# Competitive Advantage Concept Card: [Company or case name] > A concept card for competitive advantage as it is taught in a first-year MBA strategy core: what an advantage is in > economic terms (the gap between willingness to pay and cost), the generic strategies of cost leadership, > differentiation and focus, how to measure an advantage with ROIC against WACC and economic profit, what makes it > last, and three modern lenses that change the picture: disruptive innovation, value innovation (Kim and Mauborgne 2005) and > platforms with network effects. It is for MBA students preparing a case discussion or exam and for managers who must > explain where their firm's margin comes from. The card explains the idea first, then gives formulas with a notation > table, a fully solved example for Corvane Robotics, a half-solved example for Northfield Outdoor Co., an unsolved > platform exercise, a self-test and a separate answer key. All companies and numbers are fictional. > Source basis: Porter (1980, 1985, 1996), Brandenburger and Stuart (1996), Christensen (1997), Kim and Mauborgne (2005), > Katz and Shapiro (1985), Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Parker, Van Alstyne and Choudary (2016), written up in original > words and examples. Replace every [bracketed] value and every row marked *Example*. ## Document control | Field | Value | |---|---| | Course or project | [Strategy core, session 4 / client project / own company review] | | Learner or team | [Your name or learning team] | | Company and main rival | [Corvane Robotics and Rival H (both fictional) / your firms] | | Unit of analysis | [Per robot per year / per customer / per unit sold] | | Evidence sources | [Customer interviews, win-loss data, cost benchmarks, annual reports] | | Reviewed by | [Instructor, mentor or team member] | | Date | YYYY-MM-DD | | Version | [0.1] | ## When to use it **One-sentence rule:** use this card when you need to explain, measure or defend a firm's ability to earn returns above its cost of capital compared with its rivals. | Use it when | Use something else when | |---|---| | A case asks "what is this firm's strategy and is it working?" | The question is industry attractiveness only (`mba/mba-five-forces-card`) | | You compare two rivals' margins and need to explain the gap | You need the internal source of the gap (`mba/mba-resource-based-view-card`) | | A new low-cost or new-market entrant threatens an incumbent | You need to set a specific price (`mba/mba-pricing-card`) | | Management considers repositioning (cost, differentiation, focus) | The issue is strategic interaction with one rival (`mba/mba-game-theory-card`) | | A platform business must decide which side to subsidise | You need a growth path (`mba/mba-growth-strategy-card`) | ## The idea in plain language **Value creation.** Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) define the value created by a transaction as the gap between what the buyer is willing to pay (WTP) and the opportunity cost of the suppliers who provide the inputs. That gap is shared three ways: the customer keeps WTP minus price, the firm keeps price minus its costs, and suppliers keep what they are paid minus their opportunity cost. A firm has a **competitive advantage** when it creates more value than its rivals: it opens a wider gap between WTP and cost. Price only decides how the value is split; it does not create value. A common simplification, used in many textbooks, writes value created as WTP minus the firm's cost. That is fine when the firm pays suppliers roughly their opportunity cost. Keep the full version in mind when suppliers or employees capture a large share (a scarce component, a star engineering team). **Generic strategies.** Porter (1980, 1985) argued that a firm can outperform in two broad ways, on a broad or a narrow scope: | | Lower cost than rivals | Higher willingness to pay than rivals | |---|---|---| | **Broad target** | Cost leadership | Differentiation | | **Narrow target (a segment)** | Cost focus | Differentiation focus | A cost leader opens the gap from below (same WTP, much lower cost); a differentiator opens it from above (higher WTP, cost not much higher). Porter warned that a firm trying to do both without a clear choice risks being "stuck in the middle". Later work shows that some firms do achieve both, usually through a new technology or process that shifts the frontier, so treat "stuck in the middle" as a warning about unclear trade-offs, not a law. Porter (1996) added that **operational effectiveness** (doing the same activities better) is necessary but is not strategy, because best practices spread; strategy means choosing a different set of activities, with trade-offs and fit. **Measuring advantage.** Accounting margins mislead when firms use different amounts of capital. The finance test is whether return on invested capital (ROIC) exceeds the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The difference, times invested capital, is **economic profit**: the profit left after paying all providers of capital their required return. A firm with a real advantage earns positive economic profit across a cycle, not only in a good year. **Sustainability.** Advantages erode as rivals imitate, substitutes appear and customers' needs change. They last when they rest on resources that pass the VRIO tests (`mba/mba-resource-based-view-card`), on first-mover advantages such as learning, pre-emption of scarce assets and buyer switching costs (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988), or on network effects. **Disruptive innovation.** Christensen (1997) explained why well-run incumbents lose: they listen to their best customers and improve products along the dimensions those customers value, which leaves room below. An entrant starts with a product that is worse on the mainstream measure but cheaper, simpler or more convenient, either for the least demanding customers (**low-end foothold**) or for people who were not buying at all (**new-market foothold**). Because the entrant's margins look unattractive to the incumbent, it is ignored until its product improves enough for the mainstream. Christensen, Raynor and McDonald (2015) stressed that disruption describes this process; not every successful newcomer is disruptive. **Value innovation.** Kim and Mauborgne, in their book *Blue Ocean Strategy* (2005), argued that firms can escape head-to-head competition by redefining what is offered: dropping or reducing factors the industry competes on that buyers do not value much, while raising some others and creating new ones. Their four-actions grid asks which factors to **eliminate**, **reduce**, **raise** and **create** (ERRC). The aim is to raise buyer value and lower cost at the same time, which challenges the strict either-or reading of the generic strategies. Their strategy canvas plots the offering's level on each competing factor against rivals' levels. **Platforms and network effects.** A product has a **direct network effect** when each user benefits from more users of the same kind (messaging, a shared file format), formalised by Katz and Shapiro (1985). A platform has **indirect (cross-side) network effects** when users on one side benefit from more users on the other side (app developers and device owners, sellers and buyers). Rochet and Tirole (2003) showed that in such two-sided markets the **structure** of prices across sides matters, not only the level: platforms often charge one side little or nothing to attract the side that pays. Parker, Van Alstyne and Choudary (2016) describe how platform firms orchestrate value created by outside producers and consumers instead of producing it in a linear value chain. Network effects can create a strong, lasting advantage, but they can also run in reverse when users leave, and multi-homing (users on several platforms at once) weakens them. ## Formulas and notation **Value stick (per unit):** $$ \text{Value created} = WTP - SOC = \underbrace{(WTP - P)}_{\text{customer surplus}} + \underbrace{(P - C)}_{\text{firm margin}} + \underbrace{(C - SOC)}_{\text{supplier surplus}} $$ **Competitive advantage of firm A over firm B** (in value created per unit): $$ \Delta_{AB} = (WTP_A - SOC_A) - (WTP_B - SOC_B) $$ **Customer choice.** A customer buys from the firm that offers the higher customer surplus. The highest price firm A can charge while matching B's customer surplus is $$ P_A^{\max} = WTP_A - (WTP_B - P_B) $$ **Return on invested capital and economic profit:** $$ NOPAT = EBIT \times (1 - t), \qquad ROIC = \frac{NOPAT}{IC}, \qquad EP = (ROIC - WACC) \times IC = NOPAT - WACC \times IC $$ **Simple two-sided platform** (cross-side effects only, linear): $$ v_{\text{site}} = a + b \cdot A, \qquad v_{\text{dev}} = c \cdot S - f $$ | Symbol | Meaning | Unit | |---|---|---| | $WTP$ | Customer's willingness to pay: the most the customer would pay before walking away | USD per unit | | $P$ | Price charged | USD per unit | | $C$ | Firm's cost per unit, including what it pays suppliers and employees | USD per unit | | $SOC$ | Suppliers' opportunity cost: the least suppliers would accept | USD per unit | | $\Delta_{AB}$ | Advantage of A over B in value created | USD per unit | | $EBIT$ | Earnings before interest and taxes | USD m | | $t$ | Tax rate on operating profit | % | | $NOPAT$ | Net operating profit after tax | USD m | | $IC$ | Invested capital (net working capital plus net fixed assets and capitalised intangibles), here at the start of the year | USD m | | $WACC$ | Weighted average cost of capital (`mba/mba-capm-wacc-card`) | % per year | | $EP$ | Economic profit | USD m | | $A$, $S$ | Number of apps (developer side) and of customer sites (customer side) on a platform | count | | $a, b, c, f$ | Platform parameters: stand-alone value, value per app, value per site, developer fixed cost | USD k per year | ## Assumptions and limits - **WTP is hard to measure.** Use conjoint studies, win-loss interviews, price tests, or the cost savings a business customer can prove. State the range, not one number. - **Averages hide segments.** WTP differs between customer segments; the advantage may exist only in one (that is what a focus strategy exploits). - **ROIC depends on accounting.** Leases, capitalised R&D, acquired goodwill and cash balances change invested capital. Define IC the same way for every firm you compare, and use opening or average capital consistently. - **One year is not an advantage.** Look at three to five years and at the cycle. Young firms often have negative economic profit while they invest; judge them on the trend and unit economics (`finance/unit-economics-analysis`). - **Generic strategies simplify.** Real firms combine cost and differentiation elements. Use the matrix to force a clear primary choice, not to forbid combinations. - **Disruption is a theory of process, not a label.** Applying it after the fact to every winner makes it useless. - **Network effects are not automatic.** They depend on the quality of matches, local or global reach, and how easily users multi-home. Many platforms with network effects still lose. ## How managers use it in practice 1. **Draw the value stick** for your firm and the nearest rival per unit: WTP, price, cost, supplier opportunity cost. 2. **Find the driver.** Is the gap mostly on the WTP side (differentiation) or the cost side (cost leadership)? Which activities in the value chain produce it? 3. **Check it in the numbers.** ROIC against WACC over several years, economic profit, and the comparison with rivals. 4. **Test sustainability.** Which resources, first-mover advantages or network effects protect the gap? How fast could a rival close it? 5. **Scan for threats**: a low-end or new-market entrant (disruption), a rival redefining the offer (value innovation), or a platform that could make your product one of many on its marketplace. 6. **Decide pricing and investment**: where between cost and WTP to price (share more value with customers to grow, or capture more margin), and where to invest to widen the gap. ```mermaid flowchart TD A["Draw the value stick for the firm and its nearest rival"] --> B{"Where is the gap?"} B -- "Higher WTP" --> C["Differentiation or differentiation focus: protect the drivers of WTP"] B -- "Lower cost" --> D["Cost leadership or cost focus: protect scale, process and input advantages"] B -- "Both, through a new offer" --> E["Value innovation: check the ERRC logic and the cost side"] B -- "No gap" --> F["Parity: improve operational effectiveness, look for a new position"] C --> G{"ROIC above WACC over several years?"} D --> G E --> G G -- Yes --> H["Test sustainability: VRIO, first-mover advantages, network effects"] G -- No --> I["Advantage not yet real: fix unit economics or capital intensity"] H --> J["Scan threats: disruption, value innovation by rivals, platforms"] ``` ## Worked example A (fully solved): Corvane Robotics against Rival H **Situation (fictional).** Corvane Robotics sells autonomous mobile robots and fleet software to warehouses, mostly on multi-year contracts priced per robot per year. Its main rival, here called Rival H, offers a similar robot. Win-loss interviews and customer cost studies give the following estimates, per robot per year, in USD thousand. **Step 1: value stick.** | Item (USD k per robot per year) | Corvane | Rival H | Excel (Corvane column B) | |---|---|---|---| | Willingness to pay (labour saved, accuracy, uptime) | 62 | 54 | input B3 | | Price | 48 | 44 | input B4 | | Firm's cost (hardware, service, software, capital charge excluded) | 34 | 33 | input B5 | | Suppliers' opportunity cost | 26 | 26 | input B6 | | **Value created** (WTP minus SOC) | **36** | **28** | `=B3-B6` | | Customer surplus (WTP minus price) | 14 | 10 | `=B3-B4` | | Firm margin (price minus cost) | 14 | 11 | `=B4-B5` | | Supplier surplus (cost minus SOC) | 8 | 7 | `=B5-B6` | | Firm margin as % of price | 29.2% | 25.0% | `=(B4-B5)/B4` | Corvane's advantage in value created is $\Delta = 36 - 28 = 8$ (USD k per robot per year). Using the simplified WTP minus cost measure, the gap is $28 - 21 = 7$. The advantage is on the WTP side: Corvane's robots are valued USD 8k more, while its cost is only USD 1k higher. This is a **differentiation** advantage. Customers choose Corvane because it leaves them more surplus (14 against 10). Corvane could raise its price up to $P^{\max} = 62 - (54 - 44) = 52$ and still match Rival H's customer surplus. At that price its margin would be $52 - 34 = 18$. Charging less than the maximum is a choice: Corvane shares value with customers to win share faster. ```vega-lite { "$schema": "https://vega.github.io/schema/vega-lite/v5.json", "description": "Value stick per robot per year, USD thousand (fictional): how value is shared between suppliers, firm and customer", "width": 300, "height": 240, "data": {"values": [ {"firm": "Corvane", "slice": "1 Supplier opportunity cost", "value": 26}, {"firm": "Corvane", "slice": "2 Supplier surplus", "value": 8}, {"firm": "Corvane", "slice": "3 Firm margin", "value": 14}, {"firm": "Corvane", "slice": "4 Customer surplus", "value": 14}, {"firm": "Rival H", "slice": "1 Supplier opportunity cost", "value": 26}, {"firm": "Rival H", "slice": "2 Supplier surplus", "value": 7}, {"firm": "Rival H", "slice": "3 Firm margin", "value": 11}, {"firm": "Rival H", "slice": "4 Customer surplus", "value": 10} ]}, "mark": "bar", "encoding": { "x": {"field": "firm", "type": "nominal", "title": null}, "y": {"field": "value", "type": "quantitative", "aggregate": "sum", "title": "USD k per robot per year (top of bar = WTP)"}, "color": {"field": "slice", "type": "nominal", "title": "Slice"}, "order": {"field": "slice", "type": "ordinal"} } } ``` **Step 2: will the advantage show in the returns?** Corvane's operating results to 2025 were losses (EBIT USD -16.12m in 2025, Exhibit 1 of `mba/mba-strategy-guide`), so economic profit has been negative so far. The board plan below tests when the per-robot advantage should turn into returns. Tax rate 25%, WACC 11%, invested capital measured at the start of each year (USD m). | Year | EBIT | NOPAT | Opening IC | ROIC | WACC | Economic profit | Excel (row 10) | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | FY2027 plan *(Example)* | 6.0 | 4.5 | 80.0 | 5.6% | 11% | -4.30 | NOPAT `=B10*(1-25%)`, ROIC `=C10/D10` | | FY2028 plan *(Example)* | 14.0 | 10.5 | 92.0 | 11.4% | 11% | 0.38 | EP `=C10-F10*D10` | | FY2029 plan *(Example)* | 24.0 | 18.0 | 110.0 | 16.4% | 11% | 5.90 | or `=(E10-F10)*D10` (ROIC in E10, WACC in F10) | ```vega-lite { "$schema": "https://vega.github.io/schema/vega-lite/v5.json", "description": "Corvane Robotics (fictional): ROIC against WACC, board plan FY2027 to FY2029", "width": 320, "height": 180, "data": {"values": [ {"year": "FY2027", "measure": "ROIC", "pct": 5.6}, {"year": "FY2028", "measure": "ROIC", "pct": 11.4}, {"year": "FY2029", "measure": "ROIC", "pct": 16.4}, {"year": "FY2027", "measure": "WACC", "pct": 11.0}, {"year": "FY2028", "measure": "WACC", "pct": 11.0}, {"year": "FY2029", "measure": "WACC", "pct": 11.0} ]}, "mark": {"type": "line", "point": true}, "encoding": { "x": {"field": "year", "type": "ordinal", "title": null}, "y": {"field": "pct", "type": "quantitative", "title": "Percent"}, "color": {"field": "measure", "type": "nominal", "title": null} } } ``` **Interpretation.** On the plan, the value-stick advantage turns into economic profit only in FY2028 and becomes clearly positive in FY2029 (USD 5.90m). Today the advantage is visible per robot but not yet in returns: Corvane is still investing faster than its margins grow. The plan supports the claim of a real advantage only if it is met, so a board should track ROIC against WACC each year and treat a miss in FY2028 as evidence against the claim. **Step 3: sustainability and threats.** - Protection: the pick-performance data set and the engineering routines (see the VRIO analysis in `mba/mba-resource-based-view-card`) support the WTP gap; the fleet software alone does not, because rivals copy features within about a year. - Disruption check: a new entrant sells a camera-only robot at about half Corvane's price to small warehouses that today use no automation. It is worse on Corvane's main measure (picks per hour) but good enough for small sites. This is a **new-market foothold** with a path upward if the vision system improves. Corvane's response options: a separate low-cost unit, a partnership, or monitoring with a clear trigger (for example, the entrant's robots reaching 70% of Corvane's pick rate). - Value innovation check (ERRC) for a "robots for small warehouses" offer: eliminate on-site integration projects, reduce custom configuration, raise ease of set-up, create a monthly subscription with no minimum fleet size. **Step 4: so what.** (1) Pricing: Corvane has headroom up to about USD 52k per robot per year at today's WTP; a modest increase on renewals is defensible, with the rest kept to win share. (2) Investment: fund the data and engineering resources that drive WTP; set up a small team to test the small-warehouse offer before the entrant moves up. ## Worked example B (half solved): Northfield Outdoor Co. against a discount rival **Situation (fictional).** Northfield sells its own-brand technical jackets with lifetime repairs. A discount chain sells a basic jacket. Estimates per jacket, in USD: | Item (USD per jacket) | Northfield | Discount rival | Excel | |---|---|---|---| | Willingness to pay (target customer) | 240 | 150 | input | | Price | 185 | 119 | input | | Cost | 112 | 78 | input | | Value created (WTP minus cost, simplified) | [ ] | 72 | `=WTP-Cost` | | Customer surplus | 55 | [ ] | `=WTP-Price` | | Firm margin | [ ] | 41 | `=Price-Cost` | | Margin as % of price | 39.5% | [ ] | `=(Price-Cost)/Price` | Northfield's NOPAT is USD 21.6m, opening invested capital USD 160m, WACC 9%. 1. ROIC = [ ] (`=21.6/160`). 2. Economic profit = [ ] (`=21.6-9%*160`). 3. Generic strategy Northfield follows: [ ]. 4. Why do the two firms not compete for the same customer even though Northfield's customer surplus is higher? [ ]. 5. One threat to Northfield's advantage and the response you would recommend: [ ]. ## Exercise C (unsolved): Corvane's app marketplace **Situation (fictional).** Corvane opens a marketplace where third-party developers sell add-on apps (slotting, labour planning, safety analytics) to warehouse sites that run Corvane robots. Analysis suggests: - value to each customer site, in USD k per year: $v_{\text{site}} = 2.0 + 0.05 \cdot A$, where $A$ is the number of apps; - value to each developer, in USD k per year: $v_{\text{dev}} = 0.4 \cdot S - 15$, where $S$ is the number of sites. 1. What is the value to each site when $A = 40$ and when $A = 120$? 2. How many sites must the platform have before a developer finds it worth joining? 3. With $S = 300$ sites, what is each developer's value? 4. With $S = 300$ and $A = 120$, what is the total cross-side value received by all sites from the apps, and by all developers from the sites? 5. Which side should Corvane subsidise first, and why? Use Rochet and Tirole's insight on price structure. 6. Name two things that could weaken the network effect (think of multi-homing and match quality). ## Connections to other cards - `mba/mba-five-forces-card`: industry structure sets the average; competitive advantage explains the deviation from it. - `mba/mba-resource-based-view-card`: VRIO explains why the WTP or cost gap exists and how long it can last. - `mba/mba-value-chain-card`: find the activities that raise WTP or lower cost. - `mba/mba-capm-wacc-card`: WACC is the hurdle that ROIC must beat. - `mba/mba-pricing-card`: the value stick tells you the range; pricing decides the point within it. - `mba/mba-game-theory-card`: how a rival responds to your price or capacity change. - `mba/mba-growth-strategy-card`: grow where the advantage travels. - `mba/mba-dcf-valuation-card`: a sustained advantage shows up as a longer period of excess returns in the forecast. ## Common mistakes and misconceptions 1. **Confusing price with value.** A higher price is not an advantage; a wider gap between WTP and cost is. 2. **Using accounting margin alone.** A high margin with very high capital needs can mean ROIC below WACC. Always check capital. 3. **Calling operational efficiency a strategy.** Best practices spread; Porter (1996) separates them from strategic positioning. 4. **Claiming both cost leadership and differentiation without evidence.** Show the numbers on both sides or pick one. 5. **Labelling every newcomer "disruptive".** Check the foothold: low-end or new-market, and an initially inferior product on the incumbent's main measure. 6. **Reading value innovation as "find a market with no competitors".** The core is the ERRC logic: raise value and cut cost together by redefining the offer. 7. **Assuming network effects guarantee a winner.** Multi-homing, weak match quality and local effects can keep markets fragmented. 8. **Comparing ROIC computed differently.** Opening versus average capital, with or without goodwill, with or without leases: align before comparing. 9. **Ignoring who captures value.** Suppliers, employees or a platform owner can capture the value your advantage creates. 10. **Judging from one good year.** Use several years and the cycle. ## Self-test questions 1. Define value created and show how it divides between customer, firm and suppliers. 2. Firm X: WTP 100, price 80, cost 60. Firm Y: WTP 90, price 65, cost 50. Supplier opportunity cost is 45 for both. Which firm creates more value, by how much, and which do customers prefer at these prices? 3. In question 2, what is the highest price X can charge and still match Y's customer surplus? 4. Name Porter's four generic strategies and the risk Porter called "stuck in the middle". 5. EBIT USD 30m, tax 25%, invested capital USD 200m, WACC 10%. Compute ROIC and economic profit, with Excel formulas. 6. Why can a firm with a 40% gross margin still have negative economic profit? 7. Distinguish a low-end foothold from a new-market foothold, with one example of each from your own experience. 8. What do the four actions of the ERRC grid ask, and what is the aim of using them together? 9. Distinguish direct from indirect network effects. Why may a platform charge one side nothing? 10. What does Porter (1996) mean by the difference between operational effectiveness and strategy? ## My notes and next steps | Date | Note or action | Done | |---|---|---| | YYYY-MM-DD | *Example:* Draw the value stick for the two firms in Monday's case before class | [ ] | | YYYY-MM-DD | *Example:* Compute ROIC and economic profit for my employer's last three years | [ ] | | YYYY-MM-DD | [Your action] | [ ] | ## Sources and further reading - Porter, M. E. (1980). *Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors*. Free Press. - Porter, M. E. (1985). *Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance*. Free Press. - Porter, M. E. (1996). What is strategy? *Harvard Business Review*, 74(6), 61-78. - Brandenburger, A. M., and Stuart, H. W. (1996). Value-based business strategy. *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy*, 5(1), 5-24. - Lieberman, M. B., and Montgomery, D. B. (1988). First-mover advantages. *Strategic Management Journal*, 9(S1), 41-58. - Bower, J. L., and Christensen, C. M. (1995). Disruptive technologies: catching the wave. *Harvard Business Review*, 73(1), 43-53. - Christensen, C. M. (1997). *The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail*. Harvard Business School Press. - Christensen, C. M., Raynor, M. E., and McDonald, R. (2015). What is disruptive innovation? *Harvard Business Review*, 93(12), 44-53. - Kim, W. C., and Mauborgne, R. (2005). *Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant*. Harvard Business School Press. - Katz, M. L., and Shapiro, C. (1985). Network externalities, competition, and compatibility. *American Economic Review*, 75(3), 424-440. - Rochet, J.-C., and Tirole, J. (2003). Platform competition in two-sided markets. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 1(4), 990-1029. - Parker, G. G., Van Alstyne, M. W., and Choudary, S. P. (2016). *Platform Revolution: How Networked Markets Are Transforming the Economy and How to Make Them Work for You*. W. W. Norton. - Textbooks (further reading, by name only): Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer, *Economics of Strategy*; Grant, *Contemporary Strategy Analysis*; Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, *Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies* (ROIC and economic profit). - Open resource: OpenStax, *Principles of Management* (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0), chapters on strategy, https://openstax.org/details/books/principles-management. ## Answer key **Worked example B.** Value created: Northfield $240 - 112 = 128$; rival 72. Customer surplus rival: $150 - 119 = 31$. Firm margin Northfield: $185 - 112 = 73$. Margin rival: $41/119 = 34.5\%$. (1) ROIC = 21.6 / 160 = 13.5%. (2) Economic profit = $21.6 - 0.09 \times 160$ = USD 7.2m. (3) Differentiation (arguably differentiation focus on serious outdoor users): WTP is USD 90 higher for a cost USD 34 higher. (4) The two firms serve different segments: the rival's buyers have a lower WTP for technical features (their WTP for the Northfield jacket would be much lower than 240), so the comparison of surplus applies within a segment, not across them. (5) Example: a premium brand copying lifetime repairs; response: organise repair data into design improvements and resale (see the VRIO card), and make repairs faster and visible to customers. **Exercise C.** (1) $A = 40$: $2.0 + 0.05 \times 40 = 4.0$; $A = 120$: $8.0$ (USD k per site per year). (2) $0.4S - 15 > 0$ gives $S > 37.5$, so at least 38 sites. (3) $0.4 \times 300 - 15 = 105$ (USD k per year). (4) Sites receive $300 \times 0.05 \times 120 = 1{,}800$ (USD k per year) from apps; developers receive $120 \times 0.4 \times 300 = 14{,}400$ gross (before their fixed cost of 15 each). (5) Corvane already has the customer sites (its robot base), so the side that needs attracting is developers: lower or waive developer fees and offer tools, then charge the side with the higher willingness to pay. Rochet and Tirole show that the split of prices across sides, not only their total, decides participation. (6) Multi-homing (developers sell the same app on rival platforms), poor match quality (low-quality apps reduce site value), and data-access limits that restrict app usefulness. **Self-test.** 1. Value created = WTP minus suppliers' opportunity cost; customer surplus = WTP minus price; firm margin = price minus cost; supplier surplus = cost minus supplier opportunity cost. 2. X: $100 - 45 = 55$; Y: $90 - 45 = 45$; X creates 10 more. Customer surplus: X $100 - 80 = 20$, Y $90 - 65 = 25$, so customers prefer Y at these prices. 3. $P^{\max} = 100 - 25 = 75$. At 75 X matches Y's customer surplus of 25. 4. Cost leadership, differentiation, cost focus, differentiation focus. Stuck in the middle: pursuing all without a clear choice, ending up with neither the lowest cost nor a WTP premium. 5. NOPAT = $30 \times 0.75 = 22.5$ (`=30*(1-25%)`); ROIC = $22.5/200 = 11.25\%$ (`=22.5/200`); EP = $22.5 - 0.10 \times 200 = 2.5$ (`=22.5-10%*200`), USD 2.5m. 6. Gross margin ignores operating expenses, taxes and the capital needed to run the business; if NOPAT is small relative to invested capital, ROIC falls below WACC. 7. Low-end: serves the least demanding existing customers with a cheaper, good-enough product. New-market: serves people who were not buying at all because the existing product was too costly or complex. 8. Eliminate factors the industry takes for granted, reduce factors well below the standard, raise factors well above the standard, create factors never offered. Together they aim to raise buyer value while lowering cost. 9. Direct: users benefit from more users of the same kind. Indirect: users on one side benefit from more users on the other. A platform may charge one side nothing because that side's participation creates value that the other side pays for. 10. Operational effectiveness is performing similar activities better than rivals; it spreads through imitation. Strategy is choosing a different set of activities that deliver a unique mix of value, with trade-offs and fit. ## Revision history | Version | Date | Author | Change summary | |---|---|---|---| | 0.1 | YYYY-MM-DD | [Your name] | First draft from the template | | 0.2 | YYYY-MM-DD | [Your name] | *Example:* Updated WTP estimates after 12 win-loss interviews | ## Standard and licence note Based on the published strategy and economics literature on competitive advantage (Porter 1980, 1985 and 1996; Brandenburger and Stuart 1996; Christensen 1997; Kim and Mauborgne 2005; Katz and Shapiro 1985; Rochet and Tirole 2003; Parker, Van Alstyne and Choudary 2016). The text, examples, numbers and the simple platform model are original; the frameworks are described in own words. The card has no affiliation with any school, publisher or author named. Check the original works when you cite them. Template licence: MIT.