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ICT Readiness for Business Continuity Plan Template (ISO/IEC 27001 A.5.30)

ICT continuity requirements from the BIA, RTO and RPO per service, measured capability and gaps, strategies, recovery order, test programme, size tiers

ISMS và ISO/IEC 27001Đầy đủISO/IEC 27001:2022 + Amd 1:2024 A.5.29, A.5.30 (cited only); ISO/IEC 27031:2025; ISO 22301:2019 + Amd 1:2024ictreadinessbusinesscontinuityplan
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Cách dùng: Use it when you must show that ICT services can meet the recovery objectives set by the business impact analysis (A.5.30). Fill the BIA requirements and the per-service objectives with measured test results first. The main pitfall is writing RTO and RPO values that describe what current backups deliver instead of what the business needs.

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ICT Readiness for Business Continuity Plan: [Organization name]

Plan that makes sure the information and communication technology (ICT) services behind prioritized business activities can be kept running or restored within the time and data-loss objectives set by the business impact analysis. It supports ISO/IEC 27001:2022 + Amd 1:2024 Annex A control A.5.30 (ICT readiness for business continuity, new in 2022) and control A.5.29 (security during disruption), and follows the approach of ISO/IEC 27031:2025 (ICT readiness for business continuity) within a business continuity programme aligned with ISO 22301:2019 + Amd 1:2024. It sits between the business continuity plan and the technical disaster recovery plan. Replace every [bracketed] value and every row marked Example.

Document control

FieldValue
Document ID[DOC-ISMS-047]
Version[1.0]
Status[Draft / In review / Approved / Superseded]
Owner[@head-of-it-operations]
Approvers/reviewers[@ciso], [@business-continuity-lead], [@coo], [@isms-manager]
Last updatedYYYY-MM-DD
Classification[Confidential]
Standard and editionISO/IEC 27001:2022 + Amd 1:2024 (A.5.29, A.5.30, A.8.13, A.8.14); ISO/IEC 27031:2025; ISO 22301:2019 + Amd 1:2024
Next scheduled reviewYYYY-MM-DD (at least annually, after every activation and after every major test)
BIA reference[DOC-ISMS-120, version and date]
Business continuity plan reference[DOC-ISMS-121]
Disaster recovery plan reference[DR plan ID and version]
Last test[Test ID, date, result]
Offline copy location[Encrypted copy outside the primary environment, printed copy at [site]]

Approvals

RoleNameDecisionDate
Plan owner[@head-of-it-operations][Prepared]YYYY-MM-DD
Business continuity lead[@business-continuity-lead][Reviewed]YYYY-MM-DD
CISO or ISMS manager[@ciso][Reviewed]YYYY-MM-DD
Top management sponsor[@coo][Approved / Approved with changes]YYYY-MM-DD

Revision history

VersionDateAuthorChange
0.9 (Example)YYYY-MM-DD[@head-of-it-operations]Draft built from BIA version 2.1
1.0 (Example)YYYY-MM-DD[@head-of-it-operations]Approved after the first regional failover test (TST-002)

Contents

  1. Purpose, scope and relationship to other plans
  2. Roles and responsibilities
  3. ICT continuity requirements from the BIA
  4. ICT services, recovery objectives and measured capability
  5. Gap analysis and improvement actions
  6. ICT continuity strategies
  7. Readiness: prevention, detection and security during disruption
  8. Activation and recovery procedures
  9. Testing and exercising
  10. Performance measures
  11. Size tiers
  12. Records and evidence
  13. Review and maintenance
  14. References

1. Purpose, scope and relationship to other plans

This plan sets out how [Organization name] keeps the ICT services that support its prioritized activities ready to continue or to recover within the objectives approved in the BIA. It covers planning, the readiness measures in place before a disruption, the decision to invoke recovery, the recovery order and the tests that prove the plan works.

ICT readiness for business continuity (IRBC) is not a separate programme. It is the ICT part of business continuity management, and it uses the information security risk assessment to find the threats that could disrupt ICT services. ISO/IEC 27031:2025 describes this readiness view. For ISO/IEC 27001:2022 control A.5.30, the point to prove is simple: the recovery the business asked for in the BIA is what IT has designed for and has shown it can deliver, not a figure nobody tested (read the official control text for the exact requirement).

In scope:

  • ICT services: [production platform, data pipelines, identity provider, corporate e-mail and collaboration suite, source code and build pipeline, support desk tooling]
  • Environments: [primary cloud region, secondary cloud region, office network, colocation suite]
  • Suppliers whose services are part of the recovery path: [cloud provider, DNS provider, identity provider, backup service]

Out of scope: [business process workarounds, which belong to the BCP; physical safety, which belongs to the emergency plan].

PlanOwnsHands over to this plan when
Business continuity plan (DOC-ISMS-121)Business response, workarounds, prioritized activitiesA business activity needs an ICT service restored or switched
Incident response plan (DOC-ISMS-020)Detection, containment and eradication of security incidentsContainment requires a service to be rebuilt, failed over or restored from backup
Crisis management and communications plan (DOC-ISMS-078)Strategic decisions and external communicationThe crisis team decides to invoke ICT recovery or accept degraded service
This plan (DOC-ISMS-047)ICT objectives, readiness, recovery order, ICT testsRecovery is complete and the service returns to normal operations
Disaster recovery planTechnical runbooks per systemNot applicable: it is the execution layer of this plan

2. Roles and responsibilities

RoleResponsibilitiesPrimaryDeputy
Plan ownerKeeps this plan current, runs the test programme, reports results[@head-of-it-operations][@platform-lead]
ICT recovery managerLeads recovery once invoked, decides recovery order within section 8.3[@platform-lead][@sre-on-call-lead]
Service ownersConfirm objectives for their service, verify recovery, sign off return to service[@service-owner][@deputy]
Business continuity leadTranslates BIA results into requirements, links this plan to the BCP[@business-continuity-lead][@deputy]
CISO or ISMS managerEnsures security controls stay in place during disruption (A.5.29), tracks gaps as risks[@ciso][@isms-manager]
Supplier managerHolds supplier recovery commitments and contacts[@supplier-manager][@procurement]
Top management sponsorApproves objectives, funding and any accepted gap[@coo][@ceo]
Activity (Example)Plan ownerICT recovery managerService ownerBC leadCISOSponsor
Set RTO and RPOCCRRCA
Maintain readiness measuresARCICI
Invoke ICT recoveryCRCCIA
Verify and return to serviceIRAICI
Run tests and record resultsARRCCI
Accept an unresolved gapRCCCCA

3. ICT continuity requirements from the BIA

Rule: an ICT service inherits the shortest RTO and the shortest RPO of the activities that depend on it. Shared foundation services (identity, DNS, network, secrets, logging) must be available before the services that depend on them, so their RTO is shorter than that of any dependent service.

Activity (from BIA)MTPDActivity RTOActivity RPOICT services requiredNotes
ACT-01 (Example) Customer dashboards and API12 h4 h15 minSVC-001, SVC-002, SVC-003Contract service level: 99.9% monthly availability
ACT-02 (Example) Data ingestion from customer sources24 h8 h1 hSVC-002, SVC-003Sources can re-send up to 24 h of data
ACT-03 (Example) Customer support48 h24 h4 hSVC-003, SVC-004Phone fallback for priority customers
ACT-04 (Example) Software release and hotfixes96 h48 h24 hSVC-003, SVC-005Hotfix path needed for security fixes
[ACT-NN][h][h][min / h][SVC-NNN][note]

ICT requirements other than time objectives, from the BIA and the risk assessment:

  • Minimum capacity during disruption: [for example, 60% of normal API throughput for ACT-01].
  • Security level during disruption: the same classification rules, access control and logging as normal operations (section 7.3).
  • Data residency during failover: [both regions must be in the same legal jurisdiction as agreed in customer contracts].
  • Contractual and legal requirements: [customer service levels, sector rules such as the ICT continuity duties in DORA for financial entities, NIS2 national measures where applicable], recorded in the legal register (DOC-ISMS-014).

4. ICT services, recovery objectives and measured capability

Service IDICT serviceDepends onRequired RTORequired RPOStrategy (section 6)Measured recovery timeMeasured data lossLast testStatus
SVC-003 (Example)Identity provider (SaaS)Supplier, DNS2 hNot applicable (configuration exported daily)Supplier resilience plus break-glass accounts45 min (break-glass sign-in)NoneTST-001 YYYY-MM-DDMeets
SVC-001 (Example)Analytics platform and APISVC-003, SVC-0024 h15 minWarm standby in secondary region6 h 10 min12 minTST-002 YYYY-MM-DDGap on RTO
SVC-002 (Example)Customer data store and pipelineSVC-0034 h15 minCross-region replication plus immutable backups3 h 20 min12 minTST-002 YYYY-MM-DDMeets
SVC-004 (Example)Support ticketing (SaaS)SVC-00324 h4 hSupplier resilience, daily exportNot testedNot testedNoneUntested
SVC-005 (Example)Source code and build pipelineSVC-00348 h24 hHosted repository plus nightly mirror30 h0 (mirror current)TST-003 YYYY-MM-DDMeets
[SVC-NNN][service][dependencies][h][min / h][strategy][measured][measured][test ID][Meets / Gap / Untested]

SVC-002 carries a 4 h RTO, which is stricter than the 8 h needed by ACT-02, because ACT-01 also depends on it (rule in section 3). SVC-003 has a 2 h RTO because every other service needs sign-in first. Its data is held by the supplier, so its recovery point is covered by supplier evidence, and the daily configuration export protects the settings.

Status values: Meets (measured values within required values), Gap (one measured value outside the requirement), Untested (no measurement in the last 12 months). Untested counts as a gap for reporting.

Tier values: Tier 1 is any service with a required RTO of 4 h or less (SVC-001, SVC-002 and SVC-003 in the example); Tier 2 is any other service in scope. Sections 8 to 10 use these tiers.

5. Gap analysis and improvement actions

Gap IDServiceGapCauseActionOwnerDueRisk referenceStatus
GAP-001 (Example)SVC-001Recovery took 6 h 10 min against a 4 h RTOManual database promotion and DNS change took 3 h 40 minAutomate promotion and DNS switch, rehearse quarterly[@platform-lead]YYYY-MM-DDRISK-014, RTP-022Open
GAP-002 (Example)SVC-004Never testedSupplier test reports not requestedObtain supplier continuity evidence, test ticket export restore[@supplier-manager]YYYY-MM-DDRISK-019Open
[GAP-NNN][SVC-NNN][gap][cause][action][@owner]YYYY-MM-DD[RISK-NNN][Open / Closed / Accepted]

A gap that remains open past its due date is escalated to the ISMS steering committee (DOC-ISMS-007). A gap that management decides not to close is recorded as a risk acceptance (DOC-ISMS-019) using the acceptance authority of the risk methodology (DOC-ISMS-010): High residual risk needs top management acceptance.

6. ICT continuity strategies

6.1 Strategy options

StrategyTypical recovery timeTypical data lossCostFits when
Active-active across regions or sitesMinutesNear zeroHighestRTO under 1 h, revenue or safety critical
Warm standby (scaled-down copy, data replicated)1 to 8 hMinutesHighRTO of a few hours
Pilot light (core data replicated, compute built on demand)4 to 24 hMinutes to 1 hMediumRTO of a working day
Backup and restore to new infrastructure24 h or moreBackup intervalLowRTO of days
Supplier resilience (SaaS) plus data exportSupplier dependentExport intervalLowCommodity SaaS with credible supplier evidence
Manual workaround (owned by the BCP)Not an ICT recoveryRe-entry neededLowShort outages of low-volume activities

These ranges are Example planning values. Confirm them with your own tests before relying on them.

6.2 Strategy by resource

ResourceStrategy (Example, Quillmere Analytics Ltd)Your strategy
TechnologyWarm standby of the platform in the secondary cloud region, infrastructure as code for rebuild[strategy]
DataContinuous replication to the secondary region plus daily immutable backups in a separate account with separate credentials (see isms/backup-policy)[strategy]
Identity and accessBreak-glass accounts with hardware keys stored in two places, tested every quarter[strategy]
PeopleTwo engineers trained on each runbook, on-call rota covering every hour[strategy]
FacilitiesFully remote capable; office loss does not affect production[strategy]
SuppliersContract clauses for supplier continuity evidence; exit plan for the cloud provider (isms/cloud-exit-plan)[strategy]
CommunicationsStatus page hosted outside the production environment, out-of-band chat channel[strategy]

6.3 Strategy decision record

Decision IDServiceOptions consideredChosenReasonAnnual cost (USD)Approved by
STR-001 (Example)SVC-001Active-active, warm standby, pilot lightWarm standbyMeets 4 h RTO after GAP-001 automation; active-active cost not justified by BIA38,000[@coo] YYYY-MM-DD
STR-002 (Example)SVC-002Replication only, replication plus immutable backupReplication plus immutable backupReplication alone fails against ransomware (RISK-009)12,000[@coo] YYYY-MM-DD
[STR-NNN][SVC-NNN][options][chosen][reason][amount][@approver]

Costs are Example values in USD; use your local currency.

7. Readiness: prevention, detection and security during disruption

7.1 Prevention

MeasureControl referenceEvidence
Redundant processing in two regions or sitesA.8.14Architecture diagram, failover test
Backups with immutability and separate credentialsA.8.13Backup job reports, restore test log (DOC-ISMS-071)
Capacity monitoring and headroomA.8.6Capacity plan (ops/capacity-plan)
Change management with rollbackA.8.32Change records (ops/change-request)
Supplier continuity commitmentsA.5.19 to A.5.22Supplier register (DOC-ISMS-066), contract clauses
Vulnerability and patch managementA.8.8Remediation tracker (DOC-ISMS-072)

7.2 Detection

  • Health checks from outside the hosting provider for each service in section 4, alerting the on-call engineer within [5] minutes.
  • Monitoring of replication lag against the RPO: alert when lag exceeds [50%] of the RPO.
  • Backup job failure alerts and a weekly review of missed jobs.
  • Security monitoring (isms/security-monitoring-procedure) for signs that a disruption is a security incident, such as mass encryption or deletion.

7.3 Security during disruption

Information security requirements continue to apply during disruption (A.5.29). Plan any temporary change in advance rather than improvising:

SituationPre-approved temporary measureLimitRestored by
Normal privileged access tooling unavailableBreak-glass accounts, every use logged and reviewedDuration of the eventPassword and key rotation within 24 h of stand-down
Logging pipeline down in the primary regionLocal log retention on standby hosts, forwarded once the pipeline returns72 hICT recovery manager
Recovery in the secondary regionSame network rules, encryption and access groups as primary (built from code)None: no relaxationNot applicable
Third-party responders need accessNamed, time-limited accounts approved by the CISO7 daysAccess review after stand-down

Any measure not listed here needs approval by the CISO or deputy and is recorded in the recovery log.

8. Activation and recovery procedures

8.1 Activation criteria

Invoke this plan when any of these is true:

  • a service in section 4 is unavailable, or expected to be, for longer than [50%] of its RTO;
  • data loss is expected to exceed the RPO of any service;
  • the incident response plan requires a rebuild or restore as part of containment or recovery;
  • the business continuity lead or crisis team requests ICT recovery.

The ICT recovery manager decides. If the expected outage is longer than the RTO of a Tier 1 service, the decision is reported to the crisis team (DOC-ISMS-078) at once.

8.2 Recovery states

The diagram shows the states a disrupted service moves through. A service stays in degraded operation on the standby until the primary is rebuilt and verified; stand-down is a decision, not an automatic step.

8.3 Recovery order

OrderServiceTarget time from invocation (Example)RunbookVerification
1SVC-003 Identity provider and break-glass access0 h to 2 hDR-RB-01Engineers and support staff can sign in
2Network, DNS and secrets in the standby region0 h to 1 h, in parallelDR-RB-02DNS resolves to standby, secrets readable by services
3SVC-002 Customer data store and pipeline1 h to 4 hDR-RB-03Row counts and checksums match the last replicated point
4SVC-001 Analytics platform and API2 h to 4 hDR-RB-04Synthetic customer journey passes, error rate under 1%
5SVC-004 Support ticketingSupplier dependent, by 24 hSupplier status, DR-RB-05Agents can open and update tickets
6SVC-005 Source code and build pipelineBy 48 hDR-RB-06A test build and deploy completes

8.4 Return to normal operations

  1. Service owners confirm the primary environment is rebuilt, patched and verified against the same checks as section 8.3.
  2. The CISO confirms that temporary measures from section 7.3 are reversed, and that credentials used during the event are rotated.
  3. Data written to the standby is reconciled and replicated back.
  4. The ICT recovery manager plans the fail-back as a change (ops/change-request) during a low-traffic window.
  5. The plan owner records the timeline and measured values in the recovery log and opens actions for any gap.

9. Testing and exercising

Test typeWhat it provesFrequency (Example)Evidence
Plan walkthroughContacts, roles and steps are currentQuarterlyAttendance and change list
Tabletop exerciseDecisions and hand-offs between plans workTwice a year, one jointly with the crisis teamExercise report (security/tabletop-exercise)
Component restore testA backup can be restored within RPO and on timeMonthly sample per Tier 1 data storeRestore test log (DOC-ISMS-071)
Failover testA service runs in the standby site within its RTOTwice a year covering every Tier 1 service (one regional failover can cover several)DR test report (ops/dr-test-report)
Full recovery simulationAll services recover in order without the primaryOnce a yearDR test report, gap list
Supplier test participation or evidenceSupplier commitments holdAnnually per critical supplierSupplier test summary or assurance report

Each test has a written scope, success criteria taken from section 4, a named observer who is not running the recovery, and a report that records measured times, data loss, deviations and actions. Feed actions into section 5 and the risk treatment plan (DOC-ISMS-013).

10. Performance measures

MeasureTarget (Example)Source
Tier 1 services with measured recovery within RTO in the last 12 months100%Section 4
Services untested in the last 12 months0Section 4
Restore tests meeting RPOAt least 95%Restore test log (DOC-ISMS-071)
Open gaps past due date0Section 5
Mean time from detection to invocation decision in tests and real eventsUnder 30 minRecovery logs, test reports

Worked example for Quillmere Analytics Ltd: five services in section 4, three meet, one has an RTO gap and one is untested. Services meeting their objectives: 3 of 5, or 60%. Tier 1 services (SVC-001, SVC-002, SVC-003) within RTO: 2 of 3, or 67%. Both figures go to the next management review with GAP-001 and GAP-002.

11. Size tiers

AspectSmall: Quillmere Analytics Ltd (46 staff)Medium: Quillmere Health Systems (320 staff)Large: Quillmere Group (2,400 staff, 6 sites)
Plan shapeOne plan covering 5 services, owned by the Head of Engineering Operations, who is also the part-time ISMS managerOne plan plus one annex per service line (scheduling platform, managed service, corporate IT)Group plan with site annexes for 3 plants, the service centre, the data centre and HQ, including OT recovery
Recovery environmentSecondary region of the same cloud providerSecondary region for the SaaS platform, colocation suite rebuilt from backup for legacy systemsGroup data centre plus cloud; plant OT recovered locally with spare controllers and offline images
Typical strictest RTO4 h2 h for hospital-facing scheduling1 h for production control systems at plants
Test programme2 failover tests, 1 full simulation, quarterly walkthroughsFailover per service line twice a year, joint test with key hospital customersRolling site tests, annual group simulation aligned with the existing ISO 22301 exercise programme
IntegrationBIA, BCP and this plan maintained by the same small team3-person security team reviews security during disruptionIntegrated management system: this plan is the ICT annex of the certified ISO 22301 BCMS

12. Records and evidence

RecordProvesOwnerLocationRetention (Example)
Approved plan and revision historyPlan is controlled and currentPlan ownerDocument management systemCurrent plus 3 superseded versions
BIA extract with ICT requirements (section 3)Objectives come from the businessBusiness continuity leadBIA repository (DOC-ISMS-120)3 years
Test plans and reportsCapability is measuredPlan ownerops/dr-test-report records3 years
Restore test logBackups meet RPOICT recovery managerDOC-ISMS-0713 years
Gap and action list (section 5)Gaps are treatedPlan ownerRisk treatment plan (DOC-ISMS-013)Until closed plus 3 years
Recovery logs from real eventsPlan is used and improvedICT recovery managerIncident register (DOC-ISMS-021)3 years
Supplier continuity evidenceSupplier commitments are checkedSupplier managerSupplier register (DOC-ISMS-066)Contract term plus 3 years
Management review inputTop management sees readinessISMS managerManagement review minutes (DOC-ISMS-085)3 years

Retention periods are Example values; set them in the documented information register (DOC-ISMS-028) to cover at least one full certification cycle and any legal requirement.

13. Review and maintenance

Review this plan at least once a year and also when:

  • the BIA is updated or a new prioritized activity is added;
  • a new ICT service, region, site or critical supplier enters scope;
  • a test or real event shows a gap or a wrong assumption;
  • architecture changes alter dependencies or recovery order;
  • a new legal, regulatory or contractual continuity requirement applies.

Contacts and runbook references are checked every quarter during the walkthrough. Changes follow document control (DOC-ISMS-028), and results go to management review (cl. 9.3).

14. References

ReferenceEditionUse
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 + Amd 1:2024, information security management systems, requirements2022, Amd 1 published 2024-02-23A.5.29, A.5.30, A.8.13, A.8.14
ISO/IEC 27002:2022, information security controls2022Guidance for the controls above
ISO/IEC 27031:2025, ICT readiness for business continuity2025IRBC concepts, planning and testing approach
ISO 22301:2019 + Amd 1:2024, business continuity management systems, requirements2019, Amd 1 2024BIA, strategies, exercising
NIST SP 800-34 Rev. 1, Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information SystemsMay 2010, updated November 2010Optional public reference for contingency plan structure
NIST SP 800-84, Guide to Test, Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans and CapabilitiesSeptember 2006Optional public reference for test design

Related templates: compliance/business-impact-analysis, compliance/business-continuity, ops/disaster-recovery-plan, ops/backup-restore-procedure, ops/dr-test-report, compliance/incident-response-plan, isms/backup-policy, isms/backup-restore-test-log, isms/cloud-exit-plan, isms/crisis-management-communications-plan, isms/control-evidence-matrix.

Standard and licence note

Structure aligned with ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (including Amd 1:2024) Annex A controls A.5.29 and A.5.30 and with the ICT readiness approach of ISO/IEC 27031:2025, within a business continuity programme aligned with ISO 22301:2019 + Amd 1:2024. The text, tables, examples and guidance are original wording. ISO/IEC text is not reproduced: control numbers are given with short descriptive labels written for this template, which are not the official titles or control text. ISO and IEC standards are copyrighted; obtain the official standards from ISO or your national standards body before relying on this template. Check the current edition and amendments of each standard before use. This is a documentation format, not certification advice. Template licence: MIT.

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