Markdown Editor

Root Cause Analysis and Action Template (RCA2, Patient Safety)

Serious event RCA2 review: SAC prioritisation, blameworthy screen, team charter, chronology, causal statements, action hierarchy, measures, feedback

医疗完整RCA2 (NPSF 2015, version 2 January 2016)rootcauseanalysis

使用方法: Use it when a serious patient safety event or close call needs a systems-focused review. Score the event with your risk matrix within 72 hours, then fill the chronology (section 6) before the contributing factors and causal statements. The main pitfall is ending with weaker actions only, such as training and a new policy, instead of at least one stronger or intermediate action with a measure.

预览

Root Cause Analysis and Action Report: [Event reference]

Report template for a systems-focused review of a serious patient safety event or close call, from risk-based prioritisation through causal statements to ranked corrective actions with measures. The process and tools follow the RCA2 approach (Root Cause Analysis and Action) described in RCA2: Improving Root Cause Analyses and Actions to Prevent Harm (National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015, version 2 January 2016, now hosted by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement), written in original words for this collection. The worked example is a fictional inpatient fall. Replace every [bracketed] value and every row marked Example. This is a documentation format, not legal or medical advice; check the current official text of any policy or regulation that applies to you and involve qualified professionals.

Document control

FieldValue
Document ID[RCA-2026-012]
Event reference[Incident system reference]
Event dateYYYY-MM-DD
Date review required (prioritisation done)YYYY-MM-DD
Convening authority[@chief-medical-officer or delegate]
Review lead (facilitator)[@patient-safety-lead]
Version[0.4]
Status[Draft / Leadership review / Approved / Closed]
Owner[@review-lead]
Approvers[@ceo-or-delegate], [@convening-authority]
Target completion[Event date + 45 days]
Last updatedYYYY-MM-DD
Classification[Confidential: patient safety review]

Approvals

RoleNameDecisionDate
Review lead[@name][Submitted]YYYY-MM-DD
Convening authority[@name][Approved]YYYY-MM-DD
Chief executive or delegate (actions and risk acceptance)[@name][Approved with comments]YYYY-MM-DD

Revision history

VersionDateAuthorChange summary
0.1YYYY-MM-DD[@name]Event summary, prioritisation and charter
0.2YYYY-MM-DD[@name]Example: Chronology and flow diagram after interviews
0.3YYYY-MM-DD[@name]Example: Causal statements CS-01 to CS-04 and actions
0.4YYYY-MM-DD[@name]Example: Measures added; leadership comments addressed

Contents

1. Event summary and immediate actions

Event summary. [Describe the event or close call in neutral, factual language: type of event, location, time, outcome for the patient.]

Example: A patient in their 80s, admitted to Ward 4 (adult medicine, fictional Halvermoor District Hospital) with a chest infection, was found on the floor beside the bed at 02:40 on day 0. An X-ray later that morning showed a hip fracture, which was repaired surgically on day 1. The patient had been assessed as at high risk of falls on admission.

Immediate actionDone byTimeStatus
Patient assessed, treated and escalated to the on-call doctor (Example)Nurse in chargeDay 0 02:45Done
Patient and family informed of the event (initial disclosure) (Example)Ward consultantDay 0 10:30Done
Bed, sensor mat and call bell set aside and labelled for inspection (Example)Nurse in chargeDay 0 03:30Done
Incident reported in the incident system (Example)Nurse in chargeDay 0 02:55Done
Similar risks on the ward checked (other high-risk patients reviewed) (Example)Ward managerDay 0 09:00Done

2. Risk-based prioritisation

RCA2 recommends a transparent, formal, risk-based system to decide which adverse events, close calls and system vulnerabilities need a full review. The table reproduces the structure of the Safety Assessment Code (SAC) matrix of the US Veterans Health Administration (a US government work, as reproduced in RCA2 appendix 1). A score of 3 is the highest priority, 2 intermediate and 1 the lowest. Your organisation may use a different matrix; record the one you used.

Probability (rows) by severity (columns)CatastrophicMajorModerateMinor
Frequent (may happen several times in 1 year)3321
Occasional (may happen several times in 1 to 2 years)3211
Uncommon (may happen sometime in 2 to 5 years)3211
Remote (may happen sometime in 5 to 30 years)3211
FieldValue
Matrix used[SAC matrix / organisational risk matrix, document ID]
Severity (actual, or worst case for a close call)[Category and reason]
Probability[Category and data used]
Score[1 / 2 / 3]
Decision[Full RCA2 review / aggregated review / local review]
Scored by and when[@name, YYYY-MM-DD hh:mm, hours since event]

Example: Severity Major (surgical intervention required). Probability Frequent: the ward recorded three falls with injury in the previous 12 months. Score 3. Full RCA2 review required; scored by the patient safety lead on day 1 at 11:00, about 32 hours after the event.

3. Scope and blameworthy-event screen

Scope. [State what the review covers and what it does not: the event, the time window, the departments and processes involved.]

Example: From the decision to admit to Ward 4 (day -3) to the transfer to theatre (day 1). Includes falls risk assessment, the overnight observation process, equipment and staffing. Excludes the surgical care after transfer, which had no reported concerns.

Screen questionAnswerNotes
Any sign of a criminal act?[Yes / No]
Any sign of patient abuse?[Yes / No]
Any sign of alcohol or substance impairment of a provider?[Yes / No]
Any sign of an act your policy defines as intentionally unsafe?[Yes / No]
If any "Yes": referred to convening authority on[YYYY-MM-DD][Reference]

4. Review team and charter

Role on teamNameDepartmentInvolved in event?
Facilitator (RCA2 trained)[@name]Patient safetyNo
Subject matter expert (Example)[@name]Physiotherapy (falls lead)No
Front-line nurse from another ward (Example)[@name]Ward 7No
Doctor (Example)[@name]Geriatric medicineNo
Patient representative unrelated to the event (Example)[Name]Patient partner programmeNo
Estates or medical equipment engineer (as needed) (Example)[@name]Clinical engineeringNo

Charter.

ItemValue
Question to answer[What happened, why, and what will reduce the risk of recurrence?]
Meetings[Number planned; RCA2 notes meetings are typically 1.5 to 2 hours]
Protected time agreed with line managers[Yes / No]
Deadline for report to convening authority[YYYY-MM-DD, within 30 to 45 days of the event]

5. Information gathered

Source typeDetail (Example)Date collected
InterviewsNight nurse, healthcare assistant, nurse in charge, on-call doctor, patient's daughterDays 3 to 8
Site visitWard 4 bay 2 at 02:30, lighting and call bell reach checkedDay 6
Equipment inspectionBed and sensor mat checked by clinical engineeringDay 4
RecordsAdmission falls assessment, observation chart, care plan, staffing rosterDay 2
PoliciesFalls prevention policy [ID], enhanced observation procedure [ID]Day 2
DataWard falls data for 12 months; staffing fill rates for the monthDay 5

6. What happened: chronology and flow diagram

StepTimeWhat happenedSourceDiffers from expected?
T01 (Example)Day -3 16:00Admitted to Ward 4; falls risk assessment completed: high riskAssessment formNo
T02 (Example)Day -3 17:00Care plan lists sensor mat and low bed; low bed not available on wardCare plan, interviewYes: no low bed
T03 (Example)Day -1 14:00Bed moved for cleaning; sensor mat unplugged and not reconnected (found at inspection on day 4)Interview, inspectionYes
T04 (Example)Day -1 22:00Night shift: one registered nurse absent, not replaced; 2 staff for 14 patientsRosterYes: below planned staffing
T05 (Example)Day 0 02:30Healthcare assistant attending another patient in bay 4InterviewNo
T06 (Example)Day 0 02:40Patient found on floor; reports trying to reach the toiletInterview, incident reportNot applicable

The diagram shows the actual path (left branch) and the expected alternative (right branch). In the example, the low bed was unavailable and the sensor mat had been unplugged before the night of the event.

7. Why it happened: contributing factors

IDCategoryContributing factor (Example)Linked steps
CF-01EquipmentThe ward has 2 low beds for 28 patients; requests to the equipment library take a median of [n] hoursT02
CF-02Equipment and processThe sensor mat plugs into a wall socket that is unplugged when beds are moved; there is no alert when the mat is disconnectedT03
CF-03StaffingUnfilled night shifts are not escalated if the gap is reported after 20:00T04
CF-04EnvironmentThe toilet in bay 2 is 9 metres from bed 2 and the night lighting does not reach the doorwayT06
CF-05CommunicationThe patient was not told that staff would help at night and believed they should not ring the bellT06

8. Causal statements

RCA2 (appendix 6) uses five rules of causation. In short: show the cause and effect link; use specific descriptions instead of vague negative words such as "poor" or "inadequate"; trace every human error back to its preceding cause; treat a procedure violation as a symptom with its own cause, not as a root cause; and count a failure to act as causal only when there was a pre-existing duty to act.

IDCausal statement (Example)FromRules check
CS-01Ward 4 has 2 low beds for 28 patients and the equipment library has no out-of-hours delivery, so high-risk patients admitted in the afternoon often sleep in a standard-height bed, which increases the likelihood of injury when they get up alone at nightCF-011 to 5 met
CS-02The sensor mat depends on a wall socket that is unplugged whenever the bed is moved and gives no alarm when disconnected, so a disconnected mat is not noticed, which increases the likelihood that staff are not alerted when a high-risk patient gets upCF-021 to 5 met
CS-03Night staffing gaps reported after 20:00 go to a bleep holder who has no authority to move staff, so the shift runs with 2 staff for 14 patients, which increases the likelihood that a high-risk patient gets up without helpCF-031 to 5 met
CS-04The bedside information for patients does not explain night help and the call bell is not demonstrated on admission, so patients may avoid ringing at night, which increases the likelihood that they walk to the toilet aloneCF-051 to 5 met

CF-04 (route to the toilet) was judged a contributing condition rather than a cause by itself and is addressed in ACT-05 as a supporting action.

9. Corrective actions and the action hierarchy

The action hierarchy in RCA2 (from the US Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for Patient Safety) ranks actions by how much they rely on people remembering to do the right thing. The categories below are the hierarchy's category names; the descriptions are summaries in original words.

StrengthCategoriesWhy
StrongerArchitectural or physical plant changes; new devices with usability testing; engineering controls (forcing functions); simplifying the process; standardising equipment or process; tangible involvement by leadershipChange the system so the safe action is the easy or only one
IntermediateRedundancy; more staff or less workload; software changes; fewer distractions; simulation-based education with refreshers and observation; checklists and cognitive aids; removing look-alikes and sound-alikes; standardised communication tools; clearer documentationSupport people at the point of work
WeakerDouble checks; warnings; new procedure, memorandum or policy; trainingRely on memory and vigilance
IDAction (Example)AddressesStrength and categoryOwnerDue
ACT-01Buy 8 further low beds so every Ward 4 bay has one ready; add low beds to the standard bed specification for medical wardsCS-01Stronger: standardise equipment[@director-of-nursing][Day 120]
ACT-02Replace wall-powered sensor mats with battery mats that alarm on disconnection, selected after a usability test on the wardCS-02Stronger: new device with usability testing[@clinical-engineering-lead][Day 90]
ACT-03Route all night staffing gaps to the site manager, who has authority to move staff; show the live fill rate on the site dashboardCS-03Intermediate: increase staffing, software change[@deputy-director-of-nursing][Day 60]
ACT-04Add a picture card on night help to the bedside and demonstrate the call bell on admission, recorded on the admission checklistCS-04Intermediate: checklist and cognitive aid[@ward-manager][Day 45]
ACT-05Install motion-activated floor lighting from bed spaces to the bay toiletsCF-04Stronger: physical plant change[@estates-manager][Day 150]
ACT-06Brief all Ward 4 staff on the event and the changes (temporary, until ACT-01 and ACT-02 are complete)CS-01, CS-02Weaker: training[@ward-manager][Day 30]

Actions not recommended and why: [list options the team considered and rejected, with reasons].

10. Measures of implementation and effectiveness

IDActionTypeMeasure (Example)Expected levelMeasured byCheck date
MEA-01ACT-01ProcessHigh-risk patients in a low bed within 4 hours of admission, audited weekly on 10 patients90%[@ward-manager][Day 150]
MEA-02ACT-02ProcessSensor mats on Ward 4 that alarm when disconnected, tested monthly100%[@clinical-engineering-lead][Day 120]
MEA-03ACT-03ProcessNight shifts below planned staffing that were escalated to the site manager100%[@deputy-director-of-nursing][Day 90]
MEA-04ACT-04ProcessAdmission checklists with call bell demonstration recorded, 20 records a month95%[@ward-manager][Day 90]
MEA-05ACT-01 to ACT-05OutcomeFalls with moderate or greater harm per 1,000 occupied bed days on Ward 4, run chart over 12 monthsSustained reduction from baseline [rate][@patient-safety-lead][Day 365]

11. Feedback to patient, family and staff

AudienceWhat was sharedBy whomDateResponse
Patient and family (Example)Findings, actions and timescales in a meeting and a letterWard consultant and patient safety lead[Day 40]Daughter asked for an update when ACT-02 is in place
Staff involved (Example)Findings and actions in a debrief, with an explicit statement that the review found system causesReview lead[Day 38][Comments]
Ward 4 team (Example)Summary at the ward meetingWard manager[Day 42][Comments]
Incident reporter (Example)Outcome of the reviewPatient safety team[Day 40]Not applicable

12. Leadership review and risk acceptance

ItemDecision
Actions approved[ACT-01 to ACT-06 / list]
Actions not approved, with reason[None / ACT-nn: reason]
Residual risk accepted until actions complete[Description, accepted by @name]
Funding[Capital request reference for ACT-01, ACT-02 and ACT-05]
Next review of action status[YYYY-MM-DD, at patient safety committee]

Leadership also reviews the RCA2 process itself at least once a year (RCA2 recommendation 2): timeliness, the share of reviews with a stronger or intermediate action, and how many actions were implemented and shown to work.

13. External reporting and regulatory context

Jurisdiction or bodyExample framework (as understood in October 2026; verify)What to check
England (UK)NHS England Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF), published August 2022, which replaced the Serious Incident Framework for NHS-funded care and favours a range of system-based learning responses over a single investigation methodYour organisation's patient safety incident response plan and policy: https://www.england.nhs.uk/patient-safety/patient-safety-insight/incident-response-framework/
United StatesThe Joint Commission Sentinel Event Policy expects accredited organisations to complete a comprehensive systematic analysis and action plan after a sentinel event; state reporting laws and the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 may also applyThe current Sentinel Event Policy chapter of your accreditation manual and your state's reporting rules: https://www.jointcommission.org/
European UnionNo single EU-wide incident review method; national authorities and laws set reporting and review rulesYour national health authority or patient safety agency
ReportRequired?BodyDeadlineSubmittedReference
[Regulator or accreditor][Yes / No][Name][Date][YYYY-MM-DD][Ref]
[Device or medicines regulator, if equipment or a medicine was involved][Yes / No][Name][Date][YYYY-MM-DD][Ref]

This section is a prompt list, not legal advice. Ask your risk management or legal team which reports apply.

14. Follow-up and closure

ActionStatus (Example)Measure resultEvidenceClosed on
ACT-01[Done]MEA-01: [n%][Audit report ID]YYYY-MM-DD
ACT-02[In progress]MEA-02: [n%][Test log ID]
ACT-03[Done]MEA-03: [n%][Dashboard extract]YYYY-MM-DD
ACT-04[Done]MEA-04: [n%][Audit report ID]YYYY-MM-DD
ACT-05[Not started: funding pending]Not yet[Capital request]
ACT-06[Done]Attendance [n of n][Briefing record]YYYY-MM-DD

Review timeliness.

MilestoneTargetActual (Example)
Event to prioritisation scoreWithin 72 hours32 hours
Prioritisation to first team meetingAs soon as possible1 day
Event to report to convening authority30 to 45 days36 days
Event to leadership approval[Local target]40 days

Learning shared beyond the ward. [Patient safety bulletin, other wards with similar risks, regional network, equipment supplier if a device issue was found.]

15. Glossary and references

15.1 Glossary

TermMeaning
Action hierarchyA ranking of corrective actions from stronger (system changes) to weaker (reliance on memory and vigilance)
Blameworthy eventAn event your organisation defines in advance for handling outside the safety review, for example a criminal or deliberately unsafe act
Causal statementA sentence linking a cause to an effect and to the event, written to the five rules of causation
Close callAn event or situation that could have caused harm but did not, by chance or timely intervention
Convening authorityThe leader who commissions the review and receives its report
RCA2Root cause analysis and action: an approach that adds strong actions and measurement to classic root cause analysis
SACSafety Assessment Code: a severity by probability score used to prioritise events

15.2 References

  1. National Patient Safety Foundation. RCA2: Improving Root Cause Analyses and Actions to Prevent Harm. Boston: NPSF; 2015. Version 2, January 2016. Available from the Institute for Healthcare Improvement: https://www.ihi.org/library/tools/rca2-improving-root-cause-analyses-and-actions-prevent-harm
  2. Institute for Healthcare Improvement. Action Hierarchy tool. 2019. Same page as reference 1.
  3. US Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration. Safety Assessment Code matrix, as reproduced in RCA2 appendix 1.
  4. AHRQ Patient Safety Network. Root Cause Analysis primer (updated 2024): https://psnet.ahrq.gov/primer/root-cause-analysis
  5. [Local policies: incident management, falls prevention, disclosure]

Related templates in this collection: healthcare/quality-improvement-report for a project that tests the actions, healthcare/patient-safety-incident-report for the initial report and learning review, healthcare/clinical-audit for measuring compliance with a standard, business/root-cause-analysis for non-clinical problems, compliance/capa-nonconformity for regulated quality systems, and healthcare/sbar for escalation during the event.

Standard and licence note

Structure aligned with RCA2: Improving Root Cause Analyses and Actions to Prevent Harm (National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015, version 2 January 2016), now distributed by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement. RCA2 is copyright of its publisher; this template follows its recommendations, timings and tool sequence in original words and reproduces none of its text or examples. The action hierarchy category names and the Safety Assessment Code matrix originate from the US Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for Patient Safety and are given as reproduced in RCA2. Read the official RCA2 document and your organisation's incident policy before use, and check the current version of any regulatory framework named in section 13. The hospital, ward and event in the examples are fictional. This is a documentation format, not legal or medical advice; consult qualified professionals. Template licence: MIT.

相关模板