Energy Sector Controls Profile Template (ISO/IEC 27019)
OT asset classes, zone and conduit model, applicability decision, sector supplement register, energy topics mapped to Annex A, implementation table, IEC 62443 use, risk example
Як використовувати: Use it when the ISMS scope includes energy process control: control centres, substations, plants, smart metering, DER or charging. Fill the OT asset landscape and the sector supplement register from your licensed copy of ISO/IEC 27019 first. The main pitfall is applying office IT controls unchanged to OT, where scanning or patching can trip a process and safety must come first.
Перегляд
Energy Sector Controls Profile (ISO/IEC 27019): [Organization name]
Sector profile for energy utilities and organizations that run energy process control: power, gas, oil and heat generation, transmission, storage and distribution, plus smart metering, distributed energy resources and charging infrastructure. It records how the sector guidance in ISO/IEC 27019:2024 (energy utility industry controls, based on ISO/IEC 27002:2022) is applied inside an ISMS that meets ISO/IEC 27001:2022 + Amd 1:2024, mainly through risk treatment (6.1.3) and the Statement of Applicability. It also shows where IEC 62443 (industrial automation and control systems security) fits. Replace every
[bracketed]value and every row marked Example.
Document control
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Document ID | DOC-ISMS-108 |
| Version | [1.0] |
| Status | [Draft / In review / Approved / Superseded] |
| Owner | [@ot-security-lead] |
| Approvers/reviewers | [@ciso], [@head-of-operations], [@safety-manager], [@isms-manager] |
| Last updated | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Classification | [Confidential: contains OT architecture details] |
| Standard and edition | ISO/IEC 27019:2024; ISO/IEC 27002:2022; ISO/IEC 27001:2022 + Amd 1:2024 |
| Next scheduled review | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Energy activities in scope | [Generation / Transmission / Distribution / Storage / Gas / Oil / Heat / Metering / DER / Charging] |
| OT sites in scope | [List sites, or refer to DOC-ISMS-002 scope] |
| OT security framework used alongside | [IEC 62443 series / NERC CIP / National framework / None] |
Approvals
| Role | Name | Decision | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| OT security lead (author) | [@ot-security-lead] | [Prepared] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Head of operations or asset management | [@head-of-operations] | [Approved] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Safety manager | [@safety-manager] | [Reviewed: no safety conflict] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| CISO | [@ciso] | [Approved] | YYYY-MM-DD |
Revision history
| Version | Date | Author | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | YYYY-MM-DD | [@ot-security-lead] | First issue |
| [x.y] | YYYY-MM-DD | [@author] | [Change summary] |
Contents
- 1. Purpose and scope
- 2. ISO/IEC 27019 at a glance
- 3. OT asset landscape and zones
- 4. Applicability decision
- 5. Sector supplement register
- 6. Mapping of energy topics to Annex A
- 7. Implementation table
- 8. OT considerations and IEC 62443
- 9. Worked risk example
- 10. Regulatory examples
- 11. Size tiers
- 12. Records and evidence
- 13. References
- Standard and licence note
1. Purpose and scope
This profile explains how [Organization name] protects the information and systems that control and monitor its energy processes. It:
- lists the OT systems, sites and zones in scope (section 3);
- records which sector-specific controls from ISO/IEC 27019:2024 apply and why (sections 4 and 5);
- maps each energy topic to the ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A controls that carry it in the Statement of Applicability, DOC-ISMS-011 (section 6);
- assigns owners, status and evidence to each implementation item (section 7).
In scope: [control centres, substations, generating plants, compressor or pumping stations, heat plants, metering head-end systems, DER and charging back-ends, remote maintenance access, engineering workstations].
Out of scope: [office IT already covered by the general ISMS policies, nuclear process control]. ISO/IEC 27019:2024 states that it does not cover the process control domain of nuclear facilities, which is addressed by IEC 63096. If you operate nuclear assets, follow that standard and your nuclear regulator for those systems.
2. ISO/IEC 27019 at a glance
| Question | Answer for this profile |
|---|---|
| What it is | Sector guidance: information security controls for the energy utility industry, built on the ISO/IEC 27002:2022 control set |
| Edition | ISO/IEC 27019:2024 (second edition, published 2024-10-18, replaces the 2017 edition) |
| Certifiable? | No. Certification is to ISO/IEC 27001:2022 + Amd 1:2024. The sector controls inform risk treatment and the SoA |
| Systems it addresses | Process control and automation technology, PLCs and field devices, supporting systems such as historians and visualization, telecontrol and process networks, smart metering, emission measurement, protection and safety systems, energy management systems for DER, charging and customer installations, related software, premises and remote maintenance (summarised from the public scope) |
| How it is organised | In line with the four themes of ISO/IEC 27002:2022 (organizational, people, physical, technological). It adds energy-specific guidance to existing controls and, as the 2017 edition did, energy-specific controls of its own. Check your copy for the exact list, numbering and any annexes |
| Who reads it | OT security leads, control engineers, asset managers, ISMS managers, auditors familiar with the energy domain |
| Licensed copy held by | [@ot-security-lead], [document repository path] |
How the pieces fit:
3. OT asset landscape and zones
3.1 OT asset classes
| Asset class | Examples | Owner | Zone | Safety relevant? | Count |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Control centre systems | [SCADA, energy management system, distribution management system, outage management system] | [@control-centre-manager] | [Z3 control centre] | [Yes / No] | [n] |
| Field controllers (Example) | PLCs and remote terminal units at 3 plants | Plant engineering | Z1 field | Yes | 42 |
| Protection and safety systems | [Protection relays, safety PLCs, governors] | [@protection-engineer] | [Z1 field] | Yes | [n] |
| Supporting systems | [Historian, engineering workstations, HMI] | [@ot-engineering] | [Z2 site supervisory] | [Yes / No] | [n] |
| Telecontrol and process networks | [Fibre, radio, cellular links, telecontrol gateways] | [@ot-network-lead] | [Conduits] | [Yes / No] | [n] |
| Metering | [Smart meters, head-end system, meter data management] | [@metering-manager] | [Z2 / IT-OT DMZ] | [No] | [n] |
| DER and charging back-ends | [Solar inverters, battery management, charging station management] | [@der-manager] | [Z2 / cloud] | [Yes / No] | [n] |
| Remote maintenance | [Vendor access gateways, jump hosts] | [@ot-security-lead] | [IT-OT DMZ] | [No] | [n] |
3.2 Zone model
Use the same zone names as the network security standard (DOC-ISMS-063). Each arrow below is a conduit: an allowed, documented and monitored communication path.
Rules for the zone model:
- No direct path from enterprise IT or the internet to Z1 or Z0.
- Vendor access ends in the DMZ and needs a per-session approval.
- Safety systems (Z0) send status outward only; no inbound write path.
- Every conduit has an owner, a rule set and a review date in the
firewall rule review (
security/firewall-rule-review).
4. Applicability decision
Apply this decision to every entry in section 5 and record the result in the SoA.
Decision record fields: entry ID, decision, reason (risk ID, legal reference from DOC-ISMS-014, contract clause), decision maker, date.
5. Sector supplement register
Two kinds of entries:
- Energy-specific controls: controls the sector standard adds to the ISO/IEC 27002 set. Record them as additional controls in the SoA.
- Sector guidance on existing controls: extra implementation guidance on a control that is already in Annex A. Record it in the implementation notes of that Annex A row.
| Entry ID | Reference in 27019 | Type | Your short label | Related Annex A | Applicable | Section 7 item |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENR-REG-001 (Example) | [ENR control number from your copy] | Energy-specific control | Security of control centre premises | A.7.1, A.7.2, A.7.3 | Yes | ENR-IMP-004 |
| ENR-REG-002 (Example) | [ENR control number from your copy] | Energy-specific control | Protection of unattended peripheral sites | A.7.1, A.7.4 | Yes | ENR-IMP-005 |
| ENR-REG-003 (Example) | [ENR control number from your copy] | Energy-specific control | Handling legacy systems that cannot be patched | A.8.8, A.8.22 | Yes | ENR-IMP-002 |
| ENR-REG-004 (Example) | [Number from your copy] | Guidance on existing control | Remote maintenance of process control systems | A.5.19, A.8.2, A.8.5 | Yes | ENR-IMP-001 |
| ENR-REG-005 | [Number from your copy] | [Type] | [Your label] | [A.x.y] | [Yes / No] | [ENR-IMP-nnn] |
| ENR-REG-006 | [Number from your copy] | [Type] | [Your label] | [A.x.y] | [Yes / No] | [ENR-IMP-nnn] |
The example labels describe common energy topics. Confirm that each one corresponds to an entry in your copy before keeping it, and add a row for every energy-specific control listed there.
6. Mapping of energy topics to Annex A
| Energy topic | Primary Annex A controls (short labels) | Notes for OT |
|---|---|---|
| Process control asset inventory | A.5.9 inventory of information and assets | Include firmware versions, vendor, safety function, zone |
| Classification of OT information | A.5.12 information classification, A.5.13 information labelling | Network diagrams, setpoints and protection settings are confidential |
| Supplier and OEM relationships | A.5.19, A.5.20, A.5.21, A.5.22 supplier relationships and ICT supply chain | OEM service contracts must cover remote access, patch support, end of life |
| Remote maintenance | A.5.15 access control rules, A.8.2 privileged access rights, A.8.5 secure authentication | Session approval, MFA at the DMZ, recording, time limits |
| Incident response in OT | A.5.24 to A.5.28 incident management | Joint playbooks with control room; manual operation fallback |
| Operation during disruption | A.5.29 security during disruption, A.5.30 ICT readiness for business continuity | Black start, island operation, backup control centre |
| Legal and regulatory duties | A.5.31 legal, regulatory and contractual requirements | Sector regulator, NIS2, network codes, NERC CIP where applicable |
| OT operating procedures | A.5.37 documented operating procedures | Switching orders, change windows, emergency procedures |
| Competence of OT staff | A.6.3 awareness, education and training | Role-based training for control room and field engineers |
| Control centres and substations | A.7.1 to A.7.4 perimeters, entry, secure areas, monitoring | Unattended sites need intrusion detection and alarm response |
| Environmental and utility protection | A.7.5 physical and environmental threats, A.7.11 supporting utilities | Flooding, fire, UPS and auxiliary supply for protection systems |
| Field device maintenance | A.7.13 equipment maintenance | Authorised maintainers, firmware integrity check |
| Endpoint hardening | A.8.1 user endpoint devices, A.8.9 configuration management | Engineering laptops dedicated to OT, application allow-listing |
| Malware protection | A.8.7 protection against malware | Allow-listing where antivirus is not vendor-approved; removable media kiosks |
| Vulnerability and patch management | A.8.8 technical vulnerability management | Vendor-qualified patches only, compensating controls for legacy |
| Backup of configurations | A.8.13 information backup | PLC programs, relay settings, SCADA databases; tested restores |
| Redundancy | A.8.14 redundancy of processing facilities | Redundant control centre, dual communication paths |
| Logging and monitoring | A.8.15 logging, A.8.16 monitoring activities, A.8.17 clock synchronization | Passive OT network monitoring; time sync matters for protection event analysis |
| Network segregation | A.8.20 network security, A.8.21 network services, A.8.22 network segregation | Zones and conduits as in section 3.2 |
| Telecontrol protocol security | A.8.24 use of cryptography, A.8.20 network security | Secure protocol profiles where devices support them |
| Engineering and change | A.8.25, A.8.27 secure development and architecture, A.8.32 change management | Factory and site acceptance tests include security tests |
| Testing without disruption | A.8.29 security testing, A.8.34 protecting systems during audit testing | No active scanning in Z1 without engineering approval |
7. Implementation table
| Item ID | Register entry | What is done | Owner | Status | Due | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENR-IMP-001 (Example) | ENR-REG-004 | Vendor remote access through DMZ jump host with MFA, per-session approval by control room, recording kept 90 days | OT security lead | Implemented | 2027-03-31 | Access approval log, session recordings, quarterly access review |
| ENR-IMP-002 (Example) | ENR-REG-003 | 11 legacy HMIs that cannot be patched isolated in a dedicated segment with allow-listed flows only, replacement budgeted | Plant engineering | Partial | 2027-09-30 | Firewall rule review FRR-2027-02, capital plan line |
| ENR-IMP-003 (Example) | Annex A A.8.13 guidance | Monthly offline backup of PLC programs and relay settings, restore test twice a year | OT engineering | Implemented | 2027-02-28 | Backup log, restore test report (DOC-ISMS-071) |
| ENR-IMP-004 (Example) | ENR-REG-001 | Two-factor entry at the control centre, visitor escort, CCTV with 30-day retention | Facilities | Implemented | 2027-01-31 | Badge logs, CCTV retention record |
| ENR-IMP-005 (Example) | ENR-REG-002 | Intrusion alarms at 6 unattended substations linked to the control room, response within the agreed time | Field operations | Planned | 2027-12-31 | Alarm test records |
| ENR-IMP-006 | [ENR-REG-nnn] | [Action] | [@owner] | [Planned / Partial / Implemented] | YYYY-MM-DD | [Record] |
Status summary (Example): 6 items in this table, of which 3 are implemented, 1 partial, 1 planned and 1 blank row awaiting entries. Report the counts in the ISMS performance report (DOC-ISMS-081).
8. OT considerations and IEC 62443
8.1 Priorities
In OT the usual order of protection goals changes. Write your order and apply it to every decision in sections 4 to 7:
- Safety of people and the environment.
- Availability and integrity of the physical process.
- Integrity of control data and settings.
- Confidentiality of operational and customer information.
8.2 Engineering rules
| Rule ID | Rule | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| OT-RULE-001 (Example) | No active vulnerability scans in Z1 or Z0 during operation; use passive monitoring and vendor advisories | Scans can crash older controllers |
| OT-RULE-002 (Example) | Patches installed only after vendor qualification and a test on a reference system | Unqualified patches can void safety certification |
| OT-RULE-003 (Example) | Emergency access ("break glass") accounts exist for control room operators and are reviewed after each use | Operators must never be locked out during an incident |
| OT-RULE-004 (Example) | Removable media only through a scanning kiosk in the DMZ | Removable media remain a common OT infection route |
| OT-RULE-005 | [Rule] | [Reason] |
8.3 Using IEC 62443 alongside ISO/IEC 27019
The IEC 62443 series addresses security for industrial automation and control systems (IACS). It is developed jointly by the ISA99 committee and IEC TC 65 and published by IEC (and by ISA as ANSI/ISA-62443). Use it where ISO/IEC 27019 tells you what to protect and you need technical depth on how. Commonly used parts (check current editions with the publisher):
| Part | Topic | How this profile uses it |
|---|---|---|
| IEC 62443-2-1 | Security programme for IACS asset owners | Cross-check of sections 4 to 7 with the asset owner programme |
| IEC 62443-2-4 | Requirements for IACS service providers | Clauses in OEM and integrator contracts (DOC-ISMS-068) |
| IEC 62443-3-2 | Risk assessment, zones and conduits | Method behind the zone model in section 3.2 |
| IEC 62443-3-3 | System security requirements and security levels | Target security level per zone |
| IEC 62443-4-1 and 4-2 | Secure product development and component requirements | Procurement requirements for new devices |
Other energy references to consider: IEC 62351 for power system communication security, IEC 63096 for nuclear facilities, and the national or regional energy frameworks listed in section 10.
9. Worked risk example
Example: Quillmere Group (2,400 staff, 6 sites in 4 countries, OT and IT) runs combined heat and power units and rooftop solar at its 3 plants. These are energy management and DER systems, which fall within the systems ISO/IEC 27019 addresses even though the group is a manufacturer, not a utility.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Risk ID | R-071 (Example) |
| Scenario | The CHP unit's OEM connects through an always-on remote access router at Plant 2. Stolen OEM credentials allow an attacker to change setpoints |
| Inherent likelihood x impact | 4 x 5 = 20, Critical |
| Treatment | ENR-IMP-001 (remote access through DMZ jump host, MFA, per-session approval, recording); OT-RULE-003; OEM contract clause for credential management |
| Residual likelihood x impact | 2 x 5 = 10, High |
| Acceptance | High residual risk accepted by top management with treatment in place (DOC-ISMS-019 record ACC-071 (Example)) |
| Review | Every 6 months, or after any OEM access incident |
10. Regulatory examples
| Framework | Region | Relevance | Check |
|---|---|---|---|
| Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) | EU | Energy (electricity, district heating and cooling, oil, gas, hydrogen) is a sector of high criticality; risk management measures and incident reporting | National transposition law and competent authority |
| Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1366, network code on cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows | EU | Sector-specific cybersecurity rules for high-impact and critical-impact electricity entities | Consolidated text on EUR-Lex (amended 2025) |
| NERC CIP reliability standards | North America | Mandatory cybersecurity standards for the bulk electric system | Current versions on the NERC website |
| [National energy regulator rules] | [Country] | [Licence conditions, security requirements] | [Source] |
11. Size tiers
| Aspect | Small (under 50 people) | Medium (50 to 500) | Large or multi-site (over 500 or several sites) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Size reference | Quillmere Analytics Ltd, 46 staff (38 employees, 8 contractors), part-time ISMS manager | Quillmere Health Systems, 320 staff, full-time ISMS manager and 3-person security team | Quillmere Group, 2,400 staff, 6 sites in 4 countries, CISO and 14-person security office |
| Typical energy role (Example) | Analytics or software supplier handling smart meter or DER data for utilities, no own OT | Regional distribution operator, DER aggregator or charging network operator of similar size | Integrated utility, or a manufacturer with own generation and energy management at several plants |
| Use of ISO/IEC 27019 | Selected entries on metering data, supplier duties and remote access to customer systems | Most entries, one OT zone model, OT security lead role | Full register per site, group OT security standard, IEC 62443 security levels per zone |
| OT governance | ISMS manager plus customer requirements | OT security lead reporting to the ISMS manager | OT security function inside the security office, site OT coordinators |
| Monitoring | Customer-provided or none (no OT) | Passive OT monitoring at the control centre | Passive monitoring at every site feeding a central SOC |
| Review cycle | Yearly | Yearly plus after major changes | Yearly per site, rolling group review |
12. Records and evidence
| Record | Proves | Owner | Location | Retention |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OT asset inventory extract | Asset classes and zones in section 3 are current | OT engineering | [CMDB / OT asset tool] | [Current plus 3 years of snapshots] |
| Zone and conduit diagram with review date | Segregation design | OT network lead | [Document repository] | [Superseded versions 3 years] |
| Sector supplement register and SoA rows | Applicability decisions | ISMS manager | [ISMS repository] | [Life of the ISMS plus 3 years] |
| Remote access approvals and session recordings | ENR-IMP-001 operates | OT security lead | [Jump host logs] | [Example: 90 days recordings, 1 year approvals] |
| Patch qualification and change records | A.8.8 and A.8.32 in OT | OT engineering | [Change tool] | [Example: 3 years] |
| Backup and restore test reports | A.8.13 in OT | OT engineering | DOC-ISMS-071 | [Example: 3 years] |
| Physical access logs for control centres and substations | A.7.2 and A.7.4 | Facilities | [Access control system] | [Example: 1 year] |
| OT incident and exercise reports | Incident readiness in OT | OT security lead | DOC-ISMS-021, exercise folder | [Example: 6 years] |
Link each record to its control in isms/control-evidence-matrix
(DOC-ISMS-033).
13. References
| Reference | Edition and status | Use |
|---|---|---|
| ISO/IEC 27019:2024, information security controls for the energy utility industry | Current (https://www.iso.org/standard/85056.html) | Sector controls and guidance |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 + Amd 1:2024 | Current (https://www.iso.org/standard/82875.html, Amd 1: https://www.iso.org/standard/88435.html) | ISMS requirements, clause 6.1.3, Annex A |
| ISO/IEC 27002:2022 | Current (https://www.iso.org/standard/75652.html) | Control guidance the sector standard builds on |
| ISO/IEC 27005:2022 | Current (https://www.iso.org/standard/80585.html) | Risk management guidance |
| IEC 62443 series | Check current editions (cited without link) | IACS security |
| IEC 62351 series, IEC 63096 | Check current editions (cited without link) | Power system communication security, nuclear control systems |
| Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) | OJ L 333, 27.12.2022 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj) | Energy sector obligations in the EU |
| Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1366 | As amended (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/1366/oj) | Electricity network code on cybersecurity |
| Related templates | compliance/statement-of-applicability, compliance/risk-methodology, compliance/risk-register, compliance/asset-inventory, compliance/legal-register, isms/network-security-standard, isms/secure-configuration-baseline, isms/supplier-security-agreement-27036, isms/iot-27400-security, isms/backup-restore-test-log, isms/control-framework-crosswalk, isms/control-evidence-matrix, security/firewall-rule-review, industry/utility-cim-integration-design, compliance/nis2-security-measures | Linked documents |
Standard and licence note
Structure aligned with ISO/IEC 27019:2024 and ISO/IEC 27001:2022 + Amd 1:2024 (clause 6.1.3 and Annex A). The register, mapping, rules and examples are original. No text, control wording, tables or definitions from ISO, IEC or ISA standards are reproduced; the scope summary is a short paraphrase of the public catalogue description. You need your own licensed copy of ISO/IEC 27019 to fill section 5. Check the current editions before use, including the IEC 62443 parts. Official ISO text, purchase or licensed access: https://www.iso.org/standard/85056.html and https://www.iso.org/standard/82875.html. Regulatory summaries are short paraphrases; this is a documentation format, not legal advice.
Template licence: MIT.
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