint a trusted contact, follow the same secrecy rules |
3.2 RACI
| Activity | CTL | Control team | Sponsor | TIP | RTT | BT | TM |
|---|
| Scope specification | A | R | Approves | C | C | | Validates |
| Provider selection | A | R | I | | | | C |
| Targeted threat intelligence report | A | C | I | R | C | | Validates |
| Red team test plan | A | C | | C | R | | Approves |
| Active testing | A | C | I | C | R | Unaware | I |
| Leg-up approval | A | R | | | C | | Approves |
| Red team test report | I | C | | | R | Receives | Assesses |
| Blue team test report | I | C | | | Receives | R | Assesses |
| Replay and purple teaming | A | R | I | C | R | R | May attend |
| Remediation plan and summary report | A | R | Approves | | C | C | Approves |
R = responsible, A = accountable, C = consulted, I = informed.
4. Secrecy and need-to-know
| Person or group | Organisation | Reason for knowledge | Date informed | NDA signed |
|---|
| Example: Control team (5) | Varnholt Bank | Run the engagement | 2027-01-18 | Yes |
| Example: Chief executive and board risk committee chair | Varnholt Bank | Management body oversight | 2027-01-20 | Yes |
| Example: Card processor trusted contact | Third party | Third-party systems in scope | 2027-05-03 | Yes |
| [Name] | [Organisation] | [Reason] | YYYY-MM-DD | [Yes / No] |
- Use the code name in every message, ticket, calendar entry and file name. Never use the
words "red team" or the provider's name in shared systems.
- Store engagement material in a restricted repository with access logging, readable only
by the people listed above.
- Use the secure communication channels agreed in section 11, not corporate chat that the
security operations centre can read.
- If a blue team member detects the test and escalates, the control team contains the
escalation (see section 11.3) without revealing the engagement more widely than needed.
- Record any suspected leak, assess its effect on test validity with the test manager and
decide whether to continue, adapt or restart.
5. Scope and flags
5.1 Critical or important functions in scope
| CIF ID | Function | Supporting systems and processes | Third parties | Reason for inclusion |
|---|
| CIF-01 (Example) | Retail payments (SEPA credit transfers and instant payments) | Payments hub, core banking ledger, payment operations team, operator approval workflow | Clearing provider (connectivity only) | Highest financial and customer impact; known target of financially motivated groups |
| CIF-02 (Example) | Online and mobile banking | Customer identity platform, mobile backend, fraud engine | Cloud hosting provider | Large customer base; account takeover risk |
| CIF-03 (Example) | Card issuing and authorisation | Card management system, hardware security modules | Card processor | Outsourced critical function; tests third-party detection and cooperation |
| [CIF-NN] | [Function] | [Systems, processes] | [Third parties] | [Reason] |
5.2 Flags
| Flag ID | CIF | Objective that proves impact | Confidentiality, integrity, availability or authenticity | Evidence required |
|---|
| FLAG-01 (Example) | CIF-01 | Prepare an outgoing payment batch and get it approved in the production release queue; the control team stops it before release | Integrity | Screenshot of the approved batch held in the release queue, with control team witness |
| FLAG-02 (Example) | CIF-02 | Obtain a valid session for a control-team-owned test customer account without its credentials | Authenticity | Session token metadata and screenshot; no real customer data accessed |
| FLAG-03 (Example) | CIF-03 | Read access to the card management system administrative console | Confidentiality | Console screenshot with masked data |
| FLAG-04 (Example) | CIF-01, CIF-02 | Domain administrator equivalent privileges in the corporate directory | Integrity | Proof file planted at an agreed path, no change to production objects |
5.3 Out of scope
| Item | Reason |
|---|
| Real customer funds movement | Unacceptable harm; flags stop before release |
| Denial of service against production | Availability impact on customers |
| Personal devices and home networks of staff | Privacy and legal limits |
| [Item] | [Reason] |
6. Threat intelligence and scenarios
6.1 Intelligence inputs
| Input | Source | Owner | Status |
|---|
| Generic threat landscape for the sector | [National authority or sector ISAC] | TIP | [Received / Pending] |
| Target intelligence (external footprint, staff exposure, leaked credentials, supplier links) | Open-source intelligence gathered by the TIP | TIP | [Status] |
| Threat actor profiles relevant to the entity | Commercial and open sources | TIP | [Status] |
| Internal incident history and detection gaps | Control team, under need-to-know | CTL | [Status] |
6.2 Scenario shortlist and selection
| Scenario ID | Threat actor profile | Motivation | Entry route | Target CIFs and flags | Threat-led or forward-looking | Selected |
|---|
| SCN-01 (Example) | Financially motivated intrusion group targeting European banks | Fraudulent payments | Spear phishing of payment operations staff, then credential theft | CIF-01, FLAG-01, FLAG-04 | Threat-led | Yes |
| SCN-02 (Example) | Account takeover crew using purchased credentials and session hijacking | Fraud at scale | Exposed customer identity flows and help desk social engineering | CIF-02, FLAG-02 | Threat-led | Yes |
| SCN-03 (Example) | State-aligned group compromising suppliers | Espionage and pre-positioning | Compromise of a support account at the card processor | CIF-03, FLAG-03 | Threat-led | Yes |
| SCN-04 (Example) | Insider recruited by a criminal group | Data theft | Valid internal access | CIF-02 | Threat-led | No: covered by insider threat programme this year |
| SCN-05 (Example) | Attacker using AI-generated voice to defeat call-back controls | Payment fraud | Voice social engineering | CIF-01 | Forward-looking | No: candidate for purple teaming |
Selection rationale (Example): SCN-01 to SCN-03 cover all three functions, three distinct
actors and three entry routes (people, customer-facing identity, supplier). The control
team lead selected them on 2027-07-05 after the scenario selection meeting, taking into
account the TIP recommendation, test manager input, tester feasibility and the bank's risk
profile.
6.3 Technique mapping
Map each selected scenario to MITRE ATT&CK techniques (use the ATT&CK version current at
test time and record it). The red team test plan holds the detailed attack path; this table
keeps the summary visible to the control team.
| Scenario | In (initial access) | Through (lateral movement, privilege) | Out (actions on objectives) |
|---|
| SCN-01 (Example) | Phishing with a credential harvesting page | Credential reuse; abuse of remote administration tools | Access to payment approval workflow; batch held in queue |
| SCN-02 (Example) | Credential stuffing against login; help desk pretext call | Session token replay | Control of test customer session |
| SCN-03 (Example) | Valid account at supplier (provided as leg-up if not obtained) | Remote support channel into card platform | Read access to admin console |
7. Rules of engagement
7.1 Authorisation
- Written authorisation letter signed by [@sponsor] and [@legal-counsel], naming the
provider, the testers, the code name, the scope and the active testing window. Testers
carry it (digitally and, for physical tests, on paper) and show it only if challenged by
law enforcement or after a stop instruction.
- Third-party authorisation from each ICT service provider in scope, signed before any
activity touches its systems.
- Insurance: confirm professional indemnity cover of each provider, including misconduct
and negligence (see section 9).
7.2 Allowed and not-allowed techniques
| ID | Technique or activity | Allowed? | Conditions |
|---|
| ROE-01 (Example) | Phishing and spear phishing of staff | Yes | Pretexts approved by the control team and legal; no threats, no references to health, family, pay disputes or disciplinary matters; no real third-party brands without legal approval |
| ROE-02 (Example) | Telephone social engineering of help desk | Yes | Script approved in advance; testers end the call if the employee shows distress |
| ROE-03 (Example) | Physical intrusion into head office | Yes, limited | Office hours, agreed buildings only, no forced entry, no damage to locks |
| ROE-04 (Example) | Malware and implants | Yes | Custom tooling with kill switch, no self-propagation, no destructive payloads, removed at closure |
| ROE-05 (Example) | Exploitation of production vulnerabilities | Yes | Only after control team notice for any exploit with known stability risk |
| ROE-06 (Example) | Denial of service, data destruction, encryption of production data | No | Never |
| ROE-07 (Example) | Access to real customer personal data beyond what proves a flag | No | Stop, record, mask, inform the control team |
| ROE-08 (Example) | Attacks on staff personal accounts or personal devices | No | Never |
| ROE-09 (Example) | Real fund transfers | No | Flags stop before release |
7.3 Leg-ups
A leg-up is help the control team gives testers so the engagement can continue when a step
would take a real attacker longer than the test allows (for example, providing a foothold
equivalent to a successful phish). Every leg-up is planned or requested, approved by the
control team and, for regulated tests, the test manager, and recorded.
| Leg-up ID | Scenario | What is provided | Trigger | Approved by | Date |
|---|
| LEG-01 (Example) | SCN-03 | Low-privilege account at the card processor support portal | Initial access not achieved after 3 weeks | CTL and TM | YYYY-MM-DD |
| [LEG-NN] | [SCN] | [Item] | [Trigger] | [Approvers] | YYYY-MM-DD |
8. Risk management
| Risk ID | Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Measures | Owner | Residual |
|---|
| RSK-01 (Example) | Providers see sensitive information during scoping and testing | Medium | High | NDAs, least access, data masking, encrypted storage, destruction at closure (section 14) | CTL | Low |
| RSK-02 (Example) | Test fails a regulatory requirement (timelines, secrecy, provider criteria) and no attestation is issued | Low | High | Compliance checklist per phase, weekly test manager call | CTL | Low |
| RSK-03 (Example) | Blue team escalates a detection into a real crisis (regulator notification, law enforcement) | Medium | High | Containment procedure in 11.3; CTL reachable at all hours; deputy named | CTL | Medium |
| RSK-04 (Example) | Tester activity disrupts payments or corrupts data | Low | Very high | Rules in section 7, pre-notice for risky exploits, kill switches, change freeze awareness | RTT lead | Low |
| RSK-05 (Example) | Blue team response (for example isolating servers) disrupts critical activity | Medium | High | Control team member from IT operations monitors response actions and can intervene quietly | Control team | Medium |
| RSK-06 (Example) | Systems not fully restored after testing (implants, accounts, configuration) | Medium | Medium | Artefact register; clean-up verification at closure | RTT lead | Low |
| RSK-07 (Example) | Real attacker activity discovered during the test | Low | Very high | Pause test, invoke real incident response; see 11.4 | CTL | Medium |
Risk scale: likelihood and impact use the organisation's risk methodology
(compliance/risk-methodology). Accepted residual risks are signed by the sponsor.
9. Provider and tester selection
9.1 External provider checks
| Check | Threat intelligence provider | External red team | Evidence |
|---|
| Detailed CVs and certifications appropriate under recognised market standards | [Yes / No] | [Yes / No] | [File reference] |
| Professional indemnity insurance, including misconduct and negligence | [Yes / No] | [Yes / No] | [Certificate] |
| References from previous intelligence-led or red team assignments (TLPT: at least three for the TIP, at least five for testers) | [n] | [n] | [Reference letters] |
| Team composition (TLPT: TIP manager with at least 5 years in threat intelligence plus one member with at least 2 years; red team manager with at least 5 years in penetration and red team testing plus at least two testers with at least 2 years each) | [Met / Not met] | [Met / Not met] | [CVs] |
| Combined prior assignments (TLPT: at least three for the TIP team, at least five for the red team) | [n] | [n] | [List] |
| No conflict of interest, no blue team services to the entity, separation between TIP and tester staff of the same firm | [Yes / No] | [Yes / No] | [Declaration] |
Check these figures against Article 7 of the current consolidated text before contracting;
national TIBER guidance may add requirements, such as accreditation schemes.
9.2 Internal testers (if used)
| Condition (DORA Article 27 and Delegated Regulation Article 15) | Status |
|---|
| Policy for managing internal testers, documented and periodically reviewed | [Status] |
| Test team has a lead and at least two more members | [Status] |
| All members employed by the entity or an intra-group ICT provider for the preceding 12 months | [Status] |
| Using internal testers does not weaken defensive capability or ICT resources during the test | [Status] |
| Internal testers have training in penetration and red team testing | [Status] |
| Approval from the TLPT authority where required | [Status] |
10. Timeline and phases
| Step | Rule | Planned date (Example) |
|---|
| Notification from TLPT authority | Starts the engagement | 2027-01-11 |
| Initiation documents to test manager (project charter, CTL contact, tester model, channels, code name) | Within 3 months of notification (Article 9(2)) | Due 2027-04-11; sent 2027-03-15 |
| Scope specification document, approved by management body | Within 6 months of notification (Article 9(6)) | Due 2027-07-11; sent 2027-05-24 |
| Threat intelligence: collection, scenarios, targeted threat intelligence report | Indicative 4 to 6 weeks (TIBER-EU) | 2027-06-07 to 2027-07-12 (5 weeks) |
| Red team test plan | Indicative 2 to 3 weeks (TIBER-EU) | 2027-07-12 to 2027-08-02 (3 weeks) |
| Active red team testing | At least 12 weeks (Article 11(5)) | 2027-08-02 to 2027-11-01 (13 weeks) |
| Red team test report to control team | Within 4 weeks of end of active testing (Article 12(2)) | Due 2027-11-29 |
| Blue team test report; replay and purple teaming | No later than 10 weeks after end of active testing (Article 12(4) and (5)) | Due 2028-01-10 |
| 360-degree feedback between all parties | After replay and purple teaming (Article 12(6)) | 2028-01-17 |
| Test manager notifies that reports are complete | Authority step | Example: 2028-01-24 |
| Test summary report to authority | Within 8 weeks of that notification (Article 12(7)) | Due 2028-03-20 |
| Remediation plan to authority | Within 8 weeks of that notification (Article 13(1)) | Due 2028-03-20 |
| Attestation | Issued by the authority (Article 14) | After approval |
11. Communication, escalation and stop conditions
11.1 Channels and rhythm
| Purpose | Channel | Participants | Frequency |
|---|
| Progress and next steps | Encrypted video call outside corporate collaboration tools | CTL, RTT lead, TM | Weekly during active testing |
| Urgent stop or deconfliction | Dedicated phones with pre-shared verification phrase | CTL, deputy, RTT lead | Any time |
| Document exchange | Restricted encrypted file share | Control team, providers, TM | As needed |
| Management body update | Short briefing under code name | CTL, sponsor | Monthly |
11.2 Stop conditions
Testing pauses immediately when any of the following happens; it resumes only on the CTL's
instruction, after consulting the test manager for regulated tests:
- Unplanned impact on availability or integrity of a critical or important function.
- Testers access real customer personal data beyond the minimum needed to prove a flag.
- Evidence of a real attacker in the environment.
- A blue team escalation that would trigger external notification, law enforcement
involvement or customer communication.
- Safety concern for any person, including during physical or social engineering activity.
- Loss of contact between the CTL and the red team lead for more than [4] hours during an
active operation.
11.3 Handling detection by the blue team
If the red team confirms the activity, the control team decides with the test manager
whether to let the blue team continue its response (valuable learning), to provide a cover
story, or to adapt the scenario. If the red team denies it, treat the event as a real
incident immediately (11.4).
11.4 Real incident during the engagement
Pause testing, hand over to the incident response plan (compliance/incident-response-plan),
share relevant tester logs with responders under need-to-know, and assess with the test
manager whether the engagement can resume or must be restarted later. Major incidents still
follow their own reporting duties, for example compliance/dora-major-incident-report.
12. Closure: reports, replay and purple teaming
12.1 Closure deliverables
| Deliverable | Author | Contents (summary) | Due (Example) |
|---|
| Red team test report | RTT | Attack narrative per scenario, flags reached, techniques, leg-ups used, findings, detection points observed, recommendations | 2027-11-29 |
| Blue team test report | BT | Events seen, alerts raised, actions taken, timeline mapped to the red team report, root causes of missed detections | 2028-01-10 |
| Replay session | BT and RTT, facilitated by control team | Step-by-step replay of offensive and defensive actions | By 2028-01-10 |
| Purple teaming | BT and RTT, organised by control team | Joint work on gaps and on items that could not be tested | By 2028-01-10 |
| 360-degree feedback | All parties | What worked and what to change in the process | 2028-01-17 |
| Test summary report | Entity | Relevant findings for the authority | 2028-03-20 |
12.2 Replay and purple teaming plan
| Session ID | Topic | Source | Format | Expected output |
|---|
| PT-01 (Example) | Phishing entry and credential theft in SCN-01 were not detected for 9 days | RTT report finding RT-F-01 | Replay, then repeat the technique with defenders watching telemetry | New detection rule, tested (security/detection-rule-spec) |
| PT-02 (Example) | Help desk pretext in SCN-02 succeeded | RT-F-03 | Walk through call scripts; test revised call-back control | Updated help desk procedure |
| PT-03 (Example) | Supplier support channel in SCN-03 needed a leg-up; detection there untested | LEG-01 | Run the remaining steps openly with the card processor's security team | Joint monitoring use case with supplier |
| PT-04 (Example) | Forward-looking voice cloning scenario SCN-05 not selected | Scenario shortlist | Tabletop plus controlled simulation | Decision on payment call-back controls |
12.3 Findings register
| Finding ID | Scenario | Description | Detection outcome | Severity | Root cause category |
|---|
| RT-F-01 (Example) | SCN-01 | Credential harvesting page and reuse of harvested credentials not detected | Missed | High | Detection coverage |
| RT-F-02 (Example) | SCN-01 | Remote administration tool usage from workstation to payments server allowed | Detected after 2 days, not escalated | High | Process (triage) |
| RT-F-03 (Example) | SCN-02 | Help desk reset access for a caller who passed knowledge questions only | Not applicable (human control) | High | People and process |
| RT-F-04 (Example) | SCN-03 | Supplier support sessions not logged to the bank's monitoring | Missed | Medium | Third-party oversight |
13. Remediation plan and attestation
| Action ID | Finding | Remediation measure | Root cause | Priority | Owner | Due | Risk if not done | Risk of doing it |
|---|
| REM-01 (Example) | RT-F-01 | Detection for credential use from new device and location, plus phishing-resistant authentication for payments staff | No telemetry correlation between mail and identity logs | P1 | [@head-of-detection] | YYYY-MM-DD | Repeat compromise of payment approvers | Short user friction during rollout |
| REM-02 (Example) | RT-F-02 | Escalation rule for remote administration to payments segment; triage playbook update | Alert severity set too low | P1 | [@soc-manager] | YYYY-MM-DD | Lateral movement unnoticed | More alerts to triage |
| REM-03 (Example) | RT-F-03 | Help desk call-back to registered number for privileged and payments roles | Knowledge-based verification only | P1 | [@service-desk-lead] | YYYY-MM-DD | Account takeover by social engineering | Longer reset times |
| REM-04 (Example) | RT-F-04 | Contract and technical change to stream supplier session logs | Monitoring scope ended at the contract boundary | P2 | [@third-party-risk] | YYYY-MM-DD | Undetected supplier-route intrusion | Supplier cost |
Attestation: for TLPT, the authority issues an attestation that the test met the
requirements, which supports mutual recognition by other authorities. Record its reference
and date here: [Attestation reference], YYYY-MM-DD. Track remediation in the
organisation's risk treatment plan (compliance/risk-treatment-plan) and report status
in the security metrics report (security/security-metrics-report).
14. Evidence, logging and data handling
| Item | Rule |
|---|
| Tester activity log | Time-stamped (UTC), per action: operator, source, target, technique, result; kept by the RTT and shared with the control team daily during active testing |
| Artefact register | Every implant, account, file, scheduled task or configuration change created by testers, with removal confirmation at closure |
| Screenshots and captured data | Minimum needed to prove a flag; personal data masked; stored encrypted |
| Retention | Engagement records kept [5] years or as the authority requires; provider copies destroyed within [30] days of closure with a signed destruction certificate |
| Chain of custody | For any evidence that may be used in a real incident, follow security/forensic-evidence-record |
15. Traceability matrix
| CIF | Flag | Scenario | Reached | Leg-up | Findings | Remediation | Purple team |
|---|
| CIF-01 (Example) | FLAG-01 | SCN-01 | Yes | None | RT-F-01, RT-F-02 | REM-01, REM-02 | PT-01 |
| CIF-01, CIF-02 (Example) | FLAG-04 | SCN-01 | Yes | None | RT-F-02 | REM-02 | PT-01 |
| CIF-02 (Example) | FLAG-02 | SCN-02 | Yes | None | RT-F-03 | REM-03 | PT-02 |
| CIF-03 (Example) | FLAG-03 | SCN-03 | No | LEG-01 | RT-F-04 | REM-04 | PT-03 |
16. Glossary and references
16.1 Glossary
| Term | Meaning |
|---|
| TLPT | Threat-led penetration testing: the DORA term for intelligence-led red team testing of live production systems |
| TIBER-EU | Threat Intelligence-Based Ethical Red teaming framework of the European Central Bank |
| CIF | Critical or important function |
| CTL, control team | Control team lead and the small team that manages the test; often called the white team |
| RTT | Red team testers |
| TIP | Threat intelligence provider |
| BT | Blue team: defenders who are not told about the test |
| TM, TCT | Test manager and the authority's cyber team overseeing the test |
| TTIR | Targeted threat intelligence report |
| Flag | Objective that proves an attacker could have harmed a function |
| Leg-up | Approved help from the control team that lets testers continue |
| Purple teaming | Defenders and attackers working together openly to improve detection and response |
| Replay | Side-by-side walk-through of offensive and defensive actions after testing |
16.2 References
| Reference | Use |
|---|
| Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Articles 24 to 27 (eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554/oj) | TLPT obligation, frequency, scope, testers |
| Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 of 13 February 2025, OJ L 18.6.2025 (eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2025/1190/oj) | Roles, phases, deadlines, deliverable contents (Annexes I to VIII), provider and internal tester requirements |
| TIBER-EU framework, January 2025, and guidance documents (ecb.europa.eu, TIBER-EU pages) | Process model, durations, purple teaming guidance |
| CBEST Threat Intelligence-Led Assessments implementation guide, 2024 edition (bankofengland.co.uk) | UK equivalent |
| MITRE ATT&CK (attack.mitre.org) | Technique mapping |
DORA ICT Risk Management Framework (compliance/dora-ict-risk-management-framework) and ICT Third-Party Register (compliance/dora-ict-third-party-register) | Testing programme and third-party cooperation clauses |
Pentest Report (security/pentest-report), AI Red Team Plan (ai-data/ai-red-team), Attack Tree (security/attack-tree) | Neighbouring assurance activities |
SOC Playbook (security/soc-playbook), Detection Rule Specification (security/detection-rule-spec), Threat Hunting Plan (security/threat-hunting-plan) | Turning findings into detection and response improvements |
Tabletop Exercise (security/tabletop-exercise) | Decision-making exercises alongside technical testing |
Standard and licence note
Based on Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Articles 26 and 27, Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (public EU law) and the TIBER-EU framework of the European
Central Bank (January 2025 edition; ECB copyright, freely available on the ECB
website). The phase structure, role names, deadlines and deliverable lists are summarised and
paraphrased in original words; no text is reproduced from the framework or its guidance
documents. CBEST is cited by name only. Deadlines, provider requirements and authority roles
can change through amendments, national implementations and new framework editions: check
the current consolidated text on EUR-Lex, the ECB TIBER-EU pages and your authority's
guidance before each engagement. This template is not legal advice; consult qualified
counsel on authorisation, employment and privacy limits of social engineering and physical
testing in each jurisdiction. Template licence: MIT.