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Operational Loss Event Report Template (Basel, CRR3, DORA)

Event summary, Basel event type and business line, key dates, gross loss, recoveries and net loss, root cause, failed controls, boundary events, DORA link

Tài chính, Đầu tư & Kế toánĐầy đủCRR3 (Reg. (EU) 2024/1623) loss data; Basel OPE25 (names); DORA Art. 19operationallosseventreportmath
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Cách dùng: Use it when a bank records an operational risk loss event for the loss database, the RCSA and supervisory reporting. Fill the key dates and the gross loss components first, and record recoveries separately as they are received. The main pitfall is netting recoveries before recording the gross loss, or stopping the root cause at human error.

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Operational Loss Event Report: [Event ID] [Short event title]

Report for one operational risk loss event (or one group of related events) at a bank or investment firm: what happened, how it is classified, when it occurred, was discovered and was accounted for, the gross loss, recoveries and net loss, the root cause and failed controls, boundary flags with credit and market risk, remediation, and the regulatory notifications it triggered. It is structured around the loss data concepts in the Capital Requirements Regulation as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 (CRR3, Part Three, Title III, operational risk, loss data provisions in Articles 317 to 323; check the consolidated text), the Basel Framework chapter OPE25 (cited by name; Level 1 event types and business lines by name only), and the major ICT-related incident regime of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA, Article 19). Replace every [bracketed] value and every row marked Example. The worked example uses the fictional Fernhollow Bank, a mid-sized EU credit institution reporting in EUR. This is a document format, not legal, regulatory, accounting or risk advice. Obtain the regulation or standard for the normative text.

Document control

FieldValue
Document ID[OLE-RPT-YYYY-NNN]
Loss event ID[OLE-YYYY-NNN]
Linked incident IDs[INC-YYYY-NNN, DORA incident reference if any]
Legal entity[Entity name and LEI]
Business unit where the event occurred[Unit]
Version[1.0]
Status[Provisional / Under second-line review / Final / Closed / Withdrawn]
Owner (first line)[@business-unit-risk-officer]
Approvers/reviewers[@head-of-business-unit], [@head-of-operational-risk], [@finance-controller], [@cro for events above the escalation threshold]
Reporting currency[EUR]
Last updatedYYYY-MM-DD
Classification[Confidential, operational risk and audit use]

Approvals

RoleNameDecisionDate
Head of business unit (first line)[@name][Confirm facts and amounts]YYYY-MM-DD
Head of operational risk (second line)[@name][Accept / Return for changes]YYYY-MM-DD
Finance controller (amount reconciliation)[@name][Reconciled to general ledger]YYYY-MM-DD
Chief risk officer (escalated events only)[@name][Noted / Further action required]YYYY-MM-DD

Revision history

VersionDateAuthorChange
0.1YYYY-MM-DD[@author]Provisional report opened after first booking
1.0YYYY-MM-DD[@author]Root cause and recoveries completed, second-line review passed
[1.1]YYYY-MM-DD[@author][Late recovery booked, net loss updated]

Contents

1. Event summary

[Two to five sentences: what happened, where, the gross and net loss, the customer and regulatory impact, and the status of remediation.]

Example: On 2026-06-12 a faulty release of Fernhollow Bank's payment batch software caused 412 salary payments for corporate clients to be executed twice. The bank paid out EUR 1,240,000 in duplicate credits, compensated affected clients for late fees and paid external legal and forensic costs. After recoveries from beneficiaries the net loss is EUR 212,500. The event was classified as a major ICT-related incident under DORA and notified to the competent authority; the release process control that failed has been redesigned and tested.

FieldValue
Event title[Short title]
Event status[Open / Recoveries pending / Closed]
Gross loss (current)[EUR amount]
Recoveries (current)[EUR amount]
Net loss (current)[EUR amount]
Customers affected[Number, segments]
Escalation level[Business unit / Operational risk committee / Executive committee / Board risk committee]
Regulatory notification made[Yes, reference / No, with reason]

2. Classification

Classify the event in three dimensions: the event type (what kind of event occurred), the business line (where in the bank it happened), and the cause category (what made it possible). Each dimension answers a different question for the risk profile. Event type tells the board which kinds of failure are recurring. Business line supports capital allocation and comparison between units. Cause category directs remediation investment.

2.1 Event type

The seven Basel Level 1 event types are listed below by name. Map the bank's own Level 2 and Level 3 categories to them in the operational risk taxonomy, and keep the mapping stable across years so that trends remain comparable. EU institutions should also check the operational risk taxonomy that the CRR mandates in its loss data provisions, as specified in the relevant EBA technical standards once in force.

Level 1 event type (Basel name)Selected for this eventBank Level 2 categoryRationale
Internal fraud[ ][Category][Why it does or does not apply]
External fraud[ ][Category][Rationale]
Employment practices and workplace safety[ ][Category][Rationale]
Clients, products and business practices[ ][Category][Rationale]
Damage to physical assets[ ][Category][Rationale]
Business disruption and system failures[x] (Example)Systems, software change failure (Example)The duplicate execution was produced by a software defect, not by a manual input error (Example)
Execution, delivery and process management[ ] (Example)Transaction execution (Example)Considered and rejected: no person processed the payments twice; the second-line reviewer recorded the debate (Example)

2.2 Business line and other attributes

AttributeValue
Business line (Basel name)[Corporate finance / Trading and sales / Retail banking / Commercial banking / Payment and settlement / Agency services / Asset management / Retail brokerage]
Business line (Example)Payment and settlement
Process (bank process taxonomy)[Process ID and name], Example: PRC-PAY-04 Clearing and settlement (scheme submission of bulk salary files); the faulty release came through PRC-PAY-06 Platform operations (release management)
Product[Product], Example: Corporate payroll service
Cause category[People / Process / Systems / External events], Example: Process (change management) with a Systems trigger
Legal entity and country[Entity, country], Example: Fernhollow Bank, head office
ICT-related[Yes / No], Example: Yes
Third party involved[Name, register ID in the DORA register], Example: none, in-house software
Conduct or customer harm[Yes / No, describe], Example: Yes, late salary credits for some recipients after the bank reversed duplicates
Linked risk in the RCSA[Risk ID], Example: RSK-PAY-001 Misdirected or duplicate payments, in the payments operations RCSA (finance/operational-risk-rcsa)

Record the event type that best describes the event as a whole. When two event types seem equally plausible, apply the taxonomy's tie-break rule (for example, the event type of the first failure in the chain) and record the rejected option with the reason, as in the example. This makes later reclassification traceable and protects the comparability of the loss history.

3. Key dates

Date typeDateSource of evidence
Date of occurrence (event start)YYYY-MM-DD[Log, transaction record]
Date of occurrence (Example)2026-06-12Payment engine log, batch run 06:05 CET
Date of discoveryYYYY-MM-DD[Complaint, reconciliation, alert]
Date of discovery (Example)2026-06-12Nostro reconciliation break at 14:40 CET
Date of first accounting (first loss, provision or reserve booked)YYYY-MM-DD[Journal entry ID]
Date of first accounting (Example)2026-06-15JE-2026-06-0881
Date event ended (cause removed)YYYY-MM-DD[Change record]
Date event ended (Example)2026-06-12Release rolled back at 15:25 CET
Date of last accounting movementYYYY-MM-DD[Journal entry ID]
Date of last accounting movement (Example)2026-08-28JE-2026-08-1204, final beneficiary recovery

Explain any gap of more than [30] days between occurrence and discovery. A long gap is itself a finding: it shows that a detective control did not work or did not exist. For events that span several months, such as a mis-selling practice, record the first and last dates of the conduct and state the basis for the dates chosen.

4. Event narrative

Write a chronological account of the event from the first relevant action to the point where the cause was removed and customers were made whole. Use a timeline table for events with many steps, and keep the narrative paragraphs for the explanation that a table cannot carry.

Time (local)FactEvidence
2026-06-11 18:30 (Example)Release PAY-REL-2026-23 deployed to production after approval on the change advisory boardChange record CHG-2026-1147
2026-06-12 06:05 (Example)Bulk salary batch processed; the new retry logic resubmitted 412 payments after a timeout response from the clearing gatewayEngine log
2026-06-12 14:40 (Example)Reconciliation shows outgoing volume EUR 1,240,000 above client instructionsReconciliation report REC-0612
2026-06-12 15:25 (Example)Release rolled back; incident INC-2026-0412 declared, severity 1Incident record
2026-06-12 17:10 (Example)Incident classified as major ICT-related incident under DORAClassification record
2026-06-13 to 2026-08-28 (Example)Recall requests to beneficiary banks; recoveries received in tranchesRecovery ledger

[Narrative paragraphs.]

Example narrative: The release changed how the payment engine handled a timeout from the clearing gateway. Before the release, a timeout placed the batch in a manual queue. After the release, the engine retried automatically. The gateway had in fact accepted the first submission, so the retry produced a second credit for 412 payments. The test environment used a gateway simulator that never timed out, so the retry path was not exercised before go-live. Treasury noticed an unexplained outflow in the afternoon reconciliation and raised the alarm. Rolling back the release removed the cause the same day, but the duplicate credits had already reached beneficiary accounts at 37 other banks.

5. Loss amounts

5.1 Gross loss components

Gross loss is the loss before any recovery. It includes direct charges to the profit and loss account, write-downs, provisions or reserves booked for the event, external expenses directly caused by it (legal fees, consultants, settlements, compensation) and, where the bank's rules require it, pending losses held temporarily in suspense accounts. It normally excludes internal costs such as staff time, the cost of general improvements made afterwards, and insurance premiums. Check the inclusion and exclusion rules that apply to the bank's capital approach in the consolidated CRR text and the related technical standards, and record the rule you applied in the "Basis" column.

Component IDDescriptionAmount (EUR)GL account and journalBasis for inclusion
GL-01 (Example)Duplicate payments credited to beneficiaries1,240,000590-110, JE-2026-06-0881Direct charge to profit and loss
GL-02 (Example)Compensation to clients for late fees and interest after reversals18,500590-120, JE-2026-07-0310Direct charge, settlement with customers
GL-03 (Example)External legal and forensic costs46,000590-130, JE-2026-07-0455External expense directly linked to the event
Excluded (Example)Overtime of payment operations staff (internal cost, EUR 9,200)0Not booked to the eventInternal cost, excluded by bank policy
Total gross loss (Example)1,304,500

5.2 Recoveries and net loss

Recoveries are amounts received from third parties that reduce the loss: funds returned by beneficiaries, insurance payouts, indemnities from vendors, or legal awards. Record direct recoveries (the lost asset comes back) separately from insurance and other risk-transfer recoveries, because capital rules and internal reporting may treat them differently. Record a recovery only when it has been received or is certain and booked, never when it is merely expected.

Recovery IDTypeCounterpartyDate receivedAmount (EUR)
REC-01 (Example)Direct recovery, returned funds29 beneficiary banks (first tranche)2026-06-30864,000
REC-02 (Example)Direct recovery, returned funds6 beneficiary banks (second tranche)2026-07-24171,000
REC-03 (Example)Direct recovery, returned funds2 beneficiary banks (final)2026-08-2857,000
REC-04 (Example)InsuranceCyber and crime policyNot applicable0 (net loss after beneficiary recoveries, EUR 212,500, is below the EUR 250,000 retention)
Total recoveries (Example)1,092,000

Net loss equals gross loss minus total recoveries:

Net loss=Gross loss−Recoveries\text{Net loss} = \text{Gross loss} - \text{Recoveries}

Example: 1,304,500 minus 1,092,000 equals EUR 212,500. The direct recoveries add up as 864,000 plus 171,000 plus 57,000, which is 1,092,000. Of the 412 duplicate credits, the amounts not returned (EUR 148,000) relate to beneficiaries who had already withdrawn the funds; collection continues through the legal team and any later recovery will be booked as an update in section 5.3.

5.3 Amount history

Each change in a booked amount is a new row. This history shows the development of the loss over time, which supervisors and auditors use to test whether provisional amounts were reasonable and whether late adjustments were captured in the right period.

DateMovementGross loss after movementRecoveries after movementNet loss after movementEntered by
2026-06-15 (Example)Initial booking of duplicate payments1,240,00001,240,000[@ops-risk-analyst]
2026-06-30 (Example)First recovery tranche1,240,000864,000376,000[@ops-risk-analyst]
2026-07-15 (Example)Client compensation booked1,258,500864,000394,500[@ops-risk-analyst]
2026-07-22 (Example)Legal and forensic costs booked1,304,500864,000440,500[@ops-risk-analyst]
2026-07-24 (Example)Second recovery tranche1,304,5001,035,000269,500[@ops-risk-analyst]
2026-08-28 (Example)Final recovery tranche1,304,5001,092,000212,500[@ops-risk-analyst]

5.4 Non-financial impacts and near-miss value

Some effects do not appear in the ledger but matter for the risk profile: customer detriment, service downtime, regulatory attention and reputational coverage. Record them in plain terms. If the event could easily have been larger (for example, if the batch had been a month-end batch three times the size), record the potential exposure as a scenario input for the RCSA and stress testing, but never add it to the booked loss.

ImpactDescription
Customers affected (Example)61 corporate clients, 412 payees
Service disruption (Example)Bulk payment service suspended for 9 hours
Potential exposure if undetected for a full batch cycle (Example)Scenario input, not a loss: a month-end batch carries about three times the volume
Media or social media coverage (Example)None identified

6. Root cause analysis

Use a structured method such as the five whys or a fishbone (cause and effect) analysis. Involve the people who operate the process, the technology owner, and an operational risk analyst who did not take part in the original change. Record the chain of causes and the evidence for each step, then identify the root cause or causes that remediation must address.

Cause IDCause statementLevelEvidenceAddressed by action
RC-01 (Example)The payment engine lacked a duplicate check on the end-to-end payment reference before submissionRoot cause, designCode review, interface specification v4.2ACT-PAY-05
RC-02 (Example)The test plan for payment changes did not require negative-path cases such as timeoutsRoot cause, processTest plan TP-PAY-23ACT-PAY-06
RC-03 (Example)The gateway simulator in the test environment could not produce timeoutsContributing cause, toolingTest environment inventoryACT-PAY-07
RC-04 (Example)Reconciliation ran only twice a day, so detection took over eight hoursContributing cause, detectionReconciliation scheduleACT-PAY-08

Distinguish the root cause from the trigger. In the example, the gateway timeout is the trigger, an event outside the bank's control that will happen again. The root causes are the missing duplicate check and the missing test requirement, both of which the bank can fix. A remediation plan that tries to prevent timeouts would miss the point.

7. Control failures

Control IDControl descriptionTypeFailure modeRCSA rating beforeRating after review
CTL-CHG-007 (Example)Change advisory board approves production releases after test evidence reviewPreventive, manualOperating effectiveness: approval given on incomplete test evidenceEffectivePartially effective
CTL-PAY-002 (Example)Automated duplicate payment check on amount, beneficiary and reference within 5 daysPreventive, automatedDesign: did not cover bulk salary files resubmitted by the engine after a timeout, nor SEPA instant paymentsPartially effectiveIneffective
CTL-REC-002 (Example)Intraday nostro reconciliationDetective, automatedDesign: frequency too low for the volumeEffectivePartially effective
CTL-INC-001 (Example)Incident declaration and escalationCorrectiveWorked as designed: severity 1 declared within 45 minutes of detectionEffectiveEffective

Record controls that worked as well as those that failed. The example shows that incident management performed well, which is useful evidence for the RCSA and for the supervisor. In the example, CTL-PAY-002 is the same control that the payments operations RCSA rates; after ACT-PAY-05 the RCSA records the bulk-file gap as fixed and keeps the SEPA instant gap open under ISS-PAY-02. Send each change in control rating to the RCSA owner so that the risk and control self-assessment (finance/operational-risk-rcsa) reflects the new evidence before the next reporting cycle.

8. Related and grouped events

Apply the bank's grouping rule consistently. A common rule is that losses arising from the same root cause, in the same process, within a defined period, form one event. Record the individual impacts below so that the grouped event can be audited. Link, but do not merge, earlier events that point to the same control weakness; they show a pattern that the operational risk committee should see.

ItemLinked event IDRelationshipAmount (EUR)Comment
Grouped impact (Example)OLE-2026-014-A to OLE-2026-014-CSame release, same batch, three accounting entries1,304,500 grossRecorded as one event OLE-2026-014
Related prior event (Example)OLE-2026-018Duplicate SEPA instant payments after a repair batch (2026-05-20), net loss EUR 65,00065,000 netSame duplicate-check gap in CTL-PAY-002; issue ISS-PAY-02 was scoped to SEPA instant only and is still open
Related near miss (Example)NM-2026-007Duplicate file blocked manually by an operator in April 20260Weak signal that was not escalated

When an event shows that an earlier remediation action did not work, as in the example, report that fact explicitly to the operational risk committee and reopen the earlier action. Repeat events with the same root cause are among the clearest signals of weak risk culture and should influence the risk appetite discussion in the Risk Appetite Statement (finance/risk-appetite-statement).

9. Boundary events with credit and market risk

A boundary event is a loss with an operational cause that also relates to another risk type. Record every boundary event in the operational loss database with a flag, even when the applicable capital rules require the amount to stay in another risk type's calculation. Check the treatment in the bank's capital rules (CRR loss data provisions for EU institutions and the Basel loss data chapter by name) and record it in the table.

Boundary typeTypical examplesFlag in loss databaseTreatment applied (check the applicable rules)
Credit risk boundaryLoan obtained with forged documents, collateral that was never perfected because of a process failure, a limit breach caused by a system error[Yes / No][Kept in credit risk capital and excluded from the regulatory loss data set (CRR Art. 317(5)); flagged in the internal database / other]
Market risk boundaryTrade entered with the wrong quantity, unauthorised position, model input error in a pricing system[Yes / No][Included in the loss data set as operational risk (CRR Art. 317(6)) / other]
Not a boundary event (Example)Duplicate payment (this event): no credit exposure or trading position involvedNoPure operational loss

Example of a separate credit boundary event: In 2026 Fernhollow Bank's SME lending unit discovered that a borrower had obtained a EUR 380,000 loan with forged financial statements. The loss surfaced as a credit default and an impairment. The operational risk function recorded event OLE-2026-022 with the external fraud event type and a credit boundary flag, so that fraud trends are visible even though the amount stays in credit risk data under the bank's applicable rules.

10. Remediation actions

Action IDAddressesActionOwnerDue dateStatusEffectiveness test
ACT-PAY-05 (Example)RC-01Add a duplicate check on end-to-end payment reference to CTL-PAY-002 for bulk and single SEPA credit transfer files (SEPA instant follows under ACT-PAY-02 in the RCSA)[@head-of-payments-it]2026-09-30DoneReplayed the June batch in test with forced timeouts: zero duplicates
ACT-PAY-06 (Example)RC-02Make negative-path test cases mandatory for any change touching payment submission[@head-of-change-management]2026-08-31DoneSecond-line sample of five later payment changes: all had negative-path evidence
ACT-PAY-07 (Example)RC-03Upgrade the gateway simulator to produce timeouts, rejects and partial acknowledgements[@test-environment-lead]2026-10-31In progressSimulator capability demonstrated to second line
ACT-PAY-08 (Example)RC-04Move nostro reconciliation for bulk payment accounts to hourly[@head-of-treasury-operations]2026-09-15DoneDetection time in the next live test below one hour
ACT-PAY-09 (Example)Section 8Widen issue ISS-PAY-02 (from OLE-2026-018) to all payment channels and confirm closure criteria[@head-of-operational-risk]2026-07-31DoneClosure criteria rewritten to require effectiveness evidence

Track actions in the bank's issue management system and reference the issue IDs here. Overdue actions on events above the escalation threshold should be reported to the operational risk committee every month until closed, with the reason for the delay and a revised date approved by the committee.

11. Regulatory notifications and reporting

11.1 DORA major ICT-related incident

When the event is ICT-related, check whether the linked incident was classified as major under DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 18 on classification and Article 19 on reporting, with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772 for the classification criteria, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 for the content and time limits and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/302 for the forms). The incident response process owns the notification; this report records the link and makes sure the loss amounts given to the authority in the intermediate and final reports match the loss database. DORA also expects financial entities to be able to estimate the aggregated annual costs and losses caused by major ICT-related incidents when the competent authority asks for them; check Article 11 in the consolidated text. The loss database should therefore tag every loss linked to a major ICT-related incident.

ItemValue
Linked incident ID[INC-YYYY-NNN], Example: INC-2026-0412
Classified as major ICT-related incident[Yes / No], Example: Yes, criteria met for clients affected, critical service and economic impact
Classification date and time[YYYY-MM-DD hh:mm], Example: 2026-06-12 17:10
Initial notification sent[YYYY-MM-DD hh:mm], Example: 2026-06-12 20:45
Intermediate report sent[YYYY-MM-DD], Example: 2026-06-15
Final report sent[YYYY-MM-DD], Example: 2026-07-14
Loss amount in final report matches loss database[Yes / No, explain], Example: Yes at the date of the final report (gross 1,240,000; recoveries 864,000); later costs and recoveries recorded here only
ICT third-party provider involved (register reference)[Register ID or none], see DORA ICT Third-Party Register (compliance/dora-ict-third-party-register)

11.2 Other regimes

RegimeTrigger metDecision and referenceOwner
Personal data breach notification (GDPR Article 33)[Yes / No][Decision, DPO reference], Example: No personal data disclosed to unauthorised parties[@dpo]
Conduct or customer remediation notification to the conduct authority[Yes / No][Decision][@head-of-compliance]
Supervisory loss data reporting (common reporting templates where applicable)[Period][Included in the reporting for period YYYY-QN][@regulatory-reporting]
Insurance notification[Yes / No][Claim reference], Example: Notified 2026-06-14 for completeness; loss within retention[@insurance-manager]
Internal escalation to board risk committee[Yes / No][Meeting date][@cro]

Follow the Incident Response Plan (compliance/incident-response-plan) for the clocks and forms. This report does not replace it.

12. Second-line review and data-entry checklist

CheckResultComment
Event ID unique and linked to incident and journal entries[Yes / No]
Event type, business line and cause category mapped to the taxonomy[Yes / No]
Occurrence, discovery and accounting dates present and evidenced[Yes / No]
Gross loss components reconciled to the general ledger by finance[Yes / No]
Recoveries recorded separately by type, only when received[Yes / No]
Exclusions (internal costs, improvements) documented[Yes / No]
Grouping rule applied and related events linked[Yes / No]
Boundary flags set where applicable[Yes / No]
Root cause goes beyond "human error" and is evidenced[Yes / No]
Each root cause has an action with owner, date and effectiveness test[Yes / No]
RCSA, KRI and scenario owners informed[Yes / No]
Regulatory notification decisions recorded with reasons[Yes / No]
Collection threshold applied: internal threshold [EUR x] or collected voluntarily; regulatory threshold EUR 20,000 net (CRR Art. 319(1)) for the annual operational risk loss, EUR 100,000 net for Art. 446 disclosure (Art. 319(2))[Yes / No]

Second-line challenge summary: [What the operational risk function questioned, what changed as a result, and any remaining disagreement with the first line.]

Example: The second line challenged the initial classification as "Execution, delivery and process management" and agreed with the first line on "Business disruption and system failures" after reviewing the engine logs. It also asked finance to move the legal costs from a general expense account to the event-coded account so that they reach the loss database automatically.

13. Glossary

TermMeaning in this report
Operational riskRisk of loss from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events, including legal risk
Loss eventAn occurrence that produces an operational loss, or would have done so without a recovery
Gross lossLoss before any recovery
RecoveryAn amount received from a third party that reduces the loss, such as returned funds or insurance
Net lossGross loss minus recoveries
Near missAn event that could have caused a loss but did not
Grouped eventSeveral losses that share one root cause and are recorded as one event
Boundary eventAn operational loss related to credit or market risk
Major ICT-related incidentDORA term for an ICT-related incident that meets the classification criteria in the delegated regulation
RCSARisk and control self-assessment
Collection thresholdMinimum amount above which the bank must record a loss event in its database

14. References

  • Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (CRR) as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 (CRR3), Part Three, Title III (operational risk), loss data provisions in Articles 317 to 323, applicable from 2025-01-01. EUR-Lex; check the consolidated text and the related EBA technical standards.
  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel Framework, chapter OPE25 (operational risk, loss data), cited by name only.
  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Revisions to the Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk (2021), cited by name only.
  • Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Articles 11, 18 and 19; Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772; Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/302. EUR-Lex.
  • Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Article 33. EUR-Lex.
  • US Government Accountability Office, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (Green Book, 2025), for control design and operating effectiveness concepts (public domain).

Standard and licence note

Based on public law: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1623, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 and its delegated and implementing acts, and Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (EUR-Lex, reuse with acknowledgement of the source). Structure aligned with the Basel Framework operational risk chapters, which are cited by chapter and name only; no Basel Committee text is reproduced or paraphrased. The seven event types and eight business lines are listed by name only. All text, tables and the worked example are original. Fernhollow Bank, its systems and every amount are fictional. Check the current official version of each regulation and the bank's own taxonomy before use. Template licence: MIT.

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