# Brand Equity Concept Card: [Brand, business or course] > A concept card on measuring and managing brand equity for MBA brand management and marketing analytics electives: > customer-based brand equity and the brand resonance pyramid, funnel diagnostics, the revenue premium, the brand > value implied by a choice model, financial brand valuation by relief from royalty, and brand extension and licensing > decisions. It builds on the core treatment in `mba/mba-marketing-guide` (section 4, "Branding and brand equity": > Aaker's assets and Keller's definition) and on `mba/mba-stp-positioning-card` (positioning and perceptual maps), and > does not repeat them. It is for second-year MBA students and for brand, marketing and finance managers who must put a > number on a brand or defend a brand budget. Source basis: Aaker (1991, 1996), Keller (1993, 2001), Keller and > Lehmann (2006), Ailawadi, Lehmann and Neslin (2003), Kamakura and Russell (1993), Park and Srinivasan (1994), Simon > and Sullivan (1993), Aaker and Keller (1990), written up in original words with fictional Northfield Outdoor Co. and > Corvane Robotics data. Accounting references are to IAS 38 and IFRS 3 as dated facts, not accounting advice. > Replace every [bracketed] value and every row marked *Example* with your own course or company data. ## Document control | Field | Value | |---|---| | Course or project | [Brand management elective / brand valuation / client project] | | Learner or analyst | [Your name] | | Brand and category | [Northfield Outdoor Co., outdoor gear (fictional)] | | Competitor set and base product | [Rival A; retailer's store brand as the unbranded base] | | Data sources | [Brand tracker wave YYYY, scanner or e-commerce sales, licensing comparables] | | Valuation date and currency | [YYYY-MM-DD, USD] | | Reviewed by | [Study partner, tutor, mentor or finance partner] | | Date | YYYY-MM-DD | | Version | [0.1] | ## Contents 1. When to use it 2. The idea in plain language 3. Formulas and notation 4. Assumptions and limits 5. How managers use it 6. Worked example A (fully solved) 7. Worked example B (half solved): relief from royalty 8. Exercise C (unsolved) 9. Brand extensions, architecture and licensing 10. Connections to other cards 11. Common mistakes and misconceptions 12. Self-test, notes, sources, answer key ## When to use it Use this card when a decision depends on what the brand itself adds, over and above the product: - **Defending or cutting brand spend.** Advertising that builds memory structures pays back slowly; the finance director needs evidence that the brand earns a premium. - **Pricing.** How much more will customers pay for the brand than for an equivalent unbranded or store-brand product? - **Brand extensions and architecture.** Should a new product carry the master brand, a sub-brand or a new name? - **Licensing.** What royalty should a licensee pay to use the name, and what is the risk to the core brand? - **M&A and impairment.** In an acquisition, acquired trademarks are valued separately from goodwill; the deal team needs a defensible brand value (`mba/mba-synergy-valuation-card`). - **Tracking.** Is the brand getting stronger or weaker, and where in the customer journey? | Use when | Be careful when | |---|---| | A credible unbranded or store-brand comparison exists | No comparable product exists: the "premium" has no base | | You track the same funnel measures over time | Tracker questions or samples changed between waves | | Licensing or comparable royalty data are available | Royalty comparables come from different categories or deal structures | | The decision is about the brand, not the whole product | Product quality, distribution and price differences are mixed into the brand number | ## The idea in plain language A brand is worth something when people respond differently to a product because they know whose it is. Keller (1993) called this the differential effect of brand knowledge on consumer response; the core guide covers his definition and Aaker's (1991) list of brand assets. This card is about the **measurement chain** that links what customers know to what the firm earns, which Keller and Lehmann (2006) described in three levels: 1. **Customer mindset.** Awareness, associations, attitudes, attachment: measured by surveys and the brand funnel. 2. **Product-market outcomes.** Price premium, volume, share, loyalty, elasticity: measured with sales data, experiments and choice models. 3. **Financial market outcomes.** Brand value, cash flows, firm value: measured by valuation methods. Erdem and Swait (1998) offered an information-economics view of the same idea: a credible brand is a signal that lowers buyers' perceived risk and information costs, which is why brand equity matters most where quality is hard to judge before purchase. Each level has measures that suit different decisions. A brand manager diagnosing a weak funnel needs mindset measures. A pricing team needs product-market measures. A deal team or a licensing negotiation needs a financial value. The common error is to report one level and claim the others: high awareness does not prove a price premium, and a price premium does not prove that the brand is worth a given number of dollars. Keller (2001) organised the mindset level into the **brand resonance pyramid**: salience at the base (do people think of the brand in the right situations?), then performance and imagery (what the product does, and what the brand stands for), then judgments and feelings (quality, credibility, warmth), and resonance at the top (loyalty, attachment, community, active engagement). Strong brands are built from the base up; a resonance campaign for a brand with weak salience wastes money. ```mermaid flowchart BT A["Salience: category and situation recall"] --> B["Performance: what the product does"] A --> C["Imagery: what the brand stands for"] B --> D["Judgments: quality, credibility, superiority"] C --> E["Feelings: warmth, excitement, security"] D --> F["Resonance: loyalty, attachment, community, engagement"] E --> F ``` ## Formulas and notation **Funnel conversion.** For stages $k = 1, \dots, K$ (aware, consider, buy, repeat), with $n_k$ people at stage $k$: $$c_k = \frac{n_{k+1}}{n_k}, \qquad \text{aware-to-repeat} = \prod_{k=1}^{K-1} c_k = \frac{n_K}{n_1}$$ **Price premium and revenue premium** (Ailawadi, Lehmann and Neslin 2003). With branded price $P_b$ and volume $Q_b$, and the store-brand or unbranded equivalent at $P_s$ and $Q_s$: $$\text{Price premium} = \frac{P_b - P_s}{P_s}, \qquad RP = P_b\,Q_b - P_s\,Q_s$$ The revenue premium captures both what a brand can charge and how much it sells; a price premium alone can be bought by selling very little. **Brand value in a choice model** (logit; Kamakura and Russell 1993 used scanner data in this spirit). If the utility of option $j$ is $U_j = \beta_j + \beta_P P_j + \varepsilon_j$, with brand constant $\beta_j$ and price coefficient $\beta_P < 0$, the choice share and the money value of the brand constant relative to a base option are: $$s_j = \frac{e^{\beta_j + \beta_P P_j}}{\sum_k e^{\beta_k + \beta_P P_k}}, \qquad WTP_j = \frac{\beta_j - \beta_{base}}{-\beta_P}$$ The own-price elasticity of option $j$ in the logit is $\beta_P\,P_j\,(1 - s_j)$. **Relief from royalty.** The brand is worth the present value of the after-tax royalties the owner avoids by owning rather than licensing it. With brand revenue $R_t$, royalty rate $\rho$, tax rate $\tau$, discount rate $k$ and a terminal growth rate $g$ after year $T$: $$V_{brand} = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{\rho\,R_t\,(1-\tau)}{(1+k)^t} + \frac{\rho\,R_T\,(1-\tau)(1+g)}{(k-g)(1+k)^T}$$ | Symbol | Meaning | Unit | Northfield example | |---|---|---|---| | $n_k$, $c_k$ | People at funnel stage $k$; conversion to the next stage | people, share | Example A3 | | $P_b$, $Q_b$ | Branded price and volume | USD, units | 289; 8,400 | | $P_s$, $Q_s$ | Store-brand or unbranded price and volume | USD, units | 219; 9,100 | | $RP$ | Revenue premium | USD | 434,700 | | $\beta_j$, $\beta_P$ | Brand constant; price coefficient (per USD) | utils | 0.62; -0.0125 | | $WTP_j$ | Money value of the brand constant versus the base | USD | 49.6 | | $R_t$, $\rho$, $\tau$ | Brand revenue, royalty rate, tax rate | USD m, share, share | 310 growing 4%; 3%; 25% | | $k$, $g$, $T$ | Discount rate, terminal growth, explicit years | share, share, years | 11%; 2%; 5 | **Excel.** Funnel conversion `=C3/C2`. Revenue premium `=Pb*Qb-Ps*Qs`. Logit shares with utilities in `B2:B4`: `=EXP(B2)/SUM(EXP($B$2:$B$4))` (enter as an array formula in older Excel versions). WTP `=(beta_j-beta_base)/-beta_p`. Relief from royalty, after-tax royalties in `C2:G2`: `=NPV(k, C2:G2)+G2*(1+g)/(k-g)/(1+k)^5`. ## Assumptions and limits | Measure | Assumes | Fails when, and what to do | |---|---|---| | Funnel conversion | Same sample, same questions, same category definition across brands and waves | Tracker redesigns break the series: bridge the old and new waves, or restart the baseline | | Revenue premium | The store brand is a fair comparison (same quality, same shelf, same promotion) | Quality differs: the premium mixes product and brand. Use a blind-test check or a choice experiment | | Logit brand value | Independence of irrelevant alternatives; price coefficient estimated cleanly | Close substitutes (two premium brands) steal share from each other more than the logit predicts: use nested or mixed logit, and see `mba/mba-conjoint-analysis-card` | | Relief from royalty | A comparable royalty rate exists and reflects the brand's strength | Royalty comparables come from licences with different scope, territory or exclusivity: adjust, and show a range | | Any financial value | The brand's cash flows can be separated from the rest of the business | Brand, distribution and product are inseparable: that is why IAS 38 does not let firms recognise internally generated brands (see dated facts below) | Simon and Sullivan (1993) estimated brand equity from financial market values, separating the value of brand assets from tangible assets and other intangibles. Their approach shows the ambition and the difficulty: any financial brand value rests on assumptions that move the number a lot. Always show the sensitivity. ## How managers use it - **Brand health tracking.** A quarterly or annual tracker of salience, consideration, preference and recommendation, against the same competitor set. Aaker (1996) proposed a broad set of measures across loyalty, perceived quality, associations, awareness and market behaviour; most firms track a short subset consistently rather than a long list occasionally. - **Diagnosing the funnel.** The stage where the brand converts worst relative to rivals is where the problem is. Awareness problems need reach; consideration problems need relevance and associations; repeat problems need product and service. - **Linking to sales.** Marketing mix models (`mba/mba-marketing-mix-modeling-card`) estimate the short-term sales effect of media; brand measures capture the slower base-building effect. Mixing the two horizons is a common reason brand budgets are cut too far. - **Pricing.** The choice-model WTP and the revenue premium tell the pricing team how far the brand can carry a price gap (`mba/mba-pricing-card`). - **Valuation.** Relief from royalty is the method most often used for trademarks in purchase-price allocations and impairment tests; the income, market and cost approaches are all recognised in brand valuation practice. - **Extensions and licensing.** The measures above, plus fit research, decide whether the brand can stretch into a new category (section 9). ```mermaid flowchart TD A{"What decision does the number support?"} -- "Brand health and strategy" --> B["Customer mindset: tracker, funnel, pyramid"] A -- "Pricing or assortment" --> C["Product-market: revenue premium, choice-model WTP"] A -- "Deal, licence or impairment" --> D["Financial: relief from royalty with sensitivity"] B --> E{"Which funnel stage converts worst versus rivals?"} E -- "Aware" --> F["Reach and salience"] E -- "Consider" --> G["Relevance and associations"] E -- "Buy or repeat" --> H["Product, price, availability, service"] C --> I["Compare with the base product of equal quality"] D --> J["Check royalty comparables and show a range"] ``` ## Worked example A (fully solved): the Northfield brand in tents **Situation (fictional).** Northfield Outdoor Co., a mid-size outdoor-gear retailer and brand, sells Northfield-branded products (about USD 310m a year, roughly 60% of its revenue in this example) alongside third-party brands. In a partner retail chain, a Northfield three-season tent sits next to the chain's store-brand tent of comparable specification (blind field tests found no material quality difference) and a tent from Rival A, a technical specialist. **A1. Revenue premium (last 12 months).** | Product | Average price (USD) | Units | Revenue (USD) | |---|---|---|---| | Northfield tent | 289 | 8,400 | 2,427,600 | | Store-brand tent | 219 | 9,100 | 1,992,900 | - Price premium: $(289 - 219)/219 = 32.0\%$. Excel: `=(289-219)/219`. - Volume: Northfield sells 92.3% of the store brand's units (`=8400/9100`). - Revenue premium: $289 \times 8{,}400 - 219 \times 9{,}100 = 434{,}700$, so USD 434,700, or USD 51.75 per branded unit (`=(289*8400-219*9100)/8400`). Revenue ratio 1.218. Northfield gives up a little volume for a large price premium, and the net effect on revenue is strongly positive. Ailawadi, Lehmann and Neslin (2003) argued that this revenue premium is a better single outcome measure than price or volume alone, because a brand can always raise one by sacrificing the other. **A2. The brand constant in a choice model.** A choice-based conjoint study among category buyers (see `mba/mba-conjoint-analysis-card` for the method) estimated a logit with these coefficients, relative to the store brand: Northfield $\beta_N = 0.62$, Rival A $\beta_R = 0.75$, store brand $0$, price $\beta_P = -0.0125$ per USD. - Value of the Northfield name versus the store brand: $0.62/0.0125 = $ USD 49.6 per tent. Rival A's name is worth USD 60.0, so Rival A carries USD 10.4 more brand value than Northfield in this category. Excel: `=0.62/0.0125`. - Shares at current prices (Northfield 289, Rival A 279, store 219): utilities $-2.9925$, $-2.7375$, $-2.7375$; shares 27.9%, 36.0%, 36.0%. Excel: `=EXP(0.62-0.0125*289)/(EXP(0.62-0.0125*289)+EXP(0.75-0.0125*279)+EXP(-0.0125*219))`. - At USD 268.6 Northfield's utility equals the store brand's (`=219+0.62/0.0125`). At USD 269 the three shares are 33.2%, 33.4% and 33.4%. - Own-price elasticity of Northfield at the base: $-0.0125 \times 289 \times (1 - 0.279) = -2.60$. The WTP of USD 49.6 is below the actual premium of USD 70, which is why Northfield sells fewer units than the store brand: part of the price gap is not covered by brand value. The revenue premium is still positive because demand is not elastic enough to wipe out the price gain. **A3. Funnel diagnostics.** The regional brand tracker in Exhibit 4 of `mba/mba-marketing-guide` (n = 1,000 category buyers) gives: | Stage | Northfield | Rival A | Northfield conversion | Rival A conversion | |---|---|---|---|---| | Aware | 610 | 540 | | | | Would consider | 280 | 300 | 45.9% | 55.6% | | Bought in last 12 months | 120 | 150 | 42.9% | 50.0% | | Bought again (repeat) | 66 | 98 | 55.0% | 65.3% | | Aware to repeat | | | 10.8% | 18.1% | What if Northfield closed one gap at a time to Rival A's rate, holding the others? - Awareness to consideration at 55.6%: 338.9 considering, 145.2 buying, 79.9 repeating. - Consideration to purchase at 50.0%: 140.0 buying. - Purchase to repeat at 65.3%: 78.4 repeating. The biggest single lever is the first conversion: Northfield is known but not considered, an associations problem rather than an awareness problem, consistent with the teaching note in the core guide. Excel for the first what-if: `=610*(300/540)` for consideration, then multiply by Northfield's own later conversions. ```vega-lite { "$schema": "https://vega.github.io/schema/vega-lite/v5.json", "description": "Brand funnel conversion rates, Northfield versus Rival A (fictional, n = 1000 category buyers)", "width": 380, "height": 220, "data": {"values": [ {"step": "1 Aware to consider", "brand": "Northfield", "conversion": 45.9}, {"step": "1 Aware to consider", "brand": "Rival A", "conversion": 55.6}, {"step": "2 Consider to buy", "brand": "Northfield", "conversion": 42.9}, {"step": "2 Consider to buy", "brand": "Rival A", "conversion": 50.0}, {"step": "3 Buy to repeat", "brand": "Northfield", "conversion": 55.0}, {"step": "3 Buy to repeat", "brand": "Rival A", "conversion": 65.3} ]}, "mark": "bar", "encoding": { "x": {"field": "step", "type": "nominal", "title": "Funnel step"}, "xOffset": {"field": "brand"}, "y": {"field": "conversion", "type": "quantitative", "title": "Conversion (%)", "scale": {"domain": [0, 100]}}, "color": {"field": "brand", "type": "nominal", "title": "Brand"} } } ``` **Interpretation.** The three measures agree. The Northfield name is worth a real premium (USD 49.6 per tent in the choice model, USD 434,700 a year of revenue premium in one chain), but less than Rival A's, and the shortfall sits in consideration: buyers know Northfield but do not see it as a technical brand. The brand plan should work on relevant associations for technical use, not on more awareness. ## Worked example B (half solved): relief from royalty for the Northfield trademark **Situation (fictional).** Northfield's board asks for an indicative value of the Northfield trademark for a refinancing discussion. Inputs: | Input | Value | |---|---| | Northfield-branded revenue, year 1 | USD 310m, growing 4% a year to year 5 | | Royalty rate from comparable outdoor-apparel licences | 3% of revenue (range 2% to 4%) | | Tax rate | 25% | | Discount rate for the brand cash flows | 11% | | Terminal growth after year 5 | 2% | | Year | Revenue (USD m) | Royalty before tax | After-tax royalty | Discount factor | Present value | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | 310.00 | 9.300 | 6.975 | 0.9009 | 6.284 | | 2 | 322.40 | 9.672 | 7.254 | 0.8116 | 5.888 | | 3 | 335.30 | [ ] | [ ] | 0.7312 | [ ] | | 4 | 348.71 | 10.461 | 7.846 | 0.6587 | 5.168 | | 5 | 362.66 | 10.880 | 8.160 | 0.5935 | 4.842 | 1. Fill year 3. With the table in `A1:F6` (year 3 in row 4), Excel: revenue `=310*1.04^2`, royalty `=B4*3%`, after tax `=C4*(1-25%)`, discount factor `=1/1.11^3`, present value `=D4*E4`. 2. Sum of the five present values: [ ] (USD m). Excel: `=NPV(11%, D2:D6)` on the after-tax royalties, or `=SUM(F2:F6)`. 3. Terminal value at year 5: $8.160 \times 1.02/(0.11 - 0.02) =$ [ ]; its present value: [ ]. 4. Brand value: [ ] (USD m). What share of it comes from the terminal value? 5. Recompute the value at royalty rates of 2% and 4%, and at discount rates of 10% and 12%. Which input matters more? 6. In two sentences: why must the discount rate for the brand be at least the firm's WACC (`mba/mba-capm-wacc-card`), and why would an accountant not put this number on Northfield's own balance sheet? ## Exercise C (unsolved): licensing the Northfield name A home-furnishings maker offers to license the Northfield name for outdoor furniture: 5% royalty on its sales, expected at USD 40m a year for five years, no renewal assumed. Tax 25%, discount rate 11%. 1. Compute the annual after-tax royalty and its present value over five years. Excel: `=PV(11%, 5, -annual)`. 2. Brand research suggests the licence could weaken Northfield's technical associations and cost USD 1.2m a year of after-tax contribution in the core business for five years. What is the net present value of the licence? 3. Above what annual dilution cost does the licence destroy value? 4. Using Aaker and Keller (1990), which two fit dimensions would you test in research before signing? 5. Name two contract terms that limit the dilution risk. 6. Corvane Robotics, a warehouse-robotics company, is a business-to-business brand. Name one way its brand equity would show up in sales data and one way you would measure it with a survey. ## Brand extensions, architecture and licensing **Extensions.** Aaker and Keller (1990) found that consumers evaluate an extension more favourably when the parent brand is perceived as high in quality and when the new category fits the parent, with fit judged on whether the parent's skills transfer to the new product and whether the products complement or substitute for each other. A very easy extension (one any firm could make) gains little from the brand. Park and Srinivasan (1994) used surveys to split brand equity into an attribute-based part (perceived performance beyond objective measures) and a non-attribute part (the general image), and showed how to estimate how much equity transfers to an extension category. **Architecture.** The choice is a spectrum: | Option | Borrows equity | Risk to parent | When it fits | |---|---|---|---| | Master brand | Fully | Highest | Strong fit, same customers, same promise | | Sub-brand ("Fastpack by Northfield") | Partly | Moderate | New segment or technical claim, some fit | | Endorsed brand | A little | Low | Different promise, trust signal useful | | New brand | None | None | Poor fit, or the parent's associations would hurt | **Licensing.** Licensing earns royalties without investment, but the licensor's brand is in the licensee's hands. Quality control, approval rights, category limits and termination clauses protect the core. The comparison is always royalty income against the expected cost of dilution, as in Exercise C. **Dated facts on accounting (as of October 2026).** Under IAS 38 *Intangible Assets*, internally generated brands, mastheads, publishing titles and customer lists are not recognised as intangible assets, because their cost cannot be separated from the cost of developing the business as a whole. Brands acquired in a business combination are recognised separately from goodwill at fair value under IFRS 3 (and ASC 805 under US GAAP), which is why brand valuations appear in purchase-price allocations. The IASB work plan lists a research project on intangible assets. Check the current texts at [ifrs.org](https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ias-38-intangible-assets/) and with your finance team before you rely on them; this card is not accounting advice. Monetary brand valuation is also the subject of an ISO standard (ISO 10668:2010, the current edition as of October 2026; ISO lists a second edition as an approved work item under development, so check iso.org for its status before you cite the standard). ## Connections to other cards - **Core marketing and positioning** (`mba/mba-marketing-guide`, `mba/mba-stp-positioning-card`): definitions, the funnel exhibit, positioning and perceptual maps. - **Pricing** (`mba/mba-pricing-card`): the brand premium sets how far price can sit above the base product. - **Conjoint analysis** (`mba/mba-conjoint-analysis-card`): the source of brand constants and WTP. - **Marketing mix modeling and attribution** (`mba/mba-marketing-mix-modeling-card`, `mba/mba-digital-attribution-card`): short-term sales effects of media versus long-term brand building. - **Customer lifetime value** (`mba/mba-customer-lifetime-value-card`): stronger brands usually show higher retention, which raises CLV. - **Valuation** (`mba/mba-dcf-valuation-card`, `mba/mba-capm-wacc-card`, `mba/mba-synergy-valuation-card`): relief from royalty is a DCF of a slice of cash flows; in M&A it feeds the purchase-price allocation. - **New product diffusion** (`mba/mba-new-product-diffusion-card`): a trusted parent brand can raise the external influence $p$ of a launch. ## Common mistakes and misconceptions - **Equating awareness with equity.** Northfield is better known than Rival A and still has less brand value in the category. Awareness is the base of the pyramid, not the whole of it. - **Using a price premium alone.** A brand can charge more by selling almost nothing. Use the revenue premium or a choice model. - **Comparing with a product of different quality.** If the store brand is worse, the premium measures product, not brand. Check with blind tests. - **Ignoring substitution patterns in the logit.** Two premium brands compete more closely than the simple logit assumes; WTP from a constant is robust, share forecasts are not. - **Taking a royalty rate from the wrong comparables.** Licences differ in scope, territory, exclusivity and support; adjust or show a range. - **Letting the terminal value hide the assumptions.** In Worked example B two-thirds of the value is terminal value. Show it separately. - **Double counting in valuation.** Valuing the brand by relief from royalty and then also crediting the whole price premium to the brand counts the same cash twice. - **Cutting brand spend on short-term sales evidence only.** Short-window response models miss slow brand effects; combine them with tracker and premium measures before cutting. - **Expecting to see internally built brand value on the balance sheet.** IAS 38 does not allow it; only acquired brands are recognised. ## Self-test questions 1. State Keller's (1993) definition of customer-based brand equity in one sentence, and name the three levels at which Keller and Lehmann (2006) said brand equity can be measured. 2. Name the four levels of the brand resonance pyramid from the base up. 3. A logit gives a brand constant of 0.9 and a price coefficient of -0.02 per USD. What is the brand's value per unit relative to the base option? 4. Brand X sells 5,000 units at USD 120; the store brand sells 6,000 at USD 90. Compute the price premium and the revenue premium. 5. A brand earns USD 100m of revenue a year with no growth, the royalty rate is 4%, tax 25% and the discount rate 10%. What is the after-tax royalty in year 1 and its present value? What would the brand be worth as a growing perpetuity at 2% growth? 6. Why is the revenue premium a better outcome measure than the price premium alone? 7. A brand has high awareness but low consideration relative to rivals. What does that suggest, and what would you do? 8. What two fit dimensions did Aaker and Keller (1990) find matter for extensions? 9. Why can a firm not recognise its own brand as an asset under IAS 38, and when is a brand recognised? 10. Name one survey-based and one sales-based measure of brand equity, and the decision each suits best. ## My notes and next steps | Item | My entry | |---|---| | Confidence with brand equity measurement (1 = lost, 5 = could teach it) | [ ] | | The base product and competitor set I use | [ ] | | One decision where a brand number changes the answer | [ ] | | Mistakes logged in `mba/mba-error-log` | [Date and short description] | | Next review date (spacing: +2 days, +1 week, +1 month) | YYYY-MM-DD | | Next card to study | [mba/mba-conjoint-analysis-card / mba/mba-marketing-mix-modeling-card] | ## Sources and further reading - Aaker, D. A. (1991). *Managing Brand Equity*. Free Press. - Aaker, D. A. (1996). Measuring brand equity across products and markets. *California Management Review*, 38(3), 102-120. - Aaker, D. A., and Keller, K. L. (1990). Consumer evaluations of brand extensions. *Journal of Marketing*, 54(1), 27-41. - Ailawadi, K. L., Lehmann, D. R., and Neslin, S. A. (2003). Revenue premium as an outcome measure of brand equity. *Journal of Marketing*, 67(4), 1-17. - Erdem, T., and Swait, J. (1998). Brand equity as a signaling phenomenon. *Journal of Consumer Psychology*, 7(2), 131-157. - Kamakura, W. A., and Russell, G. J. (1993). Measuring brand value with scanner data. *International Journal of Research in Marketing*, 10(1), 9-22. - Keller, K. L. (1993). Conceptualizing, measuring, and managing customer-based brand equity. *Journal of Marketing*, 57(1), 1-22. - Keller, K. L. (2001). Building customer-based brand equity: a blueprint for creating strong brands. *Marketing Management*, 10(2). - Keller, K. L., and Lehmann, D. R. (2006). Brands and branding: research findings and future priorities. *Marketing Science*, 25(6), 740-759. - Park, C. S., and Srinivasan, V. (1994). A survey-based method for measuring and understanding brand equity and its extendibility. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 31(2), 271-288. - Simon, C. J., and Sullivan, M. W. (1993). The measurement and determinants of brand equity: a financial approach. *Marketing Science*, 12(1), 28-52. - IFRS Foundation. IAS 38 *Intangible Assets* and IFRS 3 *Business Combinations* (ifrs.org, checked 2026-10-28). - Further reading (by name only): Keller and Swaminathan, *Strategic Brand Management*; Aaker, *Building Strong Brands*; Kotler and Keller, *Marketing Management*; OpenStax, *Principles of Marketing* (free, CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, openstax.org). ## Answer key **Worked example B.** (1) Year 3: revenue 335.30, royalty 10.059, after tax 7.544, present value 5.516. (2) Sum of five present values: USD 27.698m. (3) Terminal value $8.160 \times 1.02/0.09 = 92.477$; present value $92.477 \times 0.5935 = 54.881$. (4) Brand value USD 82.579m (`=NPV(11%,D2:D6)+D6*1.02/(0.11-0.02)/1.11^5`); 66.5% comes from the terminal value. (5) Royalty 2%: USD 55.053m; 4%: USD 110.105m. Discount rate 10%: USD 93.028m; 12%: USD 74.223m. Value is proportional to the royalty rate, so the plausible range of comparables (2% to 4%) moves the value by a factor of two, more than a one-point change in the discount rate. Spend the analysis time on the royalty comparables. (6) Brand cash flows are at least as risky as the business that generates them, and often riskier, so the rate should not be below WACC; some practitioners add a premium. IAS 38 does not allow internally generated brands to be recognised, because their cost cannot be separated from developing the business; the number is for decision support, not the balance sheet. **Exercise C.** (1) $40 \times 5\% \times (1 - 25\%) = $ USD 1.500m a year; present value $1.5 \times 3.6959 = $ USD 5.544m (`=PV(11%,5,-1.5)`). (2) Dilution cost present value $1.2 \times 3.6959 = 4.435$; net present value USD 1.109m, positive but thin. (3) The licence destroys value if the annual after-tax dilution cost exceeds USD 1.500m, the after-tax royalty itself (both run for five years at the same rate). (4) Transfer of skills (would Northfield's know-how in outdoor gear make better outdoor furniture?) and complementarity or substitutability (are the products used together?). (5) Approval rights over designs and quality standards; a category and channel limit; a termination right if quality or brand-tracker measures fall below agreed levels; minimum royalties. (6) Sales data: a win-rate or price premium in competitive tenders against comparable rivals, all else equal. Survey: buyer ratings of credibility and reliability, or the share of procurement teams that put Corvane on the shortlist unprompted. **Self-test.** 1. The differential effect that brand knowledge has on consumer response to the marketing of the brand. Levels: customer mindset, product-market outcomes, financial market outcomes. 2. Salience; performance and imagery; judgments and feelings; resonance. 3. $0.9/0.02 = $ USD 45.0 per unit. 4. Price premium $(120 - 90)/90 = 33.3\%$. Revenue premium $5{,}000 \times 120 - 6{,}000 \times 90 = $ USD 60,000. 5. After-tax royalty $100 \times 4\% \times 0.75 = $ USD 3.0m; present value of year 1 $3.0/1.1 = 2.727$. Growing perpetuity: $3.0/(0.10 - 0.02) = $ USD 37.500m (with year-1 royalty of 3.0). 6. A brand can raise its price premium by selling less, or its volume by pricing lower. Revenue premium nets the two, so it is harder to game and closer to the cash the brand produces. 7. People know the brand but do not see it as relevant or right for them: an associations and positioning problem. Research what the brand stands for in the category, then work on relevant associations (product proof, endorsers, content), not more reach. 8. Perceived fit through transfer of skills and assets, and complementarity or substitutability of the products; the parent's perceived quality also matters. 9. Its cost cannot be separated from the cost of developing the business as a whole, so IAS 38 prohibits recognition of internally generated brands. Brands acquired in a business combination are recognised separately at fair value. 10. Survey: the brand funnel or Park and Srinivasan's survey method, suited to diagnosing brand health and extension potential. Sales: the revenue premium or a choice-model brand constant, suited to pricing and to linking the brand to money. ## Revision history | Version | Date | Author | Change summary | |---|---|---|---| | 0.1 | YYYY-MM-DD | [Your name] | First draft from the template | | 0.2 | YYYY-MM-DD | [Your name] | *Example:* Replaced Northfield data with tracker wave and licensing comparables | ## Standard and licence note Based on the published brand equity literature (Aaker 1991, 1996; Keller 1993, 2001; Keller and Lehmann 2006; Ailawadi, Lehmann and Neslin 2003; Kamakura and Russell 1993; Park and Srinivasan 1994; Simon and Sullivan 1993; Aaker and Keller 1990) as taught in MBA brand management and marketing analytics electives, with accounting references to IAS 38 and IFRS 3 as checked on ifrs.org on 2026-10-28. The explanations, worked examples, data and layout are original and fictional; no textbook text, published case, standard text or exam question is reproduced. The template is not affiliated with or endorsed by any business school, publisher or standard setter. Check the current official versions and your own course materials before you rely on them. Template licence: MIT.