# Power and Influence Concept Card: [Your name, course or situation, and date] > A concept card for the power, influence and organisational politics elective of a leading MBA programme, the course > that Pfeffer's work made a fixture of management education. It covers where power comes from (French and Raven > 1959; Emerson 1962; Hickson and colleagues 1971; Salancik and Pfeffer 1974; Pfeffer 1981 and 1992), how networks > create it (Granovetter 1973; Brass 1984; Krackhardt 1990; Burt 2004), how influence tactics turn it into action > (Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson 1980; Yukl and Falbe 1990; Falbe and Yukl 1992), political skill (Ferris and > colleagues 2005), what power does to the people who hold it (Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson 2003; Magee and > Galinsky 2008) and the ethics of organisational politics (Cavanagh, Moberg and Velasquez 1981). Worked example A is > a complete influence plan for a product manager at a fictional robotics company, with a dependence map, network > centrality computed from an advice network, a perception check and a sequenced coalition plan. It is for MBA > students preparing a case or exam and for managers who need to get things done without formal authority. > Source basis: the original works cited below, written up in original words. Corvane Robotics, Tallow Creek Medical > Center and every person and number are fictional and were computed in Python. > Replace every [bracketed] value and every row marked *Example*. ## Document control | Field | Value | |---|---| | Learner or manager | [Your name] | | Course or setting | [Power and influence elective; leadership core; workplace situation] | | Goal | [Example: approval to move two engineers to a customer-requested module for two quarters] | | Decision forum and date | [Example: executive staff meeting, YYYY-MM-DD] | | Confidentiality | [Private working notes; do not circulate] | | Reviewed by | [Coach, mentor or learning team member] | | Version | [0.1] | | Last updated | YYYY-MM-DD | ### Approvals | Role | Name | Date | Decision | |---|---|---|---| | Learner | [Name] | YYYY-MM-DD | [Plan drafted] | | Coach or mentor | [Name] | YYYY-MM-DD | [Ethics tests reviewed] | ## Contents - [When to use it](#when-to-use-it) - [The idea in plain language](#the-idea-in-plain-language) - [Formulas and notation](#formulas-and-notation) - [The frameworks in more depth](#the-frameworks-in-more-depth) - [Assumptions and limits](#assumptions-and-limits) - [Ethics of power and politics](#ethics-of-power-and-politics) - [How managers use it](#how-managers-use-it) - [Worked example A (fully solved): a product manager at Corvane Robotics](#worked-example-a-fully-solved-a-product-manager-at-corvane-robotics) - [Worked example B (half solved): a different bridge](#worked-example-b-half-solved-a-different-bridge) - [Exercise C (unsolved): a discharge process at Tallow Creek](#exercise-c-unsolved-a-discharge-process-at-tallow-creek) - [Connections to other cards](#connections-to-other-cards) - [Common mistakes and misconceptions](#common-mistakes-and-misconceptions) - [Self-test questions](#self-test-questions) - [My notes and next steps](#my-notes-and-next-steps) - [Sources and further reading](#sources-and-further-reading) - [Answer key](#answer-key) ## When to use it **One-sentence rule:** use this card when getting something done depends on people you cannot instruct, and you need to understand who has power over the outcome, why, and how to earn their support legitimately. | Use when | Use something else when | |---|---| | You lead without formal authority (product, project, staff and matrix roles) | The issue is one person's motivation in a stable role (mba/mba-motivation-card) | | A decision will be made by a group whose members have different interests | The decision is a single negotiation with clear parties (mba/mba-negotiation-planner) | | You are new to an organisation and need to read its political landscape | Many people must change behaviour after a decision (mba/mba-change-management-card) | | A case asks why a capable person failed to get support, or why a proposal stalled | The arena is government or activists outside the firm (mba/mba-nonmarket-strategy-card) | | You are building a career and want to understand how power accumulates | The issue is team process (mba/mba-team-dynamics-card) | ## The idea in plain language **Power** is the capacity to change what others do or would otherwise have done. **Influence** is power in use: the behaviours by which one person changes another's attitudes or actions. **Organisational politics** is the use of influence through informal channels to affect decisions where interests differ and the formal rules do not settle the matter. Pfeffer (1981, 1992) argued that politics is not a pathology of badly run organisations but a normal feature of any organisation where resources are scarce, goals differ and the link between action and result is uncertain. Managers who refuse to understand power do not avoid politics; they lose to people who understand it. **Bases of power.** French and Raven (1959) named five bases. Three come with a position: **legitimate** power (the right to ask, given by the role), **reward** power and **coercive** power (control over what people want or fear). Two belong to the person: **expert** power (knowledge others need) and **referent** power (others identify with and respect you). Raven later added **informational** power, the ability to change minds with the content of an argument. Positional bases tend to secure compliance; personal bases more often secure commitment. **Power is a property of a relationship.** Emerson (1962) defined the power of A over B as equal to B's dependence on A, and B's dependence as growing with how much B values what A controls and falling with B's alternatives. Power is therefore not something a person has in general, but something one party holds over another in a given matter, and it can be changed: by creating value others need, by reducing your own dependence through alternatives, or by forming coalitions. **Power comes from solving critical problems.** Hickson and colleagues (1971) proposed the strategic contingencies theory: a subunit gains power when it copes with uncertainty that matters to others, when it is hard to substitute and when it is central to the workflow. Mechanic (1962) showed how people low in the hierarchy (assistants, technicians) gain power through access to information, people and instruments. Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) found that university departments with more grants and national prestige obtained more internal resources, beyond what their workload justified: power follows control of critical resources, and then helps secure more of them. **Power comes from the network.** Who you are connected to, and where you sit in the pattern of connections, is a source of power independent of rank. Brass (1984) found that people central in workflow and communication networks were seen as more influential and were more often promoted. Granovetter (1973) showed that weak ties (acquaintances) carry new information because they bridge to other circles. Burt (2004) showed that people whose contacts are not connected to each other, who span **structural holes**, see more good ideas and are rewarded for them. Krackhardt (1990) found that people who perceived the informal advice network accurately had more power, independent of their own position: knowing the map is a source of power. **Influence tactics.** Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson (1980) collected and grouped the tactics managers use. Yukl and Falbe (1990) refined them into tactics such as rational persuasion, inspirational appeals, consultation, ingratiation, exchange, personal appeals, coalition tactics, legitimating tactics and pressure. Falbe and Yukl (1992) found that rational persuasion, inspirational appeals and consultation were more likely to produce commitment, while pressure and legitimating tactics more often produced resistance; combinations worked better than single tactics when they included a "soft" tactic. Cialdini's principles of persuasion (reciprocity, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, authority, scarcity and, in later editions, unity) describe why some requests succeed; using them to manipulate is unethical and fragile. **Political skill.** Ferris and colleagues (2005) defined political skill as the ability to understand others at work and to use that knowledge to influence them in ways that advance personal and organisational goals, with four dimensions: social astuteness, interpersonal influence, networking ability and apparent sincerity. It can be developed. **What power does to the holder.** Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson (2003) proposed that power activates approach tendencies: people with power act more, notice rewards more, take more risks and attend less to others' perspectives. Magee and Galinsky (2008) described how power and status reinforce themselves in hierarchies. The practical lesson: once you have power, build in people who will tell you what you do not want to hear. ## Formulas and notation Dependence of person $i$ on person $j$ in a matter, scored from importance $V$ (1 to 5, how much $i$ values what $j$ controls) and scarcity $S$ (1 to 5, how few alternatives $i$ has): $$ D_{i \to j} = V_{ij} \times S_{ij}, \qquad \text{Balance}_{ij} = D_{j \to i} - D_{i \to j} $$ A negative balance means $i$ depends on $j$ more than $j$ depends on $i$: $j$ holds power over $i$ in this matter. Network centrality for node $v$ in an undirected network of $n$ people, with $d(v,u)$ the shortest path length, $\sigma_{st}$ the number of shortest paths between $s$ and $t$, and $\sigma_{st}(v)$ those passing through $v$: $$ C_D(v) = \frac{\deg(v)}{n-1}, \qquad C_C(v) = \frac{n-1}{\sum_{u \ne v} d(v,u)}, \qquad C_B(v) = \sum_{s < t,\ s,t \ne v} \frac{\sigma_{st}(v)}{\sigma_{st}} $$ Normalised betweenness divides $C_B(v)$ by $(n-1)(n-2)/2$, the number of pairs that $v$ could sit between. Perception accuracy (after Krackhardt 1990), comparing a person's perceived network with the actual one over all $n(n-1)/2$ pairs: $$ \text{Accuracy} = \frac{\text{pairs classified correctly as tie or no tie}}{n(n-1)/2} $$ | Symbol | Meaning | Scale | |---|---|---| | $V_{ij}$, $S_{ij}$ | Importance and scarcity of what $j$ controls, for $i$ | 1 to 5 | | $D_{i \to j}$ | Dependence of $i$ on $j$ | 1 to 25 | | $C_D$, $C_C$, $C_B$ | Degree, closeness and betweenness centrality | 0 to 1 (normalised) | | Accuracy | Share of pairs a person perceives correctly | 0 to 1 | ```mermaid flowchart TD A["Goal and decision forum"] --> B["List the people whose support or consent is needed"] B --> C["Dependence map: what you need from each, what they need from you"] C --> D["Advice network: who talks to whom, who brokers"] D --> E["Check your perception against others' view of the network"] E --> F["Choose tactics per person: consultation, rational persuasion, exchange, coalition"] F --> G["Sequence: allies first, brokers next, decision makers last"] G --> H{"Ethics tests passed?"} H -->|"No"| F H -->|"Yes"| I["Act, then record commitments and keep them"] I --> J["Review: what changed in power and relationships"] ``` ## The frameworks in more depth ### Sources of power, from position and from the person | Source | Comes from | Typical holder *(Example)* | How to build it legitimately | |---|---|---|---| | Legitimate | Role and formal authority | Vice president | Take roles with decision rights; clarify decision rights in writing (business/raci) | | Reward and coercive | Control over budgets, promotions, assignments | Budget owner | Control resources others need; use sparingly | | Expert and informational | Knowledge, data, skills others need | Principal engineer | Solve problems others find hard; share knowledge visibly | | Referent | Respect, liking, shared identity | Trusted peer | Keep commitments, give credit, help without being asked | | Strategic contingency | Coping with critical uncertainty, non-substitutability, centrality | Team handling the biggest customer | Take on the problems that matter most to the organisation now | | Resource control | Control of money, people, external relationships | Sales lead with key accounts | Bring in resources (grants, customers, partners) | | Network position | Centrality, brokerage, accurate map | Connector between functions | Build ties across groups; ask for advice; map accurately | ### Influence tactics and their typical outcomes | Tactic | Description | Usually produces | Use when | |---|---|---|---| | Rational persuasion | Logical arguments and evidence | Commitment, if the evidence is credible | The target shares the goal but doubts the plan | | Inspirational appeal | Link the request to the target's values and ideals | Commitment | The request fits what the target cares about | | Consultation | Ask the target to help plan or improve the proposal | Commitment and ownership | The target has expertise or the plan needs their buy-in | | Collaboration | Offer resources or help to carry out the request | Commitment | The target is willing but lacks capacity | | Exchange | Offer something in return | Compliance, sometimes commitment | Both sides gain and the trade is open | | Ingratiation | Praise or flattery before the request | Mixed; looks manipulative if late | Sincere appreciation, given long before any request | | Personal appeal | Ask as a favour on the basis of friendship | Compliance | Small requests between trusted peers | | Coalition | Enlist others to support the request | Compliance or resistance | Peers or superiors need to see broad support | | Legitimating | Invoke rules, authority or precedent | Compliance or resistance | The request is clearly within the rules | | Pressure | Demands, threats, persistent checking | Resistance | Rarely; as a last resort for clear rule breaches | The pattern in the research is that tactics differ by direction: rational persuasion is common upward, consultation and inspirational appeals work in all directions, and pressure is mostly used downward and least effective. ### Reading the network - **Degree centrality** counts direct ties: who is asked for advice most. - **Closeness** measures how quickly someone can reach everyone: who hears news first. - **Betweenness** measures how often someone sits on the shortest path between others: who brokers between groups. A broker can speed up or block the flow of information, which is why people with high betweenness and no formal authority often decide whether a proposal gets traction. - **Structural holes** are gaps between groups. Someone who bridges them sees more ideas but also carries the burden of translating between groups and the risk of being seen as playing both sides. ### Power and resource dependence between organisations Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) extended the dependence logic to organisations: firms depend on external actors for critical resources and manage that dependence by contracts, alliances, mergers, board interlocks and political action. The same reasoning explains why a sales team with a key customer, or a team that controls a scarce technology, gains power inside the firm. ## Assumptions and limits | Assumption | Why it matters | When it fails and what to do | |---|---|---| | Scores of importance and scarcity are accurate | The dependence map rests on them | Test them in conversation; ask what alternatives others have | | The advice network is known | Centrality needs the actual network | Ask several people "whom do you go to for advice on X"; do not rely on your own view alone (Krackhardt 1990) | | Networks are stable | Centrality is a snapshot | Re-map after reorganisations, departures and new projects | | Tactics have the same effect on everyone | Research reports averages | Culture, relationship history and personality change the response | | Power is used for organisational goals | The method can serve private goals | Run the ethics tests; check the goal with someone who will disagree | | More power is always better | Power changes the holder | Build checks: people who challenge you, decisions explained in public | ## Ethics of power and politics Cavanagh, Moberg and Velasquez (1981) proposed judging political behaviour against three criteria: **utility** (does it produce the best outcome for the people affected, not only for the actor?), **rights** (does it respect the rights of others, including free consent, privacy, free speech and due process?) and **justice** (does it treat people fairly and allocate benefits and burdens equitably?). Behaviour that fails one test needs an overwhelming reason on another, and the actor must not be able to justify it only by appeal to self-interest. Three practical tests: 1. **Publicity test.** Would you be comfortable if the people you are influencing saw this plan? 2. **Reciprocity test.** Would you accept being influenced this way? 3. **Goal test.** Does the goal serve the organisation and the people it serves, or only your career? Unacceptable practices include withholding information others need, misrepresenting data, taking credit for others' work, retaliating against people who disagree, and manipulating with false scarcity or false consensus. ## How managers use it - **Dependence map.** One row per person whose support or consent you need: what you need, what they need, the balance. Use it to find where you can create value for others. - **Advice network sketch.** Ask four or five people whom they consult on the topic; draw the ties; find the brokers. - **Tactic plan.** One tactic per person, chosen from what they care about and the direction of the relationship. - **Sequence.** Allies and people who depend on you first, then brokers and experts, then decision makers, so that the decision makers hear the proposal with support already visible and with the experts' improvements built in. - **Commitment log.** Record what you promised and keep it; referent power rests on it. - **Career power audit.** Once a year: which critical problems am I solving, which resources do I bring, how central and how bridging is my network? See mba/mba-networking-tracker. ## Worked example A (fully solved): a product manager at Corvane Robotics **Situation (fictional).** Ana is a senior product manager for warehouse software at Corvane Robotics. A large logistics customer has asked for a fleet-scheduling module and indicates a contract if it is ready in two quarters. Ana needs two engineers from the robotics platform team for two quarters. She has no authority over engineers. The decision will be taken at the executive staff meeting, where the CEO decides after hearing Ben (VP Engineering), Dara (Head of Sales) and Eli (CFO). Ana's first attempt, a slide deck sent to Ben the week before the meeting, was declined: "platform roadmap first". The people: Ben (VP Engineering), Chen (principal engineer, platform architecture, no direct reports), Dara (Head of Sales), Eli (CFO), Femi (Head of Operations), Gus (engineering manager of the two engineers, works closely with Ana) and Hana (customer success lead for the logistics customer). **Part 1. Dependence map** (importance and scarcity scored 1 to 5 by Ana, checked with a mentor). | Person *(Example)* | What Ana needs | V | S | Ana's dependence | What they need from Ana | V | S | Their dependence | Balance | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | Ben | Release of two engineers | 5 | 4 | 20 | Product input on platform priorities | 2 | 3 | 6 | -14 | | Chen | Architecture support, credibility with Ben | 4 | 5 | 20 | Customer use cases for the platform design | 3 | 2 | 6 | -14 | | Dara | Sales case and customer commitment | 4 | 3 | 12 | A product that closes the deal | 3 | 3 | 9 | -3 | | Eli | Budget approval | 5 | 5 | 25 | A credible business case | 2 | 2 | 4 | -21 | | Gus | Team capacity plan | 3 | 2 | 6 | Clear requirements and fewer escalations | 4 | 4 | 16 | +10 | Excel (V in C2, S in D2, their V in G2, their S in H2): Ana's dependence `=C2*D2`, theirs `=G2*H2`, balance `=I2-E2`. Reading: Ana depends on everyone but Gus more than they depend on her. She cannot win by pressure. She needs to raise others' dependence on her (bring Chen the customer use cases he lacks, give Eli a business case he can defend) and to borrow power through a coalition. **Part 2. The advice network.** Ana asked Gus, Hana and Femi independently whom people go to for advice on platform and customer questions, and drew the ties (undirected, 8 people, 11 ties, density 0.39, `=11/28`). ```mermaid flowchart LR Ana --- Gus Ana --- Hana Gus --- Ben Gus --- Chen Chen --- Ben Chen --- Femi Chen --- Dara Ben --- Eli Dara --- Eli Dara --- Hana Femi --- Eli ``` | Person *(Example)* | Degree | Degree centrality | Closeness | Betweenness | Normalised betweenness | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | Ana | 2 | 0.29 | 0.500 | 1.33 | 0.063 | | Ben | 3 | 0.43 | 0.583 | 1.83 | 0.087 | | Chen | 4 | 0.57 | 0.700 | 5.33 | 0.254 | | Dara | 3 | 0.43 | 0.636 | 4.50 | 0.214 | | Eli | 3 | 0.43 | 0.583 | 2.33 | 0.111 | | Femi | 2 | 0.29 | 0.500 | 0.33 | 0.016 | | Gus | 3 | 0.43 | 0.636 | 3.83 | 0.183 | | Hana | 2 | 0.29 | 0.500 | 1.50 | 0.071 | Computed in Python with the formulas above (Brandes' algorithm for betweenness). Excel check for degree centrality: `=COUNTIF(ties,"*Chen*")/(8-1)` on a list of ties; closeness for Chen `=7/10` (sum of distances 10); normalised betweenness `=5.33/21`. In a spreadsheet, betweenness is easier with a network add-in or a short script. Reading: Chen, with no direct reports, is the most central person in the advice network on every measure. He brokers between engineering (Gus, Ben), operations (Femi) and sales (Dara). Ben's legitimate power decides the release of engineers, but Ben consults Chen on anything touching the platform. Chen is the strategic contingency: he copes with the uncertainty that matters most to the engineering leadership (whether the platform will scale). **Part 3. Perception check.** Before the interviews, Ana had drawn the network from memory. Comparing it with the mapped network over 28 pairs: | Item *(Example)* | Result | |---|---| | Pairs classified correctly | 22 of 28, accuracy 0.786 (`=22/28`) | | Ties Ana missed | Gus and Chen, Chen and Dara, Chen and Femi, Femi and Eli | | Ties Ana imagined | Ben and Dara, Gus and Femi | Ana missed three of Chen's four ties. She saw Chen as a technical specialist who talks only to Ben, and she had assumed Ben and Dara negotiated priorities directly. In fact Dara goes to Chen when a customer asks for platform features. Her first attempt failed partly because it went to Ben without Chen, whom Ben consults, and without Dara's support, which goes through Chen. **Part 4. Business case for Eli.** | Line *(Example)* | Excel | Result (USD) | |---|---|---| | Probability the customer signs if the module ships on time | Sales estimate | 60% | | First-year contract value | Customer indication | 1,200,000 | | Expected contract value | `=0.6*1200000` | 720,000 | | Expected gross margin at 70% | `=720000*0.7` | 504,000 | | Cost of two engineers for two quarters at USD 48,000 a quarter each | `=2*2*48000` | 192,000 | | Estimated cost of delaying the platform roadmap (Chen's estimate) | Input | 150,000 | | Expected net value of the proposal | `=504000-192000-150000` | 162,000 | The case is positive but not overwhelming, and it is sensitive to the probability of signing: the break-even probability is 40.7% (`=(192000+150000)/(1200000*0.7)`). That is the number Eli will ask Dara to defend. **Part 5. Tactic plan and sequence.** | Step | Person | Tactic | Specific move *(Example)* | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | Gus | Collaboration | Agree a capacity plan that protects his team's on-call rota | | 2 | Hana | Coalition | Ask Hana to confirm the customer's timeline and pain in writing | | 3 | Chen | Consultation | Ask Chen to design the module so it extends the platform, using the customer's use cases he lacked | | 4 | Dara | Rational persuasion and exchange | Show the deal case; Dara commits the 60% estimate and takes the customer relationship | | 5 | Ben | Consultation and rational persuasion | Present the proposal with Chen's architecture and the roadmap cost Chen estimated | | 6 | Eli | Rational persuasion | Send the business case with the break-even probability before the meeting | | 7 | Executive staff | Coalition | Ben, Dara and Chen's design in the pre-read; Ana presents the decision options | **Part 6. What changed.** After step 3, Ana and Chen began meeting weekly. In the network, adding the Ana and Chen tie raises Ana's betweenness from 1.33 to 2.33 and her closeness from 0.500 to 0.583, and raises Chen's betweenness from 5.33 to 7.27. Ana is now one step from every engineering decision maker through a person they trust. The proposal was approved with one change suggested by Chen: one platform engineer and one engineer from Gus's team, so the platform work did not stop. **Recommendation sentence.** "Ana's first attempt used legitimate channels with the wrong sequence. The person with the most influence on the decision had no formal authority: the principal engineer brokered the advice network. Consulting him first, building a coalition with sales and customer success, and giving the CFO a business case with its break-even point turned a refusal into an approval, without pressure and without anything Ana would hide." ## Worked example B (half solved): a different bridge Suppose Ana, instead of building a tie with Chen, built a tie with Eli (a monthly business review). Use the network in Worked example A plus the tie Ana and Eli. | Person *(Example)* | Degree | Closeness | Betweenness | |---|---|---|---| | Ana | 3 | 0.636 | [ ] | | Ben | 3 | 0.583 | 0.83 | | Chen | 4 | 0.700 | [ ] | | Eli | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | | Gus | 3 | 0.636 | 1.75 | 1. Complete the table. [ ] 2. Compare Ana's betweenness with the Chen tie (2.33) and with the Eli tie. Which tie raises it more? [ ] 3. Even if the Eli tie raises Ana's betweenness more, why might the Chen tie still be the better choice for this proposal? [ ] ## Exercise C (unsolved): a discharge process at Tallow Creek A nurse manager at Tallow Creek Medical Center wants to introduce a discharge-before-noon process on two medical units. It requires physicians to write discharge orders earlier, pharmacy to prepare medications the evening before and transport to schedule pick-ups. She has authority over nurses only. The decision sits with the hospital's patient-flow committee (chief medical officer, chief nursing officer, director of pharmacy). A senior hospitalist is the person most physicians consult about workflow changes, and a pharmacy supervisor controls the evening workload. 1. Build a dependence map for at least five people. Where is the balance most negative? 2. Sketch the likely advice network and identify the brokers. How would you check your sketch? 3. Choose a tactic for each person and justify the sequence. 4. Name the source of power the senior hospitalist holds and how the nurse manager could raise his dependence on her legitimately. 5. Apply the three ethics tests to your plan. What would fail the publicity test? ## Connections to other cards | Card or template | Connection | |---|---| | mba/mba-leadership-guide | Course map; power, politics and influence session | | mba/mba-change-management-card | Stakeholder maps and coalitions for adoption | | mba/mba-negotiation-guide | Dependence and alternatives (BATNA) are the same logic as Emerson's dependence | | mba/mba-motivation-card | Exchange and inspirational appeals work through what people value | | mba/mba-team-dynamics-card | Status and voice inside teams; psychological safety and power | | mba/mba-ethics-guide | Utility, rights and justice tests for political behaviour | | mba/mba-nonmarket-strategy-card | Influence outside the firm: legislatures, regulators, activists | | mba/mba-people-management-guide | Promotion, pay and performance systems as sources and checks of power | | mba/mba-networking-tracker | Building ties across groups over the programme and career | | project/stakeholder-register and business/raci | Formal stakeholder and decision-rights records | ## Common mistakes and misconceptions 1. **Equating power with the org chart.** Experts, brokers and resource holders often decide outcomes. 2. **Trusting your own map of the network.** Most people misperceive it; ask several others (Krackhardt 1990). 3. **Going straight to the decision maker.** Decision makers consult trusted advisers; reach the advisers first. 4. **Using pressure upward.** It produces resistance; rational persuasion and consultation work better. 5. **Relying on one tactic.** Combinations with a soft tactic outperform single tactics. 6. **Treating politics as dirty and opting out.** Others will define the agenda; legitimate influence is part of the job. 7. **Forgetting that dependence runs both ways.** Create value others need before you ask. 8. **Ignoring what power does to you.** Power reduces perspective taking; build in challenge. 9. **Keeping no record of commitments.** Referent power erodes with every forgotten promise. 10. **Writing maps that judge people.** Describe interests and needs, not personalities, and keep the maps private. ## Self-test questions 1. Define power, influence and organisational politics, and give Pfeffer's argument for studying them. 2. Name French and Raven's five bases of power and say which tend to produce commitment. 3. State Emerson's power-dependence relation and two ways to change a dependence balance. 4. What makes a subunit powerful under strategic contingencies theory? 5. What did Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) find about university departments? 6. Distinguish degree, closeness and betweenness centrality and say which captures brokerage. 7. What is a structural hole, and what do people who span them gain and risk? 8. What did Krackhardt (1990) find about perception of the advice network? 9. Which influence tactics most often produce commitment according to Falbe and Yukl (1992)? 10. Name the four dimensions of political skill (Ferris and colleagues 2005). 11. According to Keltner, Gruenfeld and Anderson (2003), how does power change the holder's behaviour? 12. In Worked example A, compute Ana's dependence on Eli and the balance, with the Excel formulas. ## My notes and next steps | Date | Note or action *(Example rows)* | |---|---| | YYYY-MM-DD | *Example:* Asked five colleagues whom they consult on budget questions; two brokers I had missed | | YYYY-MM-DD | *Example:* Rewrote my proposal sequence: expert first, decision maker last | | YYYY-MM-DD | [Next: annual career power audit with mba/mba-networking-tracker] | ## Sources and further reading - French, J. R. P., and Raven, B. (1959). The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), *Studies in Social Power*. Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. - Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations. *American Sociological Review*, 27(1), 31-41. https://doi.org/10.2307/2089716 - Mechanic, D. (1962). Sources of power of lower participants in complex organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 7(3), 349-364. https://doi.org/10.2307/2390947 - Hickson, D. J., Hinings, C. R., Lee, C. A., Schneck, R. E., and Pennings, J. M. (1971). A strategic contingencies' theory of intraorganizational power. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 16(2), 216-229. https://doi.org/10.2307/2391831 - Salancik, G. R., and Pfeffer, J. (1974). The bases and use of power in organizational decision making: the case of a university. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 19(4), 453-473. https://doi.org/10.2307/2391803 - Pfeffer, J., and Salancik, G. R. (1978). *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective*. Harper and Row. - Pfeffer, J. (1981). *Power in Organizations*. Pitman. - Pfeffer, J. (1992). Understanding power in organizations. *California Management Review*, 34(2), 29-50. https://doi.org/10.1177/000812569203400201 - Pfeffer, J. (1992). *Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations*. Harvard Business School Press. - Pfeffer, J. (2010). *Power: Why Some People Have It and Others Don't*. HarperBusiness. - Mintzberg, H. (1985). The organization as political arena. *Journal of Management Studies*, 22(2), 133-154. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.1985.tb00069.x - Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. *American Journal of Sociology*, 78(6), 1360-1380. https://doi.org/10.1086/225469 - Freeman, L. C. (1977). A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness. *Sociometry*, 40(1), 35-41. https://doi.org/10.2307/3033543 - Brass, D. J. (1984). Being in the right place: a structural analysis of individual influence in an organization. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 29(4), 518-539. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392937 - Krackhardt, D. (1990). Assessing the political landscape: structure, cognition, and power in organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 35(2), 342-369. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393394 - Burt, R. S. (2004). 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B., *Influence* (Harper Business); Pfeffer, J., *7 Rules of Power* (BenBella). ## Answer key **Worked example B.** 1. Ana: betweenness 2.83 (normalised 0.135). Chen: betweenness 4.08 (closeness unchanged at 0.700). Eli: degree 4, closeness 0.700, betweenness 4.67 (normalised 0.222). Ben falls to 0.83 and Gus to 1.75 because paths that used them now run through the Ana and Eli tie. 2. The Eli tie raises Ana's betweenness more (2.83 against 2.33) and her closeness more (0.636 against 0.583). 3. Structural position is not the whole story: the decision turns on the engineering release, and Ben consults Chen. The Chen tie gives Ana access to the person whose expert power shapes Ben's view and improves the proposal itself; the Eli tie helps with the budget step only. Choose ties by the decision, not by a centrality score. **Exercise C.** Answers vary. Check that the map shows the most negative balance with the pharmacy supervisor or the senior hospitalist (scarce, important, little need for the nurse manager), that the network sketch is tested by asking several staff whom they consult, that consultation is used with the hospitalist (expert and referent power) and collaboration with pharmacy (offer nursing help with the evening workload), and that the committee is approached last with support visible. Raising the hospitalist's dependence: bring data he needs (bed delays, readmissions on his service), or solve a problem he has (late consults). A plan that fails the publicity test: telling physicians the committee has already decided when it has not. **Self-test.** 1. Power: capacity to change what others do. Influence: power in use. Politics: influence through informal channels where interests differ. Pfeffer: politics is normal where resources are scarce, goals differ and outcomes are uncertain; ignoring it means losing to those who understand it. 2. Legitimate, reward, coercive, expert, referent. Expert and referent (personal bases) more often produce commitment. 3. A's power over B equals B's dependence on A, which rises with the value of what A controls and falls with B's alternatives. Change it by creating value others need, by developing alternatives, or by forming coalitions. 4. Coping with uncertainty that matters to others, low substitutability and centrality in the workflow. 5. Departments with more outside grants and prestige obtained more internal resources than their workload explained. 6. Degree: number of direct ties. Closeness: inverse of total distance to everyone. Betweenness: how often a person lies on shortest paths between others. Betweenness captures brokerage. 7. A gap between groups with no direct ties. Spanners see more diverse ideas and are rewarded; they risk overload and being seen as playing both sides. 8. People with more accurate perceptions of the advice network were rated as more powerful, beyond their own position. 9. Rational persuasion, inspirational appeals and consultation; combinations that include a soft tactic. 10. Social astuteness, interpersonal influence, networking ability, apparent sincerity. 11. Power activates approach: more action, more attention to rewards, more risk taking, less attention to others' perspectives and constraints. 12. Ana's dependence on Eli 5 x 5 = 25 (`=5*5`); Eli's on Ana 2 x 2 = 4 (`=2*2`); balance 4 - 25 = -21 (`=4-25`). ## Revision history | Version | Date | Author | Change summary | |---|---|---|---| | 0.1 | YYYY-MM-DD | [Your name] | First draft from the template | | 0.2 | YYYY-MM-DD | [Your name] | *Example:* Re-mapped the advice network after interviews; added the expert to step 3 | ## Standard and licence note Based on the power and influence literature cited above (French and Raven 1959; Emerson 1962; Hickson and colleagues 1971; Salancik and Pfeffer 1974; Pfeffer 1981, 1992 and 2010; Krackhardt 1990; Yukl and Falbe 1990; Ferris and colleagues 2005; Cavanagh, Moberg and Velasquez 1981). The text, worked examples, exercises and questions are original; no textbook, published case, course material or survey instrument (including the Political Skill Inventory) is reproduced. Corvane Robotics, Tallow Creek Medical Center and every person and number are fictional. This card is independent and not affiliated with or endorsed by any business school, author or publisher. Check your course readings before you rely on it. Template licence: MIT.