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SOC Playbook Template (NIST SP 800-61r3, ATT&CK, D3FEND)

One incident type: triggers, triage, severity, containment decisions, eradication, recovery, evidence, notification clocks, ATT&CK, D3FEND, CSF 2.0

Ingeniería de seguridadCompletaNIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3; NIST CSF 2.0; MITRE ATT&CK v20; MITRE D3FEND 1.6.0socplaybook

Cómo usar: Use it when the SOC needs a repeatable response for one scenario such as a cloud key leak, business email compromise or ransomware. Fill the triggers, triage questions and containment decision points first, then the ATT&CK, D3FEND and CSF 2.0 mappings. The main pitfall is copying roles, severity levels and legal duties into the playbook instead of linking the incident response plan, severity matrix and IC handbook.

Vista previa

SOC Playbook: [Incident type, for example Cloud access key leak or credential compromise]

Playbook for one incident type that the security operations centre (SOC) runs the same way every time it occurs: triggers and detections, triage questions, severity mapping, containment options with decision points, eradication, recovery, evidence handling, notification clocks, MITRE ATT&CK techniques and MITRE D3FEND countermeasures, and the NIST CSF 2.0 Function behind each step. Based on NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community Profile (April 2025), the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSWP 29, February 2024), MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20 (October 2026) and MITRE D3FEND 1.6.0. Write one playbook per scenario (cloud key leak, business email compromise, ransomware) and keep the organisation-wide rules in the Incident Response Plan (compliance/incident-response-plan). Replace every [bracketed] value and every row marked Example. Worked examples use Corvid Commerce, a fictional SaaS company running on AWS, and the scenario "long-term cloud access key leaked and used by an unknown party".

Document control

FieldValue
Document ID[PB-CLD-002]
Playbook title[Example: Cloud access key leak or credential compromise]
Version[1.0]
Status[Draft / In review / Approved / Retired]
Owner[@soc-lead]
Approvers / reviewers[@ciso], [@incident-response-lead], [@cloud-platform-lead], [@legal-counsel], [@privacy-officer]
Last updatedYYYY-MM-DD
ClassificationConfidential (internal security procedure)
Scenario category[Example: Identity and access, cloud control plane]
Parent planIncident Response Plan (compliance/incident-response-plan), version [x.y]
Severity standardIncident Severity Matrix (ops/incident-severity-matrix), version [x.y]
Framework versions mappedNIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3; NIST CSF 2.0; MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise [v20]; MITRE D3FEND [1.6.0]
Linked detections[Example: DET-CLD-007, DET-CLD-003, DET-IDP-011]
Last testedYYYY-MM-DD ([tabletop / live incident / purple team])
Next reviewYYYY-MM-DD (at least annually, after each use, and after each ATT&CK release)

Approvals

RoleNameDecisionDate
Chief information security officer[@name][Approved / Changes requested]YYYY-MM-DD
Incident response lead[@name][Decision]YYYY-MM-DD
Cloud platform lead[@name][Decision]YYYY-MM-DD
Legal counsel[@name][Decision]YYYY-MM-DD
Privacy officer[@name][Decision]YYYY-MM-DD

Revision history

VersionDateAuthorChange summary
0.1YYYY-MM-DD[@name]First draft from the cloud key leak tabletop
0.2YYYY-MM-DD[@name]Example: Containment decision points reviewed with the cloud platform team
1.0YYYY-MM-DD[@name]Example: Approved; mapped to ATT&CK v20 (Stealth and Defense Impairment tactics)

Contents

1. Purpose, scope and boundaries

This playbook tells the SOC how to respond when a cloud credential that grants programmatic access is exposed or used by someone other than its owner. It covers detection, triage, containment, eradication, recovery, evidence and notification for that one scenario. The organisation-wide rules (authority to act, who declares an incident, regulatory duties, retention of incident records) live in the Incident Response Plan (compliance/incident-response-plan). Where the two disagree, the plan wins and this playbook is corrected.

In scope (Example):

  • Long-term access keys of cloud identity and access management (IAM) users, found in public or internal code, build logs, container images, tickets, chat or paste sites.
  • Keys or session tokens used from an unexpected network, region or client, even if no leak has been found yet.
  • Federated workforce credentials used to obtain cloud console or API sessions after a confirmed account takeover.

Out of scope (use the named playbook instead):

SituationUse instead
Phishing campaign against the workforce with no cloud access yet[PB-EML-001 Phishing and business email compromise]
Ransomware or destructive activity in workloads[PB-RAN-001 Ransomware]
Leaked secret that is not a cloud credential (database password, API token for a SaaS vendor)[PB-SEC-004 Secret exposure], following the Secrets Management Standard (security/secrets-management-standard)
Vulnerability report with no sign of exploitationVulnerability Management Policy (security/vulnerability-management-policy)

2. Playbook card

ItemSummary
GoalStop unauthorised use of the credential, establish what it did, restore a trusted state, meet notification duties
First 15 minutesConfirm the key and its owner, check recent use, open an incident if the key is valid or was used by an unknown party
First hourDeactivate the key (or contain with a deny policy if deactivation would cause a larger outage), block every temporary session issued before containment (user and role sessions), preserve logs, scope activity
Default severitySEV2 for a valid leaked production key; SEV1 if privileged use or data access by an unknown party is confirmed (section 6)
Incident rolesIncident commander, security incident lead as operations lead, cloud platform responder, scribe (section 3)
Do notDelete the IAM user or the key before evidence is preserved; post the key value in any channel; rotate silently without telling the owner
Done whenExit criteria in section 9.3 are met and the postmortem is scheduled

3. Roles and responsibilities

Role definitions, handover rules and the battle rhythm are defined in the Incident Commander Handbook (ops/incident-commander-handbook). This table only assigns the scenario-specific work.

R = responsible, A = accountable, C = consulted, I = informed.

ActivitySOC analystSecurity incident leadIncident commanderCloud platform responderKey owner (team)Legal and privacy
Triage and initial scopingRAICCI
Incident declarationCRAIII
Key deactivation and session revocationCAIRCI
Activity scoping and log analysisRAICCI
Workload replacement and secret rotationICIARI
Notification decisionICCIIA, R
Closure and postmortemCRACCC

On-call contacts (Example):

RoleRotation or contactBackup
SOC analyst (24x7)[SOC queue in the case management tool][SOC shift lead]
Security incident lead[@security-oncall][@ciso-delegate]
Cloud platform responder[@platform-oncall][@cloud-platform-lead]
Legal and privacy[@legal-oncall][@privacy-officer]

4. Triggers and detections

4.1 Triggers

Trigger IDSourceSignalFidelityDetection or intake
TRG-01 (Example)Secret scanning on code hostingCloud access key pattern found in a public repositoryHigh (key format verified, validity unknown)Secret scanning alert to SOC queue
TRG-02 (Example)Cloud provider noticeProvider reports an exposed key and may apply a quarantine policyHighMailbox and ticket integration
TRG-03 (Example)SIEMBurst of discovery API calls by a long-term key from outside known networksMediumDET-CLD-007, specified in Detection Rule Specification (security/detection-rule-spec)
TRG-04 (Example)SIEMAudit trail stopped, deleted or its configuration changedHighDET-CLD-003
TRG-05 (Example)SIEMAccess key created for a different IAM user than the callerMediumDET-CLD-005
TRG-06 (Example)Billing anomalyUnplanned GPU or large compute instances in an unused regionMediumCost anomaly alert, DET-CLD-009
TRG-07 (Example)Threat huntHunt finding escalated from a Threat Hunting Plan (security/threat-hunting-plan)VariesHunt escalation record
TRG-08 (Example)External reportResearcher or customer reports a credential in a public locationVariesVulnerability disclosure intake

4.2 Required telemetry

The steps below assume the following logs are collected and searchable for at least the retention period set in the Security Logging Standard (security/security-logging-standard). If a source is missing, record it as a gap in the incident record; it limits what scoping can prove.

Data sourceNeeded forRetention check
Cloud control plane audit log, all regions, management and data events for sensitive storageActivity scoping, timeline[Example: 13 months searchable]
Identity provider sign-in and federation logsLink a key or session to a person[Retention]
Code hosting audit log and secret scanning historyWhen and where the key was exposed[Retention]
CI/CD job logs and runner audit logsWhether pipelines used or printed the key[Retention]
Network flow logs for affected virtual networksData transfer volumes, attacker infrastructure[Retention]
Billing and usage dataResource hijacking scope[Retention]

5. Triage

5.1 Triage questions

Answer these in order and record each answer, with the evidence, in the case. Stop and go to section 7 as soon as question 2 is "yes" and question 3 is "yes" or "unknown".

#QuestionHow to answerOutcome
T1Which credential is it (key ID, account, principal) and who owns it?Look up the key ID in the cloud IAM inventory and the service catalogueOwner and business service identified
T2Is the credential valid and active right now?IAM console or API "last used" fields; never test the key by signing a request with itActive, inactive or deleted
T3Was it used by anyone other than its expected workload since the exposure time?Query the audit log by key ID from the earliest exposure time: source IP, network owner, user agent, region, API calls. List every GetSessionToken and GetFederationToken call signed with the key, because the temporary credentials they return carry a different key IDExpected only, unexpected, or unknown; list of temporary sessions minted with the key
T4What can it do?Effective permissions of the principal, including roles it can assume and resource policies that trust itPrivilege level: low, high, administrative
T5Where was it exposed, since when, and is it still exposed?Code hosting history, scanning alert timestamps, paste site, image layersExposure window and channel
T6Does the activity touch data classified confidential or personal?Map accessed resources to the data inventoryData impact: none, possible, confirmed
T7Are other credentials exposed in the same place?Scan the full repository history, image or log, not only the reported lineAdditional credentials listed

5.2 Triage outcomes

OutcomeCriteriaAction
False positivePattern match is not a real key, or a documented example keyClose with reason; tune the detection through its owner
Benign true positiveKey used only by its expected workload, no exposure (for example a new CI runner IP range)Close; update known-good lists via the detection tuning process
Exposure without misuseValid key exposed; no unexpected use foundDeclare incident (section 6), contain, rotate
CompromiseUnexpected use observed, or exposure plus missing logs for the windowDeclare incident, contain immediately, full scoping

6. Severity mapping

Severity levels, their response (paging, incident commander, status page, executive notification, postmortem) and the upgrade and downgrade rules are owned by the Incident Severity Matrix (ops/incident-severity-matrix). For this scenario, apply the most severe row that matches.

Scenario factsStarting level (Example mapping)Notes
Unknown party used a credential with administrative or data access in productionSEV1Matches "active attacker with privileged access" in the matrix (section 4.4)
Confirmed read or copy of confidential or personal dataSEV1Matches "confirmed unauthorised access to or exfiltration of confidential or personal data"; starts notification assessment (section 11)
Unknown party used a production credential without administrative or data access (for example enumeration only), scoping in progressSEV2Matches "credible indication of compromise under investigation"; upgrade to SEV1 on privileged use or data access
Valid production key exposed publicly, no misuse found yetSEV2Matches "leaked production secret", listed under the same SEV2 criterion
Valid key for a non-production account with no route to production data, contained with no evidence of data accessSEV3Matches "security event contained with no evidence of data access"; upgrade if the account trusts or is trusted by production
Key already inactive or deleted before exposure, no use in the windowSEV4Matches "security weakness with no sign of exploitation"; record and close after confirming no other credential in the leak

Re-assess severity at each status update. Upgrade as soon as scoping finds privileged use, persistence (new keys, users or roles) or data access.

7. Containment

7.1 Containment options

OptionActionEffectBusiness impactReversible
C1 Deactivate keySet the access key to inactiveStops new requests signed with that key. Does not end temporary sessions already minted with it (GetSessionToken, GetFederationToken), which stay valid until they expire, up to 36 hoursWorkloads using the key fail until a new secret is deployedYes (reactivate)
C2 Deny policyAttach an explicit deny-all policy to the principalBlocks the principal, its other keys and its existing temporary sessions, because permissions are evaluated on every requestSame as C1 for all of the principal's credentialsYes (detach)
C3 Block older sessionsFor the IAM user: attach an inline deny-all policy with the condition aws:TokenIssueTime earlier than the containment time (DateLessThan). For every role the principal can assume: use "Revoke active sessions" in the IAM console, which attaches the AWSRevokeOlderSessions inline policyStops temporary sessions issued before containment, including GetSessionToken and GetFederationToken sessions and assumed-role sessions. The condition only exists on temporary credentials, so it does not block the long-term key itself (C1 or C2 does)Legitimate sessions must be re-established; allow a few minutes for policy propagationYes (remove the policy after the old sessions have expired)
C4 Organisation guardrailApply a service control or organisation policy denying risky actions (audit log changes, key creation, new regions)Limits attacker options in all accountsLow if scoped to break-glass exceptionsYes
C5 Network restrictionAdd a condition that limits the principal to known source networksBlocks use from attacker infrastructureLow for workload identities with fixed egressYes
C6 Isolate resourcesQuarantine instances or functions created by the attacker (security group with no rules, stop not terminate)Stops hijacked compute and outbound trafficNone for attacker-created resourcesYes

C3 for the IAM user (Example, containment time 2026-09-15 11:36 UTC): attach as an inline policy named [INC-ID]-deny-older-sessions.

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "DenySessionsIssuedBeforeContainment",
      "Effect": "Deny",
      "Action": "*",
      "Resource": "*",
      "Condition": {
        "DateLessThan": { "aws:TokenIssueTime": "2026-09-15T11:36:00Z" }
      }
    }
  ]
}

Notes for C3: temporary credentials are valid until they expire (15 minutes to 36 hours), and deactivating or deleting the long-term key does not end them. Keep the policy in place until the longest possible session issued before containment has expired, then remove it and record the removal in the case. Resource-based policies (for example bucket policies) that trust the principal by ARN still need an explicit deny if C2 is not used.

7.2 Decision points

Decision rules (Example):

  1. DP-1: If unexpected use is observed, the security incident lead may deactivate the key without waiting for the owner, even if a production service fails. Inform the incident commander within 5 minutes.
  2. DP-2: If no misuse is observed and the key serves production, the owner gets at most 60 minutes to deploy a replacement before C1 is applied anyway. Record the decision and the time.
  3. DP-3: Never delete the key, the IAM user or attacker-created resources during containment. Deletion destroys metadata needed for scoping (section 10).
  4. DP-4: If the audit trail was stopped or modified, restore logging first (the configuration revert of E4, done early), apply C4 to deny further log changes, then continue. Activity during the gap is treated as unknown and scoped from other sources.

7.3 Containment verification

  • Key status shows inactive (or deny policy attached) and the change appears in the audit log.
  • No successful API call by the principal after the containment time, under any key ID: the long-term key and every temporary session key (prefix ASIA) whose session was issued to the user or to a role it can assume (query re-run 15 and 60 minutes later).
  • Every GetSessionToken and GetFederationToken call signed with the key during the exposure window is listed in the scoping record (T3), with the session expiry time.
  • The aws:TokenIssueTime deny policy is attached to the IAM user, and AWSRevokeOlderSessions to every role in the principal's trust path.
  • Attacker-created resources isolated and tagged incident=[INC-ID].

8. Eradication

StepActionVerification
E1List every identity change since the exposure start: new users, keys, roles, policies, trust relationships, federation settingsDiff of IAM state against the last known-good snapshot is empty apart from approved changes
E2Remove attacker-created keys, users, roles and policies after evidence captureAudit log shows deletions by the response principal
E3Terminate attacker-created compute, functions and storage after snapshots are taken where needed for evidenceBilling and inventory show no remaining resources tagged with the incident ID
E4Revert configuration changes (logging, network, encryption, resource policies)Configuration compliance checks pass for the affected accounts
E5Remove the secret from the exposure channel: rewrite history only if the repository owner agrees, and in every case treat the old key as permanently compromisedSecret scanning re-run shows no live credential
E6Fix the root cause: replace the long-term key with workload identity or short-lived credentialsOwner's change record, reviewed against the Secrets Management Standard (security/secrets-management-standard)

9. Recovery

9.1 Recovery steps

  1. Deploy the replacement credential, or preferably workload identity, through the normal change process with an expedited approval.
  2. Confirm that the business service is healthy against its service level objectives.
  3. Verify the integrity of restored or replaced resources: images from the trusted registry, infrastructure from code, data checked against the last known-good backup where data modification was possible.
  4. Keep heightened monitoring for [Example: 14 days]: a temporary detection on any use of the old key ID, on the attacker's source networks and on identity changes in the affected accounts.
  5. Update the status page and internal stakeholders according to the cadence of the current severity.

9.2 Recovery decision

The incident commander decides to start recovery when containment is verified and eradication steps E1 to E4 are complete. If the attacker had administrative access, the security incident lead must also agree that no persistence remains.

9.3 Exit criteria

  • No unexpected use of any affected credential for [Example: 72 hours] after eradication.
  • All triage questions answered, with remaining unknowns recorded.
  • Notification decisions recorded with their legal basis (section 11).
  • Root-cause fix (E6) done, or tracked with an owner and a date.
  • Postmortem scheduled using the Postmortem template (dev/postmortem).

10. Evidence handling

Follow the evidence rules of the Incident Response Plan. For this scenario, collect at least the following before eradication:

Evidence IDItemMethodIntegrityCustodian
EV-01 (Example)Audit log events for the key ID and principal from exposure start to nowExport query results to the evidence storeSHA-256 hash recorded in the case[@soc-analyst]
EV-02 (Example)IAM state snapshot of affected accounts (users, keys, roles, policies)Read-only inventory exportHash recorded[@cloud-responder]
EV-03 (Example)Exposure artefact (commit, image layer, paste)Archive with URL, commit ID and timestamps; redact the key value in copiesHash recorded[@soc-analyst]
EV-04 (Example)Disk snapshots of attacker-created instancesProvider snapshot, copied to the forensic accountSnapshot ID and hash[@cloud-responder]
EV-05 (Example)Decision log and timelineIncident channel export and case notesRead-only archive[@scribe]

Chain of custody rules:

  • Store evidence in a dedicated forensic account or bucket with object lock, access limited to the response team.
  • Record each transfer (who, when, why) in the case.
  • Keep evidence for the period set in the Incident Response Plan, or longer if legal counsel places a hold.

11. Communication and notification clocks

The Incident Response Plan (compliance/incident-response-plan) defines which laws, contracts and regulators apply and who decides. This scenario can start the clocks below. Record the "awareness" time in the case, because most clocks run from it.

Clock (Example)Starts whenDeadlineOwner
Personal data breach notice to the supervisory authority (GDPR Art. 33)Controller becomes aware of a personal data breachSee Incident Response Plan (compliance/incident-response-plan), section 10[@privacy-officer]
Significant incident notice under NIS2 (Art. 23) where the entity is in scopeEntity becomes aware of a significant incidentSee Incident Response Plan (compliance/incident-response-plan), section 10[@ciso]
Customer contractual noticeContract trigger met (for example confirmed customer data access)Per contract, see the customer register[@account-lead]
Cloud provider abuse or support caseAttacker resources foundAs soon as practical[@cloud-responder]

Internal communication follows the cadence of the current severity level. Never include the key value, full key ID or attacker indicators in open channels; use the private incident channel.

12. ATT&CK techniques and D3FEND countermeasures

ATT&CK Enterprise v20 uses Stealth (TA0005) and Defense Impairment (TA0112) where earlier releases used Defense Evasion. Several techniques were renumbered in that change; for example disabling cloud logs is now T1685.002 under Defense Impairment. Check each ID before reuse. The pairing of each technique with a D3FEND countermeasure below is this playbook's choice of the countermeasure it applies; use the D3FEND site to explore further countermeasures for each technique.

StepATT&CK tacticATT&CK technique (v20)D3FEND countermeasure (1.6.0)Playbook step
ExposureCredential AccessT1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In FilesD3-CRO Credential RotationE5, E6
Use of keyInitial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, StealthT1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud AccountsD3-UBA User Behavior Analysis; D3-CR Credential RevocationTRG-03, C1
DiscoveryDiscoveryT1087.004 Account Discovery: Cloud Account; T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery; T1619 Cloud Storage Object DiscoveryD3-RAPA Resource Access Pattern AnalysisT3, DET-CLD-007
PersistencePersistence, Privilege Escalation (T1098); Persistence (T1136.003)T1098.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials; T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles; T1136.003 Create Account: Cloud AccountD3-UAP User Account Permissions; D3-CCSA Credential Compromise Scope AnalysisE1, E2
Logging tamperingDefense ImpairmentT1685.002 Disable or Modify Tools: Disable or Modify Cloud LogD3-PM Platform MonitoringTRG-04, DP-4
Resource creationDefense ImpairmentT1578.002 Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Cloud InstanceD3-PM Platform MonitoringC6, E3
Data accessCollectionT1530 Data from Cloud StorageD3-RAPA Resource Access Pattern AnalysisT6
ExfiltrationExfiltrationT1537 Transfer Data to Cloud AccountD3-NTF Network Traffic FilteringT6, C5
ImpactImpactT1496.001 Resource Hijacking: Compute HijackingD3-PM Platform MonitoringTRG-06, C6
Session reuseLateral MovementT1550.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access TokenD3-ST Session TerminationC3

13. CSF 2.0 traceability per step

Playbook stepCSF 2.0 FunctionSubcategory (ID only, see CSF 2.0 for the text)Evidence of performance
Triggers and detections (4)DetectDE.CM-01, DE.CM-03, DE.CM-09, DE.AE-02, DE.AE-03Alert record, detection ID
Triage (5)Detect, RespondDE.AE-06, DE.AE-08, RS.MA-02Case with triage answers
Severity mapping (6)RespondRS.MA-03, RS.MA-04, RS.AN-08Severity history in case
Containment (7)RespondRS.MI-01Containment verification checklist
Eradication (8)RespondRS.MI-02IAM diff, change records
Analysis and evidence (5, 10)RespondRS.AN-03, RS.AN-06, RS.AN-07Evidence register, timeline
Notification (11)RespondRS.CO-02, RS.CO-03Notification log
Recovery (9)Respond, RecoverRS.MA-05, RC.RP-01, RC.RP-02, RC.RP-05, RC.RP-06Recovery decision and exit checklist
Recovery communication (9.1)RecoverRC.CO-03, RC.CO-04Status updates
Lessons learned (15)IdentifyID.IM-03, ID.IM-04Postmortem actions, playbook revision
Playbook ownership and approvalGovernGV.RR-02Document control

14. Metrics

MetricFormulaTarget (Example)
Time to containContainment verified time minus incident declared time, median per quarter60 minutes or less
Time to triageTriage outcome time minus alert time, median30 minutes or less for TRG-01 to TRG-04
Exposure windowContainment time minus earliest exposure timeTrend down quarter on quarter
Scoping completenessTriage questions answered with evidence divided by 7100% at closure
RecurrenceIncidents of this type for the same service within 12 months0
Long-term key reductionActive long-term cloud keys at quarter end divided by active keys at the previous quarter endBelow 1.0

Example (Corvid Commerce, Q3 2026): 4 cases. Median time to contain was 42 minutes (values 18, 35, 49 and 95 minutes; the median of the two middle values 35 and 49 is 42; INC-2026-0412 was the 49-minute case). Active long-term keys fell from 120 to 84, a ratio of 0.70.

15. Testing and maintenance

  • Run a discussion-based exercise of this scenario at least once a year using the Tabletop Exercise template (security/tabletop-exercise).
  • Validate the linked detections with test events after each change to the logging pipeline, using the test cases in section 8 of each Detection Rule Specification (security/detection-rule-spec).
  • After every real incident, the postmortem owner checks each step of this playbook against what happened and proposes changes.
  • Re-check ATT&CK and D3FEND IDs at each ATT&CK release (normally twice a year) and record the version in Document control.

Change log of lessons applied (Example):

SourceLessonChangeDate
INC-2026-0412 (Example)DP-1 applied after hunt escalation ESC-01 (10:42): incident declared 10:55, key deactivated 11:36 (54 minutes after escalation), containment verified 11:44. Most of the delay was finding the owner of svc-reporting, who was not recorded in the IAM inventory; the reporting job outage was acceptedOwner contact made a mandatory field in the IAM inventory; DP-1 deactivation target set at 30 minutes after escalation; workload identity migration added as E6YYYY-MM-DD
TTX-2026-03 (Example)Analysts did not know where the IAM snapshot tool livedEV-02 now names the tool and runbookYYYY-MM-DD

16. Glossary and references

TermMeaning in this playbook
Long-term access keyA static credential for programmatic access that does not expire by itself
Session revocationDenying all requests made with temporary credentials issued before a given time, using a deny policy with an aws:TokenIssueTime condition (for roles, the console "Revoke active sessions" action)
ContainmentActions that stop the incident from spreading or continuing
EradicationRemoval of attacker artefacts and of the root cause
Awareness timeThe time the organisation had reasonable certainty that an incident occurred; starts most legal clocks
Workload identityShort-lived credentials issued to a workload by the platform instead of a stored secret
ReferenceUse
NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3, April 2025, csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/61/r3/finalIncident response recommendations aligned with CSF 2.0
NIST CSWP 29, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, 26 February 2024Functions and Subcategory IDs (section 13)
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20, 13 October 2026, attack.mitre.orgTechniques (section 12)
MITRE D3FEND 1.6.0, d3fend.mitre.orgCountermeasures (section 12)
Incident Response Plan (compliance/incident-response-plan)Authority, notification duties, evidence retention
Incident Severity Matrix (ops/incident-severity-matrix)Severity levels
Incident Commander Handbook (ops/incident-commander-handbook)Roles and battle rhythm
Detection Rule Specification (security/detection-rule-spec)DET-CLD-007 logic and tests
Threat Hunting Plan (security/threat-hunting-plan)Hunt escalations into this playbook
Security Logging Standard (security/security-logging-standard)Required logs and retention
Tabletop Exercise (security/tabletop-exercise)Testing this playbook
Postmortem (dev/postmortem)Post-incident review
Threat Model (security/threat-model)Threats that justify this playbook

Standard and licence note

Based on NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 (April 2025) and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (CSWP 29, February 2024), which are works of the United States Government and not subject to copyright in the United States. Function and Subcategory IDs are cited; all explanations are original text. MITRE ATT&CK technique and tactic names and IDs are used under the ATT&CK terms of use: The MITRE Corporation (MITRE) hereby grants you a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use ATT&CK® for research, development, and commercial purposes. Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE's copyright designation and this license in any such copy. "© 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation." MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE D3FEND technique names and IDs are used under the D3FEND Terms of Use (non-exclusive, royalty-free licence for research, development and commercial purposes, provided MITRE's copyright designation and that licence are kept); © 2025 The MITRE Corporation; MITRE D3FEND is a trademark of The MITRE Corporation. AWS is a trademark of Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates, and other product names are trademarks of their owners; this template is not affiliated with or endorsed by them. The AWS IAM behaviour in section 7 follows the AWS IAM User Guide as checked in October 2026. Legal deadlines are kept in the Incident Response Plan; this is a documentation format, not legal advice. Check the current official versions at nist.gov, attack.mitre.org and d3fend.mitre.org before use. Original text written for this collection. Template licence: MIT.

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