MBA Negotiation Planner Template (BATNA, ZOPA, MESOs)

Negotiation Plan: [Negotiation name and counterpart]

A one-file preparation plan for any negotiation: a job offer, a supplier contract, a lease, a partnership or a course role-play. It separates interests from positions, converts your BATNA into a reservation value, builds a weighted scoring system for multi-issue offers, draws the ZOPA, sets a target and an opening (single offer or MESOs), plans concessions and the questions to ask, and closes with a readiness checklist. It is for MBA students preparing role-plays and for anyone preparing a real negotiation. Source basis: Fisher and Ury (1981) for interests and BATNA, Raiffa (1982) for reservation values, ZOPA and scoring systems, Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) for first offers and Leonardelli et al. (2019) for MESOs, written up in original words. The worked example (a post-MBA job offer from the fictional Corvane Robotics) is invented and every number in it was computed in Python. Replace every [bracketed] value and every row marked Example. This is a planning aid, not legal, tax or financial advice.

Document control

Contents

• How the planner works
• 1. Situation and objectives
• 2. Parties, positions and interests
• 3. BATNA and reservation value
• 4. Issues and scoring system
• 5. ZOPA
• 6. Target and opening offer
• 7. MESOs
• 8. Concession plan
• 9. Questions to ask and information to share
• 10. Process, agenda and roles
• 11. Tactics, risks and ethics guardrails
• 12. Readiness checklist
• Common mistakes
• Sources and further reading
• Revision history
• Standard and licence note

How the planner works

Preparation is the part of negotiation you fully control, and it is where most of the outcome is decided. The planner moves from facts to numbers to moves. You start with what each side wants and why, convert your best alternative into the worst deal you would accept, turn every issue into points so packages can be compared, and only then decide what to ask for first and how to concede.

The worked example runs through every section. Amara Okafor, finishing her MBA, has a written offer for a Senior Product Manager role at Corvane Robotics, a venture-backed warehouse-robotics company (fictional). She also holds a written offer from another logistics-technology employer, called Rival A here, that expires in ten days. She prefers Corvane for the product and the team.

1. Situation and objectives

2. Parties, positions and interests

Other parties who influence the outcome (the "table behind the table"):

3. BATNA and reservation value

List the alternatives, pick the best, and convert it:

For a single issue, the reservation price is the BATNA's value adjusted for every cost and benefit of switching. For a multi-issue deal, score the BATNA and adjust for non-scored differences:

Example: Rival A's offer scores 40.0 points (base USD 158k = 16.0, signing bonus USD 10k = 5.0, equity USD 100k = 3.5, start in 6 weeks = 2.5, 2 remote days = 3.0, Senior title = 10). Amara would give up 5 points for Corvane's product and team, so her reservation value is 35.0 points (=40-5). The in-between values are interpolated: base USD 158k gives =10+(158-155)/(160-155)*(20-10) = 16.0.

Converted to the one issue most people think about: holding Corvane's other first-offer terms fixed (they score 20.0 points), Amara needs 15.0 points from base salary to reach 35.0, which is a base of USD 157.5k (=155+(15-10)/(20-10)*(160-155)). Below that, with the other terms unchanged, she should take the Rival A offer.

The counterpart's side, estimated:

The two estimates answer different questions. The points estimate is Corvane's overall walk-away across all issues; the base estimate is a separate cap from its pay band. With the other first-offer terms (worth 46 Corvane points), 30 points would allow any base on the scale, so on base alone the pay-band cap of about USD 168k is the binding limit.

4. Issues and scoring system

A scoring system lets you compare packages with different mixes. The total score of package $x$ is:

Non-linear issues (equity here) get points option by option. In Excel, put options and points in rows and use =INDEX(points_row, MATCH(option, options_row, 0)) per issue and =SUM() for the package.

Scoring table (Example). Points for Amara (her own) and for Corvane (her estimate):

What the table says: base salary is a pure tug of war. Start date and remote days matter more to Corvane than to Amara, so she can give them. Equity, bonus and title matter more to her than to Corvane, so she should ask for them.

Packages scored (Example).

Corvane's first offer (30.0 points) is below Amara's reservation value (35.0), so as it stands she should not accept it. Enumerating all 1,440 combinations of the options shows that the best joint total any package reaches is 120 points. A split-the-middle package (base 160, bonus 10, equity 160, start 8 weeks, 2 remote days, Senior PM) scores 56.0 for Amara and 50.0 for Corvane, 106.0 in total: 14 points of joint value left on the table.

5. ZOPA

The zone of possible agreement on base salary, holding Corvane's other first-offer terms fixed, runs from Amara's reservation base (USD 157.5k) to Corvane's estimated maximum (USD 168k): USD 10.5k wide (=168-157.5).

Reading the chart: the first offer (USD 155k) is outside the zone, the target (USD 165k) is inside it, and the opening (USD 170k) is above Corvane's estimated limit, which is normal for an opening that is meant to leave room for concessions on base while other issues carry value. Keep in mind that the right-hand edge is an estimate.

6. Target and opening offer

Rules for the first offer from the research (Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001): if you know the market, open first or counter firmly, and justify the number. When you receive an extreme anchor, do not counter it point by point: name your own alternatives and target, re-anchor, and move the discussion to interests.

7. MESOs

Multiple equivalent simultaneous offers (Leonardelli et al. 2019) let you open ambitiously while signalling flexibility. They work because you are indifferent among them, so any choice is fine for you, and the counterpart's choice reveals what they value.

How Amara will say it: "I have put together three ways this could work for me, and I am equally happy with any of them. Which one comes closest to what you can do?" If Corvane picks B, the early start matters less than she estimated; if it picks C, office days matter less; if it picks A, both the early start and office days matter to it, and a higher base is easier for it to give than a larger signing bonus.

8. Concession plan

Shrinking steps (4, 3, 2, 1 points) signal that you are approaching your limit. Every step is traded, never given. If the counterpart's offers stay below 35.0 points after step 3, the BATNA is the better choice.

9. Questions to ask and information to share

Questions to ask:

Information plan:

10. Process, agenda and roles

11. Tactics, risks and ethics guardrails

My ethical guardrails: I will not invent or inflate offers, misstate facts, or promise what I cannot deliver. I may decline to answer a question about my reservation value. Rules on what employers may ask about past pay, and on pay transparency, differ by jurisdiction and change: check the current rules where the job is located before you rely on them. See mba/mba-ethics-guide.

12. Readiness checklist

• I can state the decision and a good outcome in one sentence each.
• I have at least three interests per side, with confidence levels.
• My BATNA is concrete and I have tried to improve it.
• My reservation value is computed, including one-off costs and the fit premium.
• Every issue has options, my points and my estimate of their points.
• I know which issues to ask for and which to give.
• I have a target and an opening with a justification I can say aloud.
• My MESOs are equal in value to me (check the totals).
• My concession plan shrinks and each step is traded.
• I have at least four questions and a share-or-protect list.
• I know how agreement will be recorded and what happens if there is none.
• I have written my ethical limits.

Common mistakes

1. Using the target as the reservation value. You then walk away from deals better than your BATNA. Compute both.
2. A vague BATNA. "I could find something else" is not a BATNA. Without a concrete alternative your reservation value is a guess, and usually too low.
3. Forgetting conversion costs. Switching, moving, requalification and delay costs belong in the reservation value.
4. Planning only one issue. Price-only plans lead to positional haggling. List every issue, even fixed-looking ones.
5. Equal weights by default. If every issue gets the same weight, the scoring system cannot show you trades.
6. Assuming their weights mirror yours. The fixed-pie assumption (Thompson and Hastie 1990) hides the trades. Estimate their weights separately and test them with questions.
7. MESOs that are not equal. If the packages differ in value to you, you will regret the one they choose.
8. Concessions without a trade. Unilateral concessions teach the counterpart to wait for more.
9. Revealing the reservation value or the deadline. Share priorities, not limits.
10. Opening without a reason. An unexplained number reads as arbitrary and invites a split-the-difference counter.
11. No plan for recording the deal. Agreements that are not summarised in writing drift.

Sources and further reading

• Fisher, R., and Ury, W. (1981). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. Houghton Mifflin.
• Raiffa, H. (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
• Lax, D. A., and Sebenius, J. K. (1986). The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain. Free Press.
• Galinsky, A. D., and Mussweiler, T. (2001). First offers as anchors: The role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(4), 657-669.
• Leonardelli, G. J., Gu, J., McRuer, G., Medvec, V. H., and Galinsky, A. D. (2019). Multiple equivalent simultaneous offers (MESOs) reduce the negotiator dilemma: How a choice of first offers increases economic and relational outcomes. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 152, 64-83.
• Thompson, L., and Hastie, R. (1990). Social perception in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 47(1), 98-123.
• Froman, L. A., and Cohen, M. D. (1970). Compromise and logroll: Comparing the efficiency of two bargaining processes. Behavioral Science, 15(2), 180-183.

Further reading (named only): Raiffa, Richardson and Metcalfe, Negotiation Analysis (2002); Malhotra and Bazerman, Negotiation Genius (2007); Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator; Lewicki, Barry and Saunders, Negotiation. Open resource: OpenStax, Organizational Behavior, chapter "Conflict and Negotiations" (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0), https://openstax.org/books/organizational-behavior.

Revision history

Standard and licence note

Structure aligned with the negotiation analysis of Raiffa (1982) and the principled negotiation approach of Fisher and Ury (1981), with first-offer and MESO guidance from Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) and Leonardelli et al. (2019). The text, scoring system and worked example are original; Corvane Robotics and Amara Okafor are fictional. This planner is independent and not affiliated with or endorsed by any business school, publisher or negotiation programme. It is a planning aid, not legal, tax or financial advice; check the rules that apply where you negotiate. Template licence: MIT.