MBA Marketing Management Course Guide Template

Marketing Management Course Guide: [Programme, course or term]

A course guide for the core MBA marketing management course: what the course is for, the competencies it builds, a 12-session roadmap, the key concepts with links to the concept cards, an original mini-case on Northfield Outdoor Co. with exhibits and a teaching note, typical assignments and how they are graded, an exam preparation plan and a self-test. It is for incoming and current MBA students, and for working managers who want the core of the course in one place. Topics: customer analysis; segmentation, targeting and positioning; the marketing mix; branding and brand equity (Aaker 1991; Keller 1993); pricing; channels; communications and digital; marketing analytics; customer lifetime value; new products and diffusion (Rogers 1962; Bass 1969). Source basis: the primary works cited in each section and the structure common to core marketing courses at leading international programmes, written in original words. The case, the company and all data are fictional. Replace every [bracketed] value and every row marked Example with your own course details.

Document control

Contents

1. What the course is for
2. Prerequisites
3. Session roadmap
4. Key concepts and concept cards
5. Mini-case: Northfield Outdoor Co. and the Fastpack launch
6. Typical assignments and how they are graded
7. Common struggles
8. Exam preparation plan
9. Self-test
10. Reading list

1. What the course is for

The core marketing course teaches how a firm creates, communicates, delivers and captures value from customers, and how to make marketing decisions with evidence. It is a decision course: almost every session ends with a question of the form "what should the manager do?" Its core idea is the sequence that runs through the whole course: understand customers and the market, choose whom to serve and how to be preferred (segmentation, targeting and positioning), design the offer (the marketing mix), build the brand, and measure the results (analytics, customer lifetime value). Levitt (1960) gave the course its classic warning: define the business by the customer need it serves, not by the product it makes.

The course builds the competencies that accreditation bodies and programmes expect from the core (see mba/mba-core-curriculum-map):

2. Prerequisites

3. Session roadmap

4. Key concepts and concept cards

Branding and brand equity

Aaker (1991) described brand equity as a set of assets and liabilities linked to a brand: brand loyalty, name awareness, perceived quality, brand associations and other proprietary assets (such as trademarks and channel relationships). Keller (1993) defined customer-based brand equity as the differential effect of brand knowledge on consumer response to the marketing of the brand, with brand knowledge made up of brand awareness (recall and recognition) and brand image (favourable, strong and unique associations). The practical test of Keller's definition: do customers react more favourably to the same product, price or advertisement when they know it comes from this brand?

Managers track brand equity with a brand funnel (aware, consider, buy, repeat or recommend), price premium versus an unbranded or store-brand equivalent, and association surveys. A funnel shows where the brand loses people: a brand with high awareness and low consideration has an image problem, not a visibility problem. Brand extensions use the equity in a new category; they work when the parent brand's associations fit the new category, and they can dilute the parent when they do not.

New products and diffusion

Rogers (1962) described how innovations spread through a social system over time and grouped adopters, by time of adoption, into innovators (about 2.5%), early adopters (13.5%), early majority (34%), late majority (34%) and laggards (16%), the shares implied by cutting a normal distribution of adoption times at one and two standard deviations from the mean. Adoption is faster when an innovation has a clear relative advantage, is compatible with existing habits, is simple, can be tried, and its results are visible.

Bass (1969) turned the idea into a forecasting model of first purchases. The probability that someone adopts at time $t$, given they have not yet adopted, rises with the share who already have:

$\frac{f(t)}{1 - F(t)} = p + q\,F(t)$

$F(t) = \frac{1 - e^{-(p+q)t}}{1 + \frac{q}{p}\, e^{-(p+q)t}}, \qquad N(t) = m\,F(t), \qquad t^{*} = \frac{\ln(q/p)}{p+q}$

Excel, with $t$ in A2: =m*(1-EXP(-(p+q)*A2))/(1+(q/p)*EXP(-(p+q)*A2)); new adopters in year $t$ are the difference of two consecutive cumulative values. The model forecasts first purchases only: add replacement and repeat purchases separately. Its parameters are usually estimated from early sales or borrowed from analogous products, which is the model's main weakness before launch.

5. Mini-case: Northfield Outdoor Co. and the Fastpack launch

5.1 Situation

Mira Okonjo had been Northfield Outdoor Co.'s chief marketing officer for eight months when the board asked her for a decision on Fastpack, a range of ultralight running packs and layers that the product team had been developing for two years. Northfield, a mid-size outdoor-gear retailer and brand with 48 stores and a growing e-commerce business, had built its reputation on durable, fairly priced camping and hiking gear for families. Its customers trusted it; few of them thought of it as a technical brand.

The product team's research had found a fast-growing group of trail runners who trained on weekday evenings, raced on weekends and complained that technical running kit was either too fragile or too expensive. Prototypes had done well in field tests with a local running club, and the team believed Fastpack could become Northfield's first range with a genuine technical reputation.

Mira's analytics lead, Tomás Reyes, had pulled together the numbers in the exhibits. The diffusion forecast in Exhibit 3 used parameters from analogous product launches in the category. The launch plan assumed a price of USD 165 for the core pack, a unit cost of USD 74 and a unit mix of 55% store and 45% own e-commerce, with variable selling costs of USD 6 per store unit and USD 14 per online unit. The launch would cost USD 2.4 million (design, tooling, launch campaign and store fixtures), followed by USD 0.6 million a year of ongoing marketing.

Two disagreements dominated the pre-board meeting. Jonas Feld, head of stores, wanted Fastpack listed on the two largest online marketplaces from day one, because "that is where runners shop and the acquisition cost is tiny". Priya Raman, head of e-commerce, argued that marketplace customers rarely came back and that the marketplaces were full of discounted rival kit that would drag Fastpack's price down. The finance director, Elena Brandt, had looked at a five-year cash flow and found the launch did not pay back; she asked why the board should approve a project with a negative five-year NPV.

Mira also worried about the brand. Exhibit 4, from the annual brand tracker, showed Northfield was well known but converted awareness into consideration less well than its strongest rival. She wondered whether Fastpack should carry the Northfield name, a sub-brand ("Fastpack by Northfield"), or a stand-alone brand.

The board meeting was in three weeks. Mira needed a recommendation on four questions: whether to launch, through which channels, under which brand, and how to judge success in the first two years.

5.2 Exhibits

Exhibit 1. Segments in the regional outdoor market (survey of 400 buyers, fictional).

Exhibit 2. Customer economics by channel (annual, existing Northfield customers, fictional).

Discount rate 10% a year.

Exhibit 3. Bass diffusion forecast of Fastpack buyers (first purchases), $m$ = 120,000, $p$ = 0.04, $q$ = 0.60.

Exhibit 4. Brand funnel, category buyers in the region (n = 1,000, fictional).

5.3 Discussion questions

1. Which customers should Fastpack target, and what should its positioning statement be? Use Exhibit 1.
2. Using Exhibit 2, compute the customer lifetime value and CLV minus CAC for each channel. Should Fastpack be sold on marketplaces at launch?
3. Using Exhibit 3, when does adoption peak, and why does the five-year NPV look poor? Compute the five-year and eight-year NPV at 10%.
4. What does Exhibit 4 say about Northfield's brand equity, and what does it imply for the branding decision (master brand, sub-brand or stand-alone)?
5. Which three metrics should the board track in the first two years, and what results would make you stop or accelerate the launch?

5.4 Teaching note

Q1. Target and positioning. The fast-growing ultralight trail runners segment is small (9%) but has a clear unmet need (light and durable) that matches Northfield's real strength, durability. Family campers are Northfield's base and do not need Fastpack; commuters and alpine hikers are served by stronger rivals. A concentrated strategy for the new range fits. Positioning: "For trail runners who train after work, Fastpack is the running pack and layer system that stays light through a full season of daily use, because it is field-tested by runners and backed by Northfield's repair guarantee." See mba/mba-stp-positioning-card for the scoring and the perceptual map that support this choice.

Q2. Channel economics. Annual margin per customer is orders $\times$ (AOV $\times$ gross margin $-$ variable cost per order); CLV $= m\,r/(1+i-r)$ (end-of-period convention, mba/mba-customer-lifetime-value-card).

Excel for own e-commerce: margin =2.6*(110*0.47-14), CLV =98.02*0.72/(1+0.1-0.72). Jonas is right that marketplace CAC is low, but the customers are worth almost nothing: high fulfilment fees and 45% retention leave CLV below CAC. Priya's concern about price erosion adds a brand cost the numbers do not capture. Recommendation: launch through own e-commerce and flagship stores; revisit marketplaces only for clearance or with strict price controls. This is also a mix-consistency point (mba/mba-marketing-mix-card).

Q3. Diffusion and NPV. Peak adoption at $t^* = \ln(0.60/0.04)/(0.04 + 0.60) = 4.23$ years, so years 4 and 5 are the biggest; year 1 is only about 5% of the market. Contribution per unit is $165 - 74 - (0.55 \times 6 + 0.45 \times 14) = 81.40$. Net cash flow per year is new buyers $\times$ 81.40 minus USD 0.6 million of ongoing marketing (USD millions):

Five-year NPV at 10%: USD -0.482 million (IRR 4.0%); eight-year NPV: USD 0.223 million (IRR 12.1%). Excel, with year 0 in B2 and years 1 to 8 in C2:J2: five-year =NPV(10%,C2:G2)+B2, eight-year =NPV(10%,C2:J2)+B2, and =IRR(B2:G2) or =IRR(B2:J2). Elena's five-year view cuts the project off just as adoption peaks: a diffusion curve puts most of the volume after year 3. The eight-year view is modestly positive. The model also leaves out repeat and replacement purchases and the value of new customers Fastpack brings to Northfield. If 30% of Fastpack buyers are new to Northfield and each brings a further USD 60 of present value in other categories (an assumption to test), the eight-year NPV rises to USD 1.510 million (IRR 22.9%). The board should see the base case and this sensitivity side by side, with the halo labelled as an assumption.

Q4. Brand equity. Northfield's awareness is higher than Rival A's (61% versus 54%), but conversion from awareness to consideration is lower (45.9% versus 55.6%), as are consideration to purchase (42.9% versus 50.0%) and purchase to repeat (55.0% versus 65.3%). In Keller's (1993) terms, Northfield has salience but weaker image in this category: its associations (durable, family, good value) are favourable but not technical. A stand-alone brand would waste the awareness and the durability association; the master brand alone would carry "family camping" associations into a technical segment. A sub-brand ("Fastpack by Northfield") borrows trust and durability while building a technical identity, and limits the risk to the parent if the launch disappoints.

Q5. Metrics and decision rules. (1) Fastpack buyers versus the Bass forecast (6,367 in year 1, 16,756 cumulative by year 2); re-estimate $p$ and $q$ after four quarters. (2) Share of Fastpack buyers new to Northfield and their 12-month repeat rate (the halo assumption). (3) Average realised price versus USD 165 and funnel conversion among trail runners. Stop or rethink if year-2 cumulative buyers are below about half the forecast and repeat is below the store average; accelerate (more stores, second product line) if adoption runs ahead of forecast and realised price holds.

6. Typical assignments and how they are graded

Rubric for a case write-up or plan (score each 1 to 5):

7. Common struggles

• Describing instead of deciding. Case discussions reward a position. State it early and defend it with evidence.
• Positioning before targeting. A positioning statement without a named target is an advertising line.
• Numbers without assumptions. Every CLV, forecast or allocation needs its inputs and convention stated.
• Average versus marginal. Budget questions turn on marginal returns (mba/mba-marketing-mix-card).
• Short horizons for new products. Diffusion puts volume late; do not judge a launch on year 1 alone (mini-case Q3).
• Ignoring the brand. Channel and price decisions change what the brand means; say how.
• Treating digital as a separate subject. Digital channels are part of place and promotion and must fit the same positioning.
• Overconfidence in data. Attribution reports and model outputs are estimates; ask how they were validated.

8. Exam preparation plan

9. Self-test

1. What is "marketing myopia", and who described it?
2. Name the five tests a useful segment must pass.
3. A segment scores 3.4 and another 3.6 on a weighted attractiveness model. Why might you still choose the first?
4. Name Aaker's (1991) dimensions of brand equity and Keller's (1993) two components of brand knowledge.
5. A brand has 70% awareness and 20% consideration. What problem does that suggest?
6. In the Bass model, what do $p$ and $q$ capture? With $p = 0.03$ and $q = 0.38$, when does adoption peak?
7. Name Rogers's five adopter categories and their approximate shares.
8. Compute CLV for annual margin USD 50, retention 80% and discount rate 10% (end-of-period convention).
9. Why should a budget be allocated by marginal rather than average return?
10. Name the three Ps Booms and Bitner added for services.
11. Why is a marketplace channel with a low CAC not necessarily attractive?
12. In the mini-case, why does the five-year NPV understate Fastpack's value?

10. Reading list

Classic works cited in this guide

• Levitt, T. (1960). Marketing myopia. Harvard Business Review, 38(4), 45-56.
• Smith, W. R. (1956). Product differentiation and market segmentation as alternative marketing strategies. Journal of Marketing, 21(1), 3-8.
• McCarthy, E. J. (1960). Basic Marketing: A Managerial Approach. Richard D. Irwin.
• Rogers, E. M. (1962). Diffusion of Innovations. Free Press.
• Bass, F. M. (1969). A new product growth for model consumer durables. Management Science, 15(5), 215-227.
• Ries, A., and Trout, J. (1981). Positioning: The Battle for Your Mind. McGraw-Hill.
• Booms, B. H., and Bitner, M. J. (1981). Marketing strategies and organization structures for service firms. In J. H. Donnelly and W. R. George (Eds.), Marketing of Services (pp. 47-51). American Marketing Association.
• Aaker, D. A. (1991). Managing Brand Equity. Free Press.
• Keller, K. L. (1993). Conceptualizing, measuring, and managing customer-based brand equity. Journal of Marketing, 57(1), 1-22.
• Berger, P. D., and Nasr, N. I. (1998). Customer lifetime value: marketing models and applications. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 12(1), 17-30.
• Gupta, S., Lehmann, D. R., and Stuart, J. A. (2004). Valuing customers. Journal of Marketing Research, 41(1), 7-18.
• Christensen, C. M., Hall, T., Dillon, K., and Duncan, D. S. (2016). Know your customers' "jobs to be done". Harvard Business Review, 94(9).

Textbooks and further reading (by name only)

• Kotler and Keller, Marketing Management.
• Keller, Strategic Brand Management.
• Moore, Crossing the Chasm.
• Farris, Bendle, Pfeifer and Reibstein, Marketing Metrics.
• OpenStax, Principles of Marketing (free, CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, openstax.org).

Answer key

1. Defining a business by its product rather than by the customer need it serves, which blinds the firm to substitutes; Levitt (1960).
2. Measurable, substantial, accessible, differentiable, actionable.
3. Scores ignore competitive position and profit pools: if a strong rival owns the higher-scoring segment and the other has an open position the firm can win, the lower score can be the better choice (see mba/mba-stp-positioning-card).
4. Aaker: brand loyalty, name awareness, perceived quality, brand associations, other proprietary brand assets. Keller: brand awareness and brand image.
5. An image or relevance problem: people know the brand but do not see it as right for them. More awareness spending will not fix it.
6. $p$: external influence (innovation); $q$: word of mouth and imitation. $t^* = \ln(0.38/0.03)/0.41 = 6.19$ years.
7. Innovators 2.5%, early adopters 13.5%, early majority 34%, late majority 34%, laggards 16%.
8. $50 \times 0.8/(1.1 - 0.8) = 133.33$ (=50*0.8/(1+0.1-0.8)).
9. The average includes the early, high-return dollars; the decision is about the next dollar, which may earn much less in a saturated channel.
10. People, process, physical evidence.
11. Value depends on CLV, not CAC alone: in the mini-case marketplace customers are worth USD 17.65 against a CAC of USD 18, and the channel can erode price and brand.
12. Diffusion peaks after year 4 ($t^* = 4.23$), so a five-year window captures the launch cost but not most of the volume; repeat purchases and new-customer value are also excluded.

Revision history

Standard and licence note

Structure aligned with the core marketing management course common to leading international MBA programmes and with the competency areas used in business-school accreditation; it follows no single school's syllabus. Frameworks are attributed to their original works (Levitt 1960; Smith 1956; McCarthy 1960; Rogers 1962; Bass 1969; Booms and Bitner 1981; Aaker 1991; Keller 1993; Gupta, Lehmann and Stuart 2004). The explanations, the Northfield Outdoor Co. mini-case, its people, exhibits and teaching note are original and fictional; no published case, textbook text or exam question is reproduced. The template is not affiliated with or endorsed by any business school, accreditation body or publisher. Check your own syllabus for the topics and assessment your course requires. Template licence: MIT.