DORA ICT Risk Management Framework: [Financial entity name]
The framework document that sets out how a financial entity governs,
identifies, protects against, detects, responds to, recovers from and
learns from ICT risk under Chapter II of the Digital Operational
Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, DORA, Articles 5 to 16),
with the policies, procedures and review report that Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 (the RTS on the ICT risk management
framework) specifies. It holds the digital operational resilience
strategy, the ICT risk tolerance, the risk assessment method, the
policy map, the yearly review and the traceability from each legal
requirement to the document and evidence that meets it. DORA has
applied since 17 January 2025; check the consolidated texts on EUR-Lex
and your competent authority's expectations before use. Replace every
[bracketed] value and every row marked Example. This is a
documentation format, not legal advice; check the current official
text and a qualified professional.
Document control
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Document ID | [DORA-RMF-001] |
| Financial entity | [Legal name], LEI [20-character LEI] |
| DORA entity type (Article 2(1)) | [Credit institution / Investment firm / Payment institution / Insurance undertaking / Other] |
| Framework applied | [Full framework (Articles 5 to 15) / Simplified framework (Article 16)] |
| Group scope | [Solo / Sub-consolidated / Consolidated, list of entities in section 1.4] |
| Competent authority | [Name, Member State] |
| ICT risk control function | [Name of function, head] |
| Version | [0.1] |
| Status | [Draft / In review / Approved by management body / Superseded] |
| Owner | [@head-of-ict-risk] |
| Approvers/reviewers | [@management-body], [@cro], [@ciso], [@cio], [@head-of-internal-audit] (review only), [@compliance] |
| Management body approval date | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Next scheduled review | YYYY-MM-DD (at least yearly, Article 6(5)) |
| Last updated | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Classification | [Confidential] |
Approvals
| Role | Name | Decision | Date |
|---|
| Management body (resolution reference) | [@chair] | [Approve / Approve with conditions / Return] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Chief risk officer | [@name] | [Recommend for approval] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Head of ICT risk control function | [@name] | [Author sign-off] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Chief information officer | [@name] | [Acknowledge first-line duties] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Head of internal audit | [@name] | [Reviewed for audit planning, no approval role] | YYYY-MM-DD |
Revision history
| Version | Date | Author | Change summary |
|---|
| 0.1 | YYYY-MM-DD | [@name] | First draft from gap assessment |
| 1.0 | YYYY-MM-DD | [@name] | Example: Approved by management body, resolution MB-2025-014 |
| 1.1 | YYYY-MM-DD | [@name] | Example: Unscheduled review after major ICT-related incident INC-2026-007; tolerance for card authorisation tightened |
Contents
1. Purpose, scope and legal basis
1.1 Purpose
This document establishes the ICT risk management framework of
[Entity]. It describes how the entity keeps a high level of digital
operational resilience: how ICT risk is governed, measured and kept
within the tolerance the management body has set, and how the entity
continues to deliver its critical or important functions when ICT
systems fail or are attacked. It is part of the entity's overall risk
management system and uses the same risk taxonomy, committees and
reporting lines.
1.2 Legal basis
| Provision | What it requires (paraphrase) | Where handled |
|---|
| DORA Article 5 | Internal governance and control framework for ICT risk; management body defines, approves, oversees and is accountable for the framework | Section 2 |
| DORA Article 6(1) to (3) | Sound, comprehensive, documented framework that protects information and ICT assets and physical components; complete and current information to the competent authority on request | Sections 1, 6, 7 |
| DORA Article 6(4) | Independent control function for ICT risk; segregation of risk management, control and internal audit (three lines of defence or equivalent) | Section 2.3 |
| DORA Article 6(5) | Review at least yearly and after major ICT-related incidents, supervisory instructions or testing and audit conclusions; review report on request | Section 13 |
| DORA Article 6(6), (7) | Regular internal audit by qualified, independent auditors; formal follow-up of findings | Section 12 |
| DORA Article 6(8) | Digital operational resilience strategy with eight elements, points (a) to (h) | Section 3 |
| DORA Article 6(9), (10) | Optional multi-vendor strategy; option to outsource verification tasks while staying responsible | Sections 3.3, 12.3 |
| DORA Articles 7 to 14 | ICT systems and tools, identification, protection and prevention, detection, response and recovery, backup and restoration, learning and evolving, communication | Sections 6 to 9 |
| DORA Article 16 | Simplified framework for the entities listed in Article 16(1) | Section 1.3 |
| Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, Title II | ICT security policies, procedures, protocols and tools (Articles 2 to 26) and the review report (Article 27) | Sections 5, 7, 8, 13 |
| Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, Title III | Simplified framework content (Articles 28 to 41) | Section 1.3 |
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 was adopted on 13 March 2024 and
published in the Official Journal on 25 June 2024. It applies from the
DORA application date. Check the consolidated texts and any later
amendments before relying on article numbers.
1.3 Full or simplified framework
| Question | Answer | Evidence |
|---|
| Is the entity a small and non-interconnected investment firm, an exempted payment institution, an institution exempted under Directive 2013/36/EU that the Member State has kept in DORA scope (it has decided not to use the Article 2(4) exclusion option), an exempted electronic money institution, or a small institution for occupational retirement provision? | [Yes / No] | [Licence, legal opinion reference] |
| If yes, framework applied | [Simplified, RTS Title III, Articles 28 to 41] | [Reference] |
| If no, is the entity a microenterprise? | [Yes / No] | [Headcount and turnover figures] |
| Proportionality factors considered (RTS Article 1) | [Size, overall risk profile, nature, scale and complexity of services, activities and operations] | [Section 3.1] |
Example: Corvellan Bank AG is a credit institution with about 1,400
staff. It is not in the Article 16(1) list and is not a microenterprise,
so it applies the full framework.
1.4 Entities and perimeter
| Entity | LEI | Role in group | Framework owner | Notes |
|---|
| Corvellan Bank AG (Example) | [LEI] | Parent, credit institution | Head of ICT risk | Full framework |
| Corvellan Payments GmbH (Example) | [LEI] | Payment institution subsidiary | Group framework adopted by board resolution | Local addendum for card scheme rules |
| [Entity] | [LEI] | [Role] | [Owner] | [Notes] |
1.5 Other jurisdictions
Groups with operations outside the EU map this framework to local
regimes rather than run parallel documents. Two common examples, named
for orientation only: in the United Kingdom, the PRA's supervisory
statement SS1/21 on operational resilience and impact tolerances for
important business services, with the FCA's matching rules; in the
United States, the interagency paper on sound practices to strengthen
operational resilience (Federal Reserve SR 20-24, issued 2 November 2020
and revised 2 June 2026). Check each regulator's current text.
2. Governance and organisation
2.1 Management body responsibilities (Article 5(2))
| Point | Duty (paraphrase) | How it is met | Evidence |
|---|
| (a) | Ultimate responsibility for managing ICT risk | Framework approved by management body; ICT risk standing item at risk committee | [Minutes reference] |
| (b) | Policies that keep data available, authentic, intact and confidential | Approves ICT security policy set (section 7) | [Approval records] |
| (c) | Clear roles and responsibilities for ICT functions, with governance for communication and coordination | Approves section 2.2 RACI | [This document, version] |
| (d) | Sets and approves the digital operational resilience strategy, including ICT risk tolerance | Sections 3 and 4 | [Resolution reference] |
| (e) | Approves, oversees and reviews the ICT business continuity policy and response and recovery plans | Yearly approval cycle | [Approval records] |
| (f) | Approves and reviews ICT internal audit plans and material changes | Audit committee, then management body | [Audit plan approval] |
| (g) | Allocates and reviews budget for digital operational resilience, including awareness and training | Annual budget line, reviewed mid-year | [Budget paper] |
| (h) | Approves and reviews the policy on use of ICT services from third-party providers | Section 10 | [Policy approval] |
| (i) | Reporting channels on third-party arrangements, material changes and at least major ICT-related incidents | Quarterly ICT risk report; ad hoc incident briefings | [Report pack] |
Article 5(4) requires management body members to keep sufficient
knowledge and skills to understand and assess ICT risk, including
through regular, specific training. Record the training plan here:
[training provider, topics, dates, attendance].
Article 5(3) requires entities other than microenterprises either to
establish a role to monitor arrangements with ICT third-party service
providers or to designate a senior manager for that exposure. Name the
holder: [role, person].
2.2 Roles and responsibilities
| Activity | Management body | ICT risk control function (2nd line) | CIO and ICT operations (1st line) | CISO | Business function owners | Internal audit (3rd line) |
|---|
| Approve strategy and tolerance | A | R | C | C | C | I |
| Maintain risk methodology | I | A | C | C | C | I |
| Identify and assess ICT risk | I | A | R | R | R | I |
| Implement controls | I | C | A | R | R | I |
| Monitor KRIs and tolerance | I | A | R | R | C | I |
| Yearly review and report | A | R | C | C | C | C |
| Independent audit of framework | I | I | I | I | I | A |
R responsible, A accountable, C consulted, I informed.
2.3 Control function and lines of defence (Article 6(4))
The ICT risk control function sits in the risk management division and
reports to the chief risk officer. It does not operate ICT systems and
does not approve its own changes. Internal audit is separate from both
the first and second lines. Describe the model in one paragraph and
attach the organisation chart: [reference].
Independence test: [state how conflicts are avoided, for example the
head of the function has direct access to the risk committee and cannot
be dismissed without management body approval].
3. Digital operational resilience strategy
3.1 Strategy elements
| Point | Element (paraphrase) | Content for [Entity] |
|---|
| (a) | How the framework supports the business strategy and objectives | Example: Growth in SME lending depends on the digital onboarding channel; the framework prioritises its availability and fraud resistance |
| (b) | ICT risk tolerance level in line with risk appetite, and impact tolerance for ICT disruptions | Section 4 |
| (c) | Information security objectives, with key performance indicators and key risk metrics | Section 3.2 |
| (d) | ICT reference architecture and changes needed to reach business objectives | Example: Move from one primary data centre to an active-active design across two sites by Q4 2027 |
| (e) | Mechanisms to detect ICT-related incidents, prevent their impact and protect against it | Sections 7 and 8 |
| (f) | Current digital operational resilience position, based on major ICT-related incidents reported and the effectiveness of preventive measures | Section 3.4 |
| (g) | Digital operational resilience testing under DORA Chapter IV | Section 11 |
| (h) | Communication strategy for ICT-related incidents whose disclosure Article 14 requires | Section 9.2 |
3.2 Objectives and indicators
| ID | Objective | Indicator (KPI or KRI) | Target | Current | Status |
|---|
| OBJ-01 (Example) | Close exposure to known exploited vulnerabilities quickly | Share of critical patches applied within 14 days (KPI) | 95% | 91% | Amber |
| OBJ-02 (Example) | Keep critical services within impact tolerance | Number of tolerance breaches in 12 months (KRI) | 0 | 1 | Red |
| OBJ-03 (Example) | Restrict privileged access | Privileged accounts reviewed each quarter (KPI) | 100% | 100% | Green |
| OBJ-04 (Example) | Prove recoverability | Critical services with a successful restore test in 12 months (KPI) | 100% | 8 of 9 (89%) | Amber |
| [OBJ-NN] | [Objective] | [Indicator] | [Target] | [Value] | [Status] |
3.3 Multi-vendor strategy (optional, Article 6(9))
If the entity adopts a multi-vendor ICT strategy, state the key
dependencies on ICT third-party service providers and the reasons for
the mix of providers. Example: Corvellan Bank AG uses two cloud
providers for customer-facing workloads so that the mobile app can run
in either; the core banking platform stays with one provider and is
covered by the exit plan in the register of information.
3.4 Current resilience position
| Measure | Last 12 months | Previous 12 months | Comment |
|---|
| Major ICT-related incidents reported to the competent authority | Example: 2 | Example: 3 | Classification under Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772 |
| Significant cyber threats notified voluntarily | [n] | [n] | [Comment] |
| Preventive control effectiveness (controls tested effective / tested) | Example: 46 of 50 (92%) | Example: 41 of 48 (85%) | Section 12 |
| Open high-severity audit findings | Example: 3 | Example: 5 | Section 12.2 |
4. ICT risk tolerance and impact tolerances
4.1 ICT risk tolerance statements
| ID | Tolerance statement | Metric and limit | Escalation when breached |
|---|
| TOL-01 (Example) | The bank does not accept residual ICT risks rated 10 or higher (on the 5 by 5 scale in section 5.2) without management body acceptance | Residual score of 10 or more needs management body acceptance | Risk committee within 10 business days |
| TOL-02 (Example) | No critical or important function is unavailable longer than its impact tolerance | See section 4.2 | Immediate incident escalation |
| TOL-03 (Example) | No loss of committed customer transactions | Recovery point objective 0 for payment ledger | CIO and CRO |
| [TOL-NN] | [Statement] | [Limit] | [Route] |
4.2 Impact tolerances for critical or important functions
| Function | Critical or important | Maximum tolerable disruption | Recovery time objective | Recovery point objective | Basis |
|---|
| Card authorisation (Example) | Yes | 2 hours | 1 hour | 0 | Scheme rules, customer harm analysis |
| Retail payments (SEPA credit transfer) (Example) | Yes | 4 hours | 2 hours | 0 | Settlement deadlines |
| Mobile and online banking (Example) | Yes | 8 hours | 4 hours | 15 minutes | Customer impact and complaint volume |
| Regulatory reporting (Example) | Yes | 3 business days | 1 business day | 24 hours | Reporting deadlines |
| [Function] | [Yes / No] | [Duration] | [Duration] | [Duration] | [Rationale] |
The recovery time objective is shorter than the maximum tolerable
disruption so that there is time to detect, decide and invoke before the
tolerance is breached. Link each function to its business impact
analysis in compliance/business-continuity.
5. ICT risk management policy and methodology
5.1 Policy content (RTS Article 3(1))
| Point | Required content (paraphrase) | Where in this framework |
|---|
| (a) | Indication that the ICT risk tolerance has been approved | Section 4, approval in Document control |
| (b) | Procedure and method for ICT risk assessment: identify vulnerabilities and threats to business functions, ICT systems and assets; quantitative or qualitative indicators for impact and likelihood | Section 5.2 |
| (c) | Procedure to identify, implement and document treatment measures, including those to bring risk within tolerance | Section 5.3 |
| (d) | Residual risk: identify it, assign who may accept risks above tolerance, keep an inventory with justification, review accepted risks at least yearly | Section 5.4 |
| (e) | Monitor changes in the ICT risk and cyber threat landscape, internal and external vulnerabilities and threats, and ICT risk so changes to the risk profile are detected promptly | Sections 5.5, 8 |
| (f) | Process to take account of changes to the business strategy and the resilience strategy | Section 13.1 |
RTS Article 3(2) adds that the treatment procedure monitors the
effectiveness of measures, checks whether tolerance levels have been
reached, and checks whether corrective or improving actions were taken
where needed. Section 5.3 covers these three checks.
5.2 Assessment method
Likelihood and impact are each rated from 1 to 5. The risk score is
likelihood multiplied by impact (range 1 to 25). Bands: 1 to 9 within
tolerance, 10 to 14 elevated (treat, or accept at management body level
under TOL-01), 15 to 25 outside tolerance (treat as a priority).
| Rating | Likelihood (12-month horizon) | Impact (worst credible of financial, customer, regulatory, operational) |
|---|
| 1 | Rare: not expected, under 5% | Negligible: no customer impact, loss under EUR 50,000 |
| 2 | Unlikely: 5% to 20% | Minor: short disruption inside impact tolerance |
| 3 | Possible: 20% to 50% | Moderate: disruption near tolerance, limited data exposure |
| 4 | Likely: 50% to 80% | Major: tolerance breach for one function, reportable incident |
| 5 | Almost certain: over 80% | Severe: several functions down, large data breach, supervisory action |
Example thresholds above are illustrative; calibrate them to the
entity's risk appetite and the group risk taxonomy in
compliance/risk-methodology.
5.3 Risk assessment and treatment extract
| Risk ID | Risk (cause, event, consequence) | Function | Inherent L x I | Inherent score | Treatment | Residual L x I | Residual score | Owner | Status |
|---|
| ICT-R-001 (Example) | Single primary data centre; site loss stops card authorisation beyond tolerance | Card authorisation | 3 x 5 | 15 | Active-active second site (project PRJ-021) | 2 x 4 | 8 | CIO | In progress |
| ICT-R-002 (Example) | Internet-facing VPN appliance with known exploited vulnerability; intrusion into internal network | All | 4 x 4 | 16 | Emergency patch, MFA, appliance replacement | 2 x 4 | 8 | CISO | Done |
| ICT-R-003 (Example) | Legacy payment gateway past vendor support; unpatched flaws and no expert staff | Retail payments | 3 x 4 | 12 | Compensating controls (segmentation, extra monitoring); replacement in 2027 | 3 x 4 | 12 | Head of payments | Accepted, see 5.4 |
| ICT-R-004 (Example) | Misuse of privileged database accounts; data altered or exfiltrated | All | 2 x 5 | 10 | Privileged access management, session recording | 1 x 5 | 5 | CISO | Done |
For each treatment, record the three RTS Article 3(2) checks: is the
measure effective (test result), is the risk now within tolerance
(residual score), and were further actions taken where needed.
5.4 Accepted residual risk inventory (RTS Article 3(1)(d))
| Risk ID | Residual score | Above tolerance? | Justification | Accepted by | Acceptance date | Next review |
|---|
| ICT-R-003 (Example) | 12 | Yes (TOL-01) | Replacement contracted for Q2 2027; compensating controls tested effective; earlier migration would add change risk during peak season | Management body, resolution MB-2026-031 | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD (12 months or earlier on change) |
| [ICT-R-NNN] | [n] | [Yes / No] | [Reason] | [Body or role] | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
At each yearly review, confirm for each accepted risk: what has changed,
which new mitigations are available, and whether the reasons for
acceptance still hold.
5.5 Threat and vulnerability monitoring
| Source | Frequency | Owner | Feeds |
|---|
| Threat intelligence feeds and sector information sharing (DORA Article 45 arrangements) | Continuous | CISO | Risk reassessment, detection rules |
| Vulnerability scans, internal and external | Weekly | ICT operations | Patch management, ICT-R entries |
| Supplier security notifications | On receipt | Third-party risk | Register of information, risk register |
| Changes in the network or infrastructure (DORA Article 8(3)) | Each major change | Change advisory board | Risk assessment before change |
| [Source] | [Frequency] | [Owner] | [Feeds] |
6. Identification of functions, assets and dependencies
6.1 What is identified
Under DORA Article 8, the entity identifies, classifies and documents
its ICT-supported business functions, roles and responsibilities, the
information assets and ICT assets that support them, and their roles and
dependencies with respect to ICT risk. It reviews this at least yearly.
It identifies all sources of ICT risk, including exposure to and from
other financial entities, and assesses the cyber threats and
vulnerabilities relevant to its functions and assets. It performs a
risk assessment on each major change in network and information system
infrastructure and in processes or procedures (Article 8(3)). It runs a
specific ICT risk assessment on all legacy ICT systems at least yearly
and before and after connecting new technologies, applications or
systems (Article 8(7)). Both duties apply to entities other than
microenterprises.
6.2 Asset management policy and procedure (RTS Articles 4 and 5)
| Required element (paraphrase) | Where documented | Owner |
|---|
| Monitoring of ICT assets across their lifecycle | [Asset management policy, section] | [Owner] |
| Record per asset: unique identifier, location, classification, owner, business functions supported, continuity requirements, external network exposure, links to other assets and functions, end-of-support dates for third-party assets | [CMDB field list] | [Owner] |
| Risk assessment of legacy ICT systems | [Procedure] | [Owner] |
| Asset management procedure covering the criteria for criticality of information and ICT assets supporting business functions | [Procedure] | [Owner] |
6.3 Function to asset mapping extract
| Function | Critical or important | Supporting ICT assets | Third-party providers | Inventory reference |
|---|
| Card authorisation (Example) | Yes | Card switch, HSM cluster, fraud scoring service | Card processor, HSM vendor | CMDB-SVC-004 |
| Mobile banking (Example) | Yes | Mobile API gateway, identity provider, core banking APIs | Cloud provider A | CMDB-SVC-011 |
| [Function] | [Yes / No] | [Assets] | [Providers] | [Reference] |
Keep this mapping consistent with function identifiers in the register
of information (compliance/dora-ict-third-party-register, template
B_06.01).
7. Policy and procedure map
7.1 General elements of ICT security policies (RTS Article 2)
Each ICT security policy, procedure, protocol and tool listed below must
show: approval by the management body or delegated authority, alignment
with the entity's information security objectives, roles and
responsibilities, the measures that apply to staff and providers, the
exception process, and the review cycle. Check that every row in 7.2
meets these elements before the yearly review.
7.2 Map
| Area | RTS article | Document | Owner | Last approved | Next review |
|---|
| ICT risk management policy and procedures | 3 | This framework, section 5 | Head of ICT risk | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| ICT asset management policy and procedure | 4, 5 | [Policy ID] | CIO | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Encryption, cryptographic controls and key management | 6, 7 | [Policy ID] | CISO | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| ICT operations, capacity and performance | 8, 9 | [Policy ID] | Head of ICT operations | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Vulnerability and patch management | 10 | ops/patch-management-policy | CISO | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Data and system security | 11 | [Policy ID] | CISO | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Logging | 12 | [Policy ID] | CISO | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Network security and information in transit | 13, 14 | [Policy ID] | Head of network | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| ICT project management | 15 | [Policy ID] | PMO | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Acquisition, development and maintenance | 16 | [Policy ID] | CIO | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| ICT change management | 17 | [Policy ID] | Change manager | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Physical and environmental security | 18 | [Policy ID] | Facilities | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Human resources policy (ICT aspects) | 19 | [Policy ID] | HR | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Identity management and access control | 20, 21 | [Policy ID] | CISO | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| ICT-related incident management policy | 22 | compliance/incident-response-plan | CISO | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Anomaly detection and incident detection criteria | 23 | [Procedure ID] | SOC lead | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| ICT business continuity policy | 24 | compliance/business-continuity | Head of BCM | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Testing of ICT business continuity plans | 25 | [Test plan ID] | Head of BCM | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| ICT response and recovery plans | 26 | ops/disaster-recovery-plan | CIO | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Backup policy and restoration (DORA Article 12) | 11, 24 | ops/backup-policy | Head of ICT operations | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
7.3 Exceptions
| Exception ID | Policy and requirement | Reason | Compensating control | Risk ID | Approved by | Expiry |
|---|
| EXC-007 (Example) | Patch policy, critical patches within 14 days | Legacy payment gateway cannot be patched by vendor | Network isolation, enhanced monitoring | ICT-R-003 | CRO | YYYY-MM-DD |
| [EXC-NNN] | [Policy, clause] | [Reason] | [Control] | [ICT-R-NNN] | [Role] | YYYY-MM-DD |
8. Detection, response and recovery
8.1 Detection (DORA Article 10, RTS Article 23)
The entity has mechanisms to detect anomalous activities promptly,
including network performance issues and ICT-related incidents, with
several layers of control, alert thresholds and criteria that trigger
incident response. Describe: monitoring coverage (which systems, which
logs), the alert thresholds, the criteria used to escalate an anomaly to
an incident, and the link to incident classification under Delegated
Regulation (EU) 2024/1772.
| Detection layer | Coverage | Tool or service | Owner | Tested |
|---|
| Security monitoring (SOC) (Example) | All production systems, identity, cloud control plane | SIEM with 24x7 managed service | SOC lead | Quarterly purple-team exercise |
| Application performance (Example) | Customer channels, payments | APM and synthetic transactions | Head of ICT operations | Monthly threshold review |
| [Layer] | [Coverage] | [Tool] | [Owner] | [Test] |
8.2 Response and recovery (DORA Articles 11 and 12, RTS Articles 24 to 26)
| Element | Requirement (paraphrase) | Document | Last test | Result |
|---|
| ICT business continuity policy | Dedicated policy, part of the overall business continuity policy, approved by the management body | compliance/business-continuity | n/a | n/a |
| Business impact analysis | Assess exposure to severe disruption, quantitatively and qualitatively | [BIA reference] | YYYY-MM-DD | [Result] |
| ICT response and recovery plans | Plans per critical or important function, with scenarios | ops/disaster-recovery-plan | YYYY-MM-DD | [Result] |
| Testing of plans | Tested at least yearly and after substantive changes, including cyber-attack scenarios and switchover to redundant capacity (DORA Article 11(6)) | [Test report] | YYYY-MM-DD | Example: Card authorisation switchover met 1-hour RTO (52 minutes) |
| Backup and restoration | Backup policies, restoration and recovery methods, segregated backups, restore tests | ops/backup-policy | YYYY-MM-DD | Example: 8 of 9 critical services restored within RTO |
| Crisis management function | Activation criteria, decision rights, communication | [Crisis plan] | YYYY-MM-DD | [Result] |
9. Learning, evolving and communication
9.1 Learning and evolving (DORA Article 13)
| Input | Process | Output | Owner |
|---|
| Major ICT-related incidents | Post-incident review with root cause, within [n] business days of closure | Lessons log, risk register updates, framework change requests | Head of ICT risk |
| Resilience testing results | Findings triage | Remediation plan, KRI updates | CISO |
| Technology and threat developments | Horizon scanning | Strategy update input | CIO, CISO |
| Staff awareness and training | Yearly programme for all staff, specific training for ICT staff and management body | Completion records | HR, CISO |
Senior ICT staff report the lessons learned, with recommendations, to
the management body at least yearly (DORA Article 13(5)). ICT security
awareness and digital operational resilience training are compulsory
modules for all staff and senior management (Article 13(6)).
9.2 Communication (DORA Article 14)
| Element | Content | Owner |
|---|
| Crisis communication plan | Responsible disclosure of major ICT-related incidents or significant vulnerabilities to clients, counterparts and the public | Head of communications |
| Internal communication | Who informs staff, what they are told, by which channel | Head of ICT risk |
| Designated person | At least one person tasked with the communication strategy for ICT-related incidents and public and media relations | [Name, role] |
| Regulatory reporting | Major incident notifications on the DORA clocks | compliance/dora-major-incident-report |
10. ICT third-party risk link
| Item | Where it lives | Owner |
|---|
| Strategy on ICT third-party risk, including the policy on services supporting critical or important functions | [Policy ID] | Senior manager under Article 5(3) |
| Register of information | compliance/dora-ict-third-party-register | Head of third-party risk |
| Pre-contract assessment and due diligence | compliance/supplier-security-assessment | Procurement |
| Concentration risk assessment (Article 29) | Register of information, section on concentration | Head of third-party risk |
| Exit strategies for services supporting critical or important functions | [Exit plan references] | Function owners |
Third-party risks appear in the ICT risk register with the provider
identifier from the register of information so that both views stay
reconciled.
11. Digital operational resilience testing
11.1 Testing programme
| Test type | Scope | Frequency | Last run | Next run | Report |
|---|
| Vulnerability assessments and scans | All internet-facing and critical systems | [Weekly / Monthly] | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD | [Ref] |
| Network security assessments | Core network, segmentation | [Yearly] | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD | [Ref] |
| Penetration tests | Systems supporting critical or important functions | Risk-based; every system supporting a critical or important function gets appropriate tests at least yearly (Article 24(6)) | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD | security/pentest-report |
| Scenario-based and switchover tests | Critical or important functions | Yearly | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD | [Ref] |
| Source code review | In-house critical applications | Per release | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD | [Ref] |
| Threat-led penetration testing (DORA Article 26) | Critical or important functions as scoped with the TLPT authority | At least every three years, if required | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD | security/red-team-engagement-plan |
The DORA Article 25 list of test types includes vulnerability
assessments and scans, open source analyses, network security
assessments, gap analyses, physical security reviews, questionnaires and
scanning software solutions, source code reviews where feasible,
scenario-based tests, compatibility testing, performance testing,
end-to-end testing and penetration testing. Choose a risk-based mix and
explain omissions.
11.2 Independence of testers
Record whether each test is internal or external and how independence
is assured (DORA Article 24(4) and, for TLPT, Article 27). [Describe.]
12. Internal audit and follow-up of findings
12.1 Audit coverage
| Audit area | Last audit | Rating | Next audit | Auditor qualifications |
|---|
| ICT risk management framework (whole) (Example) | 2026-03 | Needs improvement | 2027-03 | CISA, two staff with cloud security certification |
| Business continuity and recovery (Example) | 2025-11 | Satisfactory | 2026-11 | [Qualifications] |
| [Area] | YYYY-MM | [Rating] | YYYY-MM | [Qualifications] |
12.2 Findings follow-up
| Finding ID | Source | Severity | Description | Action | Owner | Due | Verified closed |
|---|
| AUD-2026-04 (Example) | Internal audit | High | Restore tests not run for one critical service | Add service to quarterly restore schedule | Head of ICT operations | 2026-09-30 | [Date, by whom] |
| AUD-2026-05 (Example) | Internal audit | High | Accepted residual risks not reviewed in 12 months | Add review step to yearly cycle (section 5.4) | Head of ICT risk | 2026-06-30 | YYYY-MM-DD, internal audit |
| [ID] | [Source] | [Severity] | [Description] | [Action] | [Owner] | YYYY-MM-DD | [Evidence] |
Critical ICT audit findings are verified and remediated on a timeline
set in the audit follow-up procedure: [state rule, for example
remediation plan within 30 days and closure verified by internal
audit].
12.3 Outsourced verification (Article 6(10))
If compliance verification is outsourced to an intra-group or external
undertaking, name it, the scope and the contract reference. The entity
remains fully responsible.
13. Framework review and review report
13.1 Review triggers and cycle
| Trigger | Response |
|---|
| Yearly cycle | Full review, report to management body in [month] |
| Major ICT-related incident | Unscheduled review within [n] business days of the final report; report lists the incidents with root cause analysis |
| Supervisory instruction | Review of the scope instructed; report references the instruction |
| Testing or audit conclusions | Review of affected sections; report references the conclusions |
| Change in business strategy or resilience strategy (RTS Article 3(1)(f)) | Strategy and tolerance review |
13.2 Review report outline (RTS Article 27(2))
| Point | Content (paraphrase) | Entry |
|---|
| (a) | Introduction: entity and group structure; context of services, organisation, critical functions, strategy, major projects and dependence on ICT; summary of major changes since the previous report; executive summary of current and near-term ICT risk profile, threat landscape, control effectiveness and security posture | [Text] |
| (b) | Date the management body approved the report | YYYY-MM-DD |
| (c) | Reason for the review under DORA Article 6(5) | [Yearly / Incident / Instruction / Testing or audit] |
| (d) | Start and end dates of the review period | YYYY-MM-DD to YYYY-MM-DD |
| (e) | Function responsible for the review | [Function] |
| (f) | Major changes and improvements since the previous review, with their impact on the resilience strategy, the ICT internal control framework and ICT risk governance (Article 27(4)) | [Text] |
| (g) | Summary of findings, with detailed analysis of the severity of weaknesses, deficiencies and gaps | [Table reference] |
| (h) | Measures to address them: remediation summary; expected implementation dates and progress, flagging risk of delay; tools and responsible function (internal or external); impact on budget, staff and resources; how the competent authority is informed where appropriate; where no measure is taken, the criteria used to assess impact, evaluate residual risk and accept it | [Table reference] |
| (i) | Planned further developments of the framework | [Text] |
| (j) | Conclusions from the review | [Text] |
| (k) | Past reviews: list; status of measures from the last report; where past measures were ineffective, how to improve them | [Table reference] |
| (l) | Sources: internal audit results; compliance assessments; resilience testing results, including TLPT where applicable; external sources | [List] |
13.3 Worked summary (Example)
Review period 2025-10-01 to 2026-09-30, yearly cycle plus one
unscheduled review after INC-2026-007 (card authorisation outage of 2
hours 40 minutes, against a 2-hour tolerance). Findings: 7 (2 high, 3
medium, 2 low). Measures: 5 completed, 2 in progress, none overdue.
Residual risks above tolerance: 1 accepted (ICT-R-003, score 12).
Control effectiveness: 46 of 50 controls tested effective (92%).
14. Traceability matrix
| Req ID | Source | Requirement (short) | Framework section | Policy or procedure | Evidence | Status |
|---|
| REQ-01 | DORA Art. 5(2)(d) | Management body approves strategy and tolerance | 3, 4 | This document | Resolution MB-2025-014 (Example) | Met |
| REQ-02 | DORA Art. 6(4) | Independent ICT risk control function | 2.3 | Risk function charter | Charter, org chart | Met |
| REQ-03 | DORA Art. 6(5) | Yearly review and report | 13 | This document | Review report 2026 | Met |
| REQ-04 | DORA Art. 6(8)(c) | Security objectives with KPIs and KRIs | 3.2 | ICT risk report | Quarterly report pack | Met |
| REQ-05 | RTS Art. 3(1)(d)(iv) | Accepted residual risks reviewed yearly | 5.4 | This document | Inventory review log | Partly met (AUD-2026-05) |
| REQ-06 | RTS Art. 4 | Asset records with required attributes | 6.2 | Asset policy | CMDB field audit | [Status] |
| REQ-07 | RTS Art. 10 | Vulnerability and patch management | 7.2 | Patch management policy | KPI OBJ-01 | Partly met |
| REQ-08 | DORA Art. 11(6) and RTS Art. 25 | Business continuity plans tested at least yearly | 8.2 | BC test plan | Test reports | Partly met (AUD-2026-04) |
| REQ-09 | DORA Art. 6(6), (7) | Internal audit and follow-up | 12 | Audit charter | Audit reports, tracker | Met |
| REQ-10 | DORA Art. 14 | Communication strategy and designated person | 9.2 | Crisis communication plan | Plan, appointment letter | [Status] |
| [REQ-NN] | [Source] | [Requirement] | [Section] | [Document] | [Evidence] | [Status] |
15. Glossary and references
15.1 Glossary
| Term | Meaning in this document |
|---|
| ICT risk | Any reasonably identifiable circumstance in relation to network and information systems that, if materialised, may compromise their security or the services they support (paraphrase of the DORA definition) |
| Critical or important function | A function whose disruption would materially impair financial performance, the soundness or continuity of services and activities, or regulatory compliance |
| ICT risk tolerance | The level of ICT risk the management body is willing to accept, expressed as limits in section 4 |
| Impact tolerance | Maximum tolerable disruption of a critical or important function |
| Major ICT-related incident | An ICT-related incident with high adverse impact, classified under Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772 |
| Residual risk | Risk remaining after treatment measures |
| TLPT | Threat-led penetration testing under DORA Article 26 |
| Three lines of defence | Model separating operational management (first line), risk control (second line) and internal audit (third line) |
15.2 References
| Reference | Version or date | Use |
|---|
| Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), OJ L 333, 27.12.2022 | Applies from 17 January 2025; check the consolidated text | Articles 5 to 16, 24 to 30 |
| Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 (RTS on ICT risk management tools, methods, processes and policies and the simplified framework) | Adopted 13 March 2024, OJ L of 25 June 2024 | Sections 5, 7, 8, 13 |
| Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772 (classification of ICT-related incidents and cyber threats) | Check the consolidated text | Sections 3.4, 8.1 |
| PRA SS1/21, Operational resilience: impact tolerances for important business services (UK) | Current version on the Bank of England site | Section 1.5 |
| Federal Reserve SR 20-24, Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen Operational Resilience (US) | Issued 2 November 2020, revised 2 June 2026 | Section 1.5 |
Standard and licence note
Based on Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA) and Commission Delegated
Regulations (EU) 2024/1774 and (EU) 2024/1772, as published in the
Official Journal of the European Union, with UK and US operational
resilience texts named for orientation only. EU legislative texts are
free to reuse. Article and point numbers are cited and requirements are
summarised in original wording; no legal text is reproduced. Official
text: EUR-Lex, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554/oj and
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/1774/oj. Check the
consolidated texts and your competent authority's guidance before use.
All organisations, figures and identifiers in the examples are
fictional. This is a documentation format, not legal advice. Template
licence: MIT.