Fraud Risk Assessment Template (GAO Framework, UK Failure to Prevent Fraud)
Scope and size test, governance, scales, scheme inventory, inherent and residual scoring, anti-fraud controls, override, analytics, six principles, actions
Cách dùng: Use it when a group must document its fraud risk profile for the board, the auditor or the UK failure to prevent fraud defence. Fill the scope, the size test and the scoring scales first, then run scheme workshops with process owners. The main pitfall is a list of generic fraud types with scores but no named, tested controls, which shows awareness rather than reasonable procedures.
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Fraud Risk Assessment: [Organisation name] [FYYYYY]
Enterprise fraud risk assessment: scope and associated persons, fraud risk governance, method and scoring scales, fraud risk factors, a fraud scheme inventory (financial reporting fraud, asset misappropriation, corruption, external fraud and payment fraud, plus fraud committed for the benefit of the organisation), inherent likelihood and impact, anti-fraud controls, residual risk against a stated tolerance, management override, data analytics, evidence of reasonable procedures and an action plan. The backbone is the GAO Fraud Risk Management Framework (GAO-15-593SP, July 2015, US public domain) with GAO Green Book 2025 Principle 8. It supports the "reasonable procedures" defence to the UK failure to prevent fraud offence in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (section 199, in force 2025-09-01) and the Home Office guidance on that offence (gov.uk, Open Government Licence v3.0). ISA 240 (Revised) (auditor's responsibilities relating to fraud, periods beginning on or after 2026-12-15) and the COSO/ACFE Fraud Risk Management Guide (2nd edition, 2023) are named only. The example organisation, Corvid Commerce Group, and the bank variant, Fernhollow Bank, are fictional. Replace every
[bracketed]value and every row marked Example. Obtain the law, guidance and standards for the normative text and check the consolidated text. This is a documentation format, not legal, accounting or audit advice.
Document control
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Document ID | [FRA-2027-001] (Example) |
| Organisation | [Corvid Commerce Group plc and subsidiary undertakings] (Example, fictional) |
| Entities in scope | [CC-HOLD, CC-DE, CC-UK, CC-US, CC-VN] (Example) |
| Assessment period | [FY2027, 2027-01-01 to 2027-12-31] (Example) |
| Version | [1.0] |
| Status | [Draft / Approved / Superseded] |
| Owner | [@group-head-of-compliance] |
| Antifraud lead (dedicated entity) | [Group Fraud Risk Lead, reporting to the CFO with a line to the audit committee chair] (Example) |
| Approvers/reviewers | [Audit committee], [@cfo], [@general-counsel], [@head-of-internal-audit] |
| Last updated | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Classification | [Confidential; restricted to board, executive and control functions] |
| Review cycle | [Annual full refresh; quarterly update of high and above-tolerance risks] |
| Legal basis tracked | [ECCTA 2023 s.199 to s.206 and Schedule 13 (UK); local anti-fraud law per entity] |
Approvals
| Role | Name | Decision | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audit committee chair | [Name] | [Approved / Approved with actions] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Chief Financial Officer | [Name] | [Approved] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| General Counsel | [Name] | [Reviewed] | YYYY-MM-DD |
| Head of Internal Audit | [Name] | [Reviewed, independent challenge] | YYYY-MM-DD |
Revision history
| Version | Date | Author | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0.1 | YYYY-MM-DD | [@fraud-risk-lead] | Draft after scheme workshops in all five entities (Example) |
| 0.9 | YYYY-MM-DD | [@fraud-risk-lead] | Control mapping and residual scoring after internal audit challenge (Example) |
| 1.0 | YYYY-MM-DD | [@group-head-of-compliance] | Approved by audit committee (Example) |
Contents
- 1. Scope and associated persons
- 2. Governance and top-level commitment
- 3. Method, scales and tolerance
- 4. Fraud risk factors
- 5. Fraud scheme inventory
- 6. Inherent risk scoring
- 7. Anti-fraud controls
- 8. Residual risk and response
- 9. Management override of controls
- 10. Data analytics and monitoring
- 11. Reasonable procedures evidence
- 12. Fraud response and investigation interface
- 13. Action plan
- 14. Bank variant: Fernhollow Bank
- 15. Reporting and review cadence
- Glossary and references
- Standard and licence note
1. Scope and associated persons
State the legal entities, business lines and processes that this assessment covers, and say why anything is excluded. A group assessment is acceptable when entities share processes and controls, but record entity-specific schemes separately where the local process differs (for example a separate payroll provider or a local bank).
Under ECCTA 2023 section 201, the failure to prevent fraud offence applies to large organisations: in the financial year before the fraud, the organisation met at least two of three conditions (more than 250 employees, more than GBP 36 million turnover, more than GBP 18 million total assets). Section 201 and section 202 explain how group figures and parent undertakings count; read them with the Home Office guidance and record your conclusion below. The offence can reach organisations incorporated outside the UK where the base fraud has a UK connection, so do not limit the analysis to UK entities without legal advice.
| Entity | Country | Activities in scope | Headcount | Associated persons in scope | UK nexus |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CC-HOLD (Example) | England and Wales | Group treasury, listing, group tax | 15 | Directors, company secretary agent | Yes |
| CC-DE (Example) | Germany | Operating HQ, SaaS platform, EU commerce, finance shared service | 330 | Employees, payroll provider, logistics partner | Yes, serves UK customers |
| CC-UK (Example) | United Kingdom | UK sales, UK commerce, public-sector contracts | 95 | Employees, sales agents, resellers | Yes |
| CC-US (Example) | United States | US subscription sales and support | 80 | Employees, marketplace partners | Possible, through group reporting |
| CC-VN (Example) | Vietnam | Engineering and customer service centre | 165 | Employees, recruitment agency | Possible, through services to UK customers |
Size test conclusion (Example): the group budget for FY2027 shows revenue of EUR 160,000 thousand and 685 FTE in FY2026 (more than 250 employees), so the group meets two of the three section 201 conditions and is treated as a large organisation. Confirm the figures for the financial year that precedes each assessment period.
An associated person under section 199 is an employee, an agent, a subsidiary undertaking or any other person who performs services for or on behalf of the organisation. List categories, not individuals, and name the owner of each relationship. Resellers, introducers, outsourced customer service agents and tax advisers are common blind spots.
2. Governance and top-level commitment
The GAO framework asks management to commit to combating fraud by creating an organisational culture and structure that supports it, including a designated entity that leads fraud risk management with defined responsibilities and enough authority. The Home Office guidance places top-level commitment first among its six principles. Record the structure that exists today, not the one you plan, and put gaps in the action plan.
| Role | Responsibility for fraud risk | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Board | Sets tone, approves anti-fraud policy and fraud risk tolerance | Board minutes YYYY-MM-DD (Example) |
| Audit committee | Oversees this assessment, reviews fraud incidents and override risk, receives internal audit opinion | Committee terms of reference, agenda log |
| CFO | Accountable executive for anti-fraud programme and financial reporting fraud | Objectives and scorecard |
| Group Fraud Risk Lead | Runs this assessment, maintains scheme inventory, coordinates analytics and response | Role profile, budget line |
| Process owners | Own schemes and controls in their area; attest quarterly | Quarterly attestations |
| Internal audit | Independent challenge of scoring; tests key anti-fraud controls | Audit plan entries |
| Speak-up function | Runs the reporting channel, routes fraud allegations | Case log under compliance/whistleblowing-policy |
Describe in a few sentences how leadership communicates its stance: the anti-fraud policy, the code of conduct, the CEO message, consequence management after proven cases and how bonuses treat misconduct. A written commitment matters less than visible consequences; record whether any proven fraud in the last cycle led to discipline, recovery or referral, without naming individuals.
3. Method, scales and tolerance
The method follows the GAO Assess component: plan a regular assessment tailored to the organisation and involve the people who run the controls; identify inherent fraud risks; assess their likelihood and impact; determine fraud risk tolerance; examine the suitability of existing controls and prioritise residual risks; and document the result as a fraud risk profile (sections 5 to 8 of this template). GAO Green Book 2025 Principle 8 sets the same expectation for management to consider the potential for fraud when it assesses risks.
Inherent risk ignores existing anti-fraud controls; residual risk reflects controls that are designed and evidenced as operating. Score both on the same scales. The score is the product of the two ratings:
where is likelihood (1 to 5) and is impact (1 to 5), giving a score from 1 to 25. Impact covers money and non-financial effects; take the higher of the two ratings.
| Rating | Likelihood (over the assessment period) | Financial impact (EUR thousand) | Non-financial impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Rare: no known cases here or in peers | Below 50 | Internal only |
| 2 | Unlikely: known in peers, not here | 50 to 249 | Local customer complaints |
| 3 | Possible: attempted here in last 3 years | 250 to 999 | Regulator query, local press |
| 4 | Likely: occurred here in last 3 years | 1,000 to 3,999 | Restatement risk, criminal investigation |
| 5 | Almost certain: recurring attempts | 4,000 or more | Prosecution of the organisation, loss of licence or listing |
Example: the financial thresholds above are illustrative and set by Corvid's audit committee. Calibrate yours to your own materiality and risk appetite; they are not normative.
| Band | Score | Fraud risk tolerance and response |
|---|---|---|
| Low | 1 to 6 | Within tolerance: monitor through routine controls |
| Medium | 8 to 12 | Above tolerance: treatment action with owner and date within 12 months |
| High | 15 to 25 | Well above tolerance: executive owner, treatment within 6 months, audit committee tracking |
Scores of 7, 11, 13, 14 and similar cannot occur with a 5 by 5 product, so the band edges are complete. For any scheme tagged FTPF (section 5), rate impact at 4 or higher whatever the financial amount, because prosecution of the organisation is a severe non-financial outcome, and record the rationale for any Low residual rating explicitly.
Record the workshop plan in a short list: dates, entities, attendees by role, and the data reviewed before each session (incident log, speak-up cases, audit findings, chargeback data, supplier master changes). GAO recommends specific tools, methods and sources for gathering fraud information, including data from detection activities; note which you used so the next cycle can repeat them.
4. Fraud risk factors
The Home Office guidance suggests considering opportunity, motive and rationalisation (the fraud triangle) when assessing risk. Describe the factors that apply to the organisation and refer to them by ID in the scheme inventory.
| ID | Factor type | Description | Schemes affected |
|---|---|---|---|
| RF-01 (Example) | Pressure | Bonus pool tied to annual recurring revenue and EBITDA targets in a growth plan | FRA-001, FRA-002, FRA-013 |
| RF-02 (Example) | Pressure | UK public-sector bids with tight win targets | FRA-008, FRA-013 |
| RF-03 (Example) | Opportunity | Supplier master data maintained by the same shared-service team that processes invoices in CC-DE | FRA-004 |
| RF-04 (Example) | Opportunity | High-volume card-not-present commerce with instant digital delivery | FRA-010, FRA-012 |
| RF-05 (Example) | Opportunity | Small finance team in CC-VN with combined payroll input and approval | FRA-006 |
| RF-06 (Example) | Rationalisation | Perception that expense rules are outdated and tolerated informally | FRA-005 |
| RF-07 (Example) | Opportunity | Senior finance staff can post manual journals after close with limited second review | FRA-002 |
Consider also external factors: economic stress among customers and suppliers, new criminal methods such as impersonation using synthetic voice or video, staff turnover in control roles, and any recent system migration. A migration or reorganisation often weakens segregation of duties for several months.
5. Fraud scheme inventory
Describe each scheme in one sentence that names the actor, the method and the gain. Use the categories below; one scheme belongs to one category. Tag schemes that would be committed by an associated person intending to benefit the organisation (or its clients) as "FTPF", because those are the ones relevant to the section 199 offence. The base offences for that offence are listed in Schedule 13 of the Act; in England, Wales and Northern Ireland they include fraud by false representation, by failing to disclose information and by abuse of position, false accounting, false statements by company directors, fraudulent trading and cheating the public revenue. The organisation is not liable where it is the victim or intended victim.
| Category | Meaning in this template |
|---|---|
| Financial reporting fraud | Intentional misstatement or omission in financial statements or regulatory returns |
| Asset misappropriation | Theft or misuse of the organisation's cash, inventory, data or other assets by insiders |
| Corruption | Bribery, kickbacks, undisclosed conflicts of interest, bid rigging |
| External fraud | Fraud by customers, suppliers or criminals against the organisation |
| Payment fraud | Diversion of outgoing payments by impersonation, account takeover or manipulated instructions |
| FTPF | Fraud by an associated person intended to benefit the organisation or its clients |
| Scheme ID | Category | Scheme description | Entity | Risk factors | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FRA-001 (Example) | Financial reporting | Sales or finance staff record fictitious or early subscription revenue to meet ARR targets | CC-DE, CC-UK | RF-01 | [@group-controller] |
| FRA-002 (Example) | Financial reporting | Management overrides controls through manual journals or biased estimates (provisions, capitalised development) | Group | RF-01, RF-07 | [@cfo] |
| FRA-003 (Example) | Financial reporting | Operating costs capitalised as platform development to raise EBITDA | CC-DE | RF-01 | [@group-controller] |
| FRA-004 (Example) | Asset misappropriation | Insider creates a fictitious supplier or changes a supplier's bank details and diverts payments | CC-DE | RF-03 | [@head-of-shared-services] |
| FRA-005 (Example) | Asset misappropriation | Employees claim personal or inflated expenses | Group | RF-06 | [@head-of-shared-services] |
| FRA-006 (Example) | Asset misappropriation | Ghost employee or inflated overtime in payroll | CC-VN | RF-05 | [@cc-vn-finance-manager] |
| FRA-007 (Example) | Asset misappropriation | Warehouse or logistics partner staff steal goods or process fake returns | CC-DE, CC-UK | RF-04 | [@head-of-commerce-operations] |
| FRA-008 (Example) | Corruption | Sales agent pays an inducement to a public official to win a UK contract | CC-UK | RF-02 | [@cc-uk-managing-director] |
| FRA-009 (Example) | Corruption | Buyer awards contracts to a supplier in which they hold an undisclosed interest | Group | RF-03 | [@head-of-procurement] |
| FRA-010 (Example) | External | Criminals use stolen cards or take over customer accounts to buy goods, subscriptions and digital credit | CC-DE, CC-UK, CC-US | RF-04 | [@head-of-payments] |
| FRA-011 (Example) | Payment | Impersonation of an executive or supplier by email, phone or synthetic voice leads to an urgent payment | Group | RF-03 | [@group-treasurer] |
| FRA-012 (Example) | External | Customers abuse refunds, chargebacks and promotions (first-party fraud) | CC-DE, CC-UK, CC-US | RF-04 | [@head-of-customer-service] |
| FRA-013 (Example) | FTPF | Sales staff or resellers mislead customers about contract terms, uptime or cancellation rights to close deals | CC-UK, CC-DE | RF-01, RF-02 | [@chief-revenue-officer] |
| FRA-014 (Example) | FTPF | Staff or a tax adviser overstate R&D relief or VAT recovery claims | CC-UK, CC-DE | RF-01 | [@group-head-of-tax] |
| FRA-015 (Example) | External | Channel partners inflate rebate or referral commission claims | CC-US, CC-UK | RF-04 | [@head-of-partnerships] |
Bribery schemes (FRA-008, FRA-009) also sit in the anti-bribery management system. Keep the scheme
here for completeness of the fraud profile and link the detailed bribery risk assessment in ISO
37001 Anti-Bribery (compliance/iso-37001-anti-bribery) rather than repeating it. The UK guidance
for this offence follows the same six principles shape as the guidance on the bribery offence, so
the two assessments can share workshops and evidence.
6. Inherent risk scoring
Score each scheme with the scales in section 3. Write the rationale in a short phrase that cites data (incident counts, chargeback rates, peer cases) where you have it. Impact reflects the larger of the financial and non-financial ratings.
| Scheme ID | Inherent L | Inherent I | Inherent score | Band | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FRA-001 (Example) | 3 | 5 | 15 | High | Strong target pressure; misstatement could exceed EUR 4,000 thousand |
| FRA-002 (Example) | 3 | 5 | 15 | High | Override is always possible; restatement and listing consequences |
| FRA-003 (Example) | 2 | 4 | 8 | Medium | Judgemental capitalisation; no history of issues |
| FRA-004 (Example) | 4 | 4 | 16 | High | Two attempted bank detail changes last year; large supplier runs |
| FRA-005 (Example) | 4 | 1 | 4 | Low | Frequent small amounts |
| FRA-006 (Example) | 2 | 2 | 4 | Low | Small payroll, local provider |
| FRA-007 (Example) | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium | Returns volume rising |
| FRA-008 (Example) | 3 | 4 | 12 | Medium | Public-sector bids through agents |
| FRA-009 (Example) | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium | Decentralised buying in three entities |
| FRA-010 (Example) | 5 | 3 | 15 | High | Constant attempts; digital goods delivered instantly |
| FRA-011 (Example) | 4 | 4 | 16 | High | Monthly impersonation attempts; treasury pays large sums |
| FRA-012 (Example) | 4 | 2 | 8 | Medium | Known refund abuse patterns |
| FRA-013 (Example) | 3 | 4 | 12 | Medium | Misleading sales claims could support prosecution under s.199 |
| FRA-014 (Example) | 2 | 5 | 10 | Medium | Cheating the public revenue is a base offence; claims are large |
| FRA-015 (Example) | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium | Self-reported partner data |
Inherent profile (Example): 5 High (FRA-001, FRA-002, FRA-004, FRA-010, FRA-011), 8 Medium and 2 Low, 15 schemes in total.
7. Anti-fraud controls
The GAO Design and Implement component asks for an antifraud strategy that favours preventive
controls, weighs the benefits and costs of controls and includes a fraud response plan. List each
anti-fraud control with its type and its test status. Where the control is also an ICFR key
control, use the same control ID as the Risk and Control Matrix (compliance/risk-control-matrix)
so testing is not duplicated.
| Control ID | Description | Type | Schemes | Automated / manual | Tested | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AFC-01 (Example) | Revenue contract review: signed order, credit check and start date verified before activation | Preventive | FRA-001 | Manual, IT-dependent | Internal audit Q2 | Effective |
| AFC-02 (Example) | Manual journal review by a second person above EUR 50 thousand and all post-close entries | Detective | FRA-001, FRA-002, FRA-003 | Manual | External auditor | Effective with exceptions |
| AFC-03 (Example) | Capitalisation committee approves development projects and time-sheet basis quarterly | Preventive | FRA-003 | Manual | Internal audit Q3 | Effective |
| AFC-04 (Example) | Supplier bank changes verified by call-back to a number held on file, second approver in a different team | Preventive | FRA-004, FRA-011 | Manual with workflow | Internal audit Q1 | Effective |
| AFC-05 (Example) | Duplicate and new-supplier analytics before each payment run | Detective | FRA-004, FRA-009 | Automated | Control testing | Effective |
| AFC-06 (Example) | Expense tool rules, receipt matching and monthly sample review | Preventive, detective | FRA-005 | Automated, manual | Not tested this cycle | Not assessed |
| AFC-07 (Example) | Payroll starter and leaver reconciliation to HR system, independent of payroll input | Detective | FRA-006 | Manual | Not tested | Not assessed |
| AFC-08 (Example) | Returns authorisation and cycle counts with CCTV in warehouses | Preventive, detective | FRA-007 | Manual | Operations self-assessment | Partly effective |
| AFC-09 (Example) | Third-party due diligence and contractual anti-bribery clauses for agents | Preventive | FRA-008 | Manual | Compliance review | Effective |
| AFC-10 (Example) | Annual conflict of interest declarations and vendor-employee data match | Detective | FRA-009 | Manual, automated match | Compliance review | Partly effective |
| AFC-11 (Example) | Real-time transaction risk scoring, 3-D Secure step-up and velocity rules | Preventive | FRA-010, FRA-012 | Automated | Payments team | Effective, tuning needed |
| AFC-12 (Example) | Payment release requires two authorisers and a call-back for new or urgent payee instructions | Preventive | FRA-011 | Manual with workflow | Internal audit Q1 | Effective |
| AFC-13 (Example) | Sales claims and contract template approval by legal; mystery-shopper review of reseller scripts | Preventive, detective | FRA-013 | Manual | Not tested | Not assessed |
| AFC-14 (Example) | Tax claims reviewed by group tax and signed off by CFO, adviser engagement terms require accuracy statement | Preventive | FRA-014 | Manual | Group tax review | Effective |
| AFC-15 (Example) | Partner commission audit rights and quarterly reconciliation to sales data | Detective | FRA-015 | Manual | Not tested | Not assessed |
| AFC-16 (Example) | Speak-up channel and fraud response plan | Detective, response | All | Manual | Case log review | Effective |
| AFC-17 (Example) | Fraud awareness training, role-based for finance, procurement, sales and customer service | Preventive | All | Manual | Completion tracking | 91% completed (Example) |
The rule for control credit: a control that is "Not assessed" gives no credit at residual scoring until it has evidence. Process owners often challenge this rule; hold to it, because a defence of reasonable procedures depends on procedures that actually run.
8. Residual risk and response
Re-rate likelihood and impact with credit only for controls in section 7 that are tested or otherwise evidenced. Preventive controls usually reduce likelihood; detective controls reduce impact by limiting how long a fraud runs. Recompute the score as ; do not adjust scores by judgement after the multiplication.
| Scheme ID | Inherent score | Controls credited | Residual L | Residual I | Residual score | Band | Response |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FRA-001 (Example) | 15 | AFC-01, AFC-02 | 2 | 4 | 8 | Medium | Treat: ACT-01 |
| FRA-002 (Example) | 15 | AFC-02 | 2 | 5 | 10 | Medium | Treat: ACT-02 |
| FRA-003 (Example) | 8 | AFC-02, AFC-03 | 1 | 4 | 4 | Low | Accept and monitor |
| FRA-004 (Example) | 16 | AFC-04, AFC-05 | 2 | 4 | 8 | Medium | Treat: ACT-03 |
| FRA-005 (Example) | 4 | None credited (AFC-06 not assessed) | 4 | 1 | 4 | Low | Accept; test AFC-06 (ACT-09) |
| FRA-006 (Example) | 4 | None credited (AFC-07 not assessed) | 2 | 2 | 4 | Low | Accept; test AFC-07 (ACT-09) |
| FRA-007 (Example) | 9 | AFC-08 | 2 | 3 | 6 | Low | Accept and monitor |
| FRA-008 (Example) | 12 | AFC-09 | 2 | 4 | 8 | Medium | Treat: ACT-04 |
| FRA-009 (Example) | 9 | AFC-05, AFC-10 | 2 | 3 | 6 | Low | Accept and monitor |
| FRA-010 (Example) | 15 | AFC-11 | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium | Treat: ACT-05 |
| FRA-011 (Example) | 16 | AFC-04, AFC-12 | 2 | 4 | 8 | Medium | Treat: ACT-06 |
| FRA-012 (Example) | 8 | AFC-11 | 3 | 2 | 6 | Low | Accept and monitor |
| FRA-013 (Example) | 12 | None credited (AFC-13 not assessed) | 3 | 4 | 12 | Medium | Treat: ACT-07 (FTPF priority) |
| FRA-014 (Example) | 10 | AFC-14 | 1 | 5 | 5 | Low | Accept and monitor; FTPF Low rationale: AFC-14 tested effective, no adviser claim rejected by HMRC in 3 years |
| FRA-015 (Example) | 9 | None credited (AFC-15 not assessed) | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium | Treat: ACT-08 |
Residual profile (Example): 0 High, 8 Medium (FRA-001, FRA-002, FRA-004, FRA-008, FRA-010, FRA-011, FRA-013, FRA-015) and 7 Low (FRA-003, FRA-005, FRA-006, FRA-007, FRA-009, FRA-012, FRA-014), 15 schemes in total. All 8 Medium schemes are above tolerance and carry an action in section 13. FRA-013 is the priority because it is an FTPF scheme with no evidenced control.
Where you accept a risk above tolerance (for example because the cost of a control exceeds the expected loss), record the decision, the reason, the name and position of the person who approved it and the date. The Home Office guidance expects decisions not to implement a measure to be documented in this way. GAO also asks managers to weigh the benefits and costs of controls; write the comparison in money where you can.
| Accepted risk ID | Scheme | Reason | Approved by (name, position) | Date | Review date |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACC-01 (Example) | FRA-015 (part) | A full audit of all partners would cost more than the expected overclaims (estimated EUR 60 thousand a year); only the top-10 partner audits under ACT-08 are performed and the remaining partners are accepted at Medium until the next assessment | [Name], Chief Commercial Officer | YYYY-MM-DD | YYYY-MM-DD |
9. Management override of controls
Management override is present in every organisation, because those who design and run controls can also circumvent them. Auditors treat it as a fraud risk in every audit; ISA 240 (Revised), effective for audits of periods beginning on or after 2026-12-15, is the international standard that sets the auditor's side. Read the standard for its requirements; this section records management's own view and responses so that the audit committee and the auditor can rely on it.
Answer these questions in prose for the organisation:
- Which people can post journal entries, change master data, approve their own transactions or instruct payments without an independent check? Name roles, not individuals.
- Which accounting estimates are most sensitive to bias (for example expected credit losses on receivables, capitalised development, provisions for returns, revenue cut-off)? Who sets the assumptions, and who challenges them?
- Which significant transactions fall outside the normal course of business, such as one-off disposals, related-party dealings or year-end deals with unusual terms? How are they approved?
- How does the audit committee meet the external and internal auditors without management present, and how often?
(Example) At Corvid, override risk sits with the CFO, the group controller and two senior accountants in CC-DE who hold posting rights in all ledgers. AFC-02 covers post-close journals; ACT-02 adds a quarterly analytic of journal entries by user, time, round amounts and unusual account combinations, reviewed by internal audit and reported to the audit committee. Estimates with the largest judgement are capitalised development (AFC-03) and the returns provision, which the audit committee will challenge each half-year against actual returns.
10. Data analytics and monitoring
GAO's fourth component asks managers to evaluate outcomes using a risk-based approach and adapt
activities to improve fraud risk management, with monitoring and feedback as continuous activities
across all four components. Describe the analytics that support detective controls and how results
flow back into scheme scores. For real-time customer and payment fraud, the system design belongs
in Fraud Detection System Design (system-design/design-fraud-detection); record here only the
outcome measures that inform the risk profile.
| Analytic ID | Purpose | Data source | Frequency | Alert owner | Schemes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DA-01 (Example) | Journal entry analytics: post-close, weekend, round amounts, rare account pairs | General ledger | Quarterly | Internal audit | FRA-001, FRA-002 |
| DA-02 (Example) | Supplier master changes followed by payment within 14 days | ERP change log, payment file | Each payment run | Shared services | FRA-004, FRA-011 |
| DA-03 (Example) | Employee and supplier address and bank account match | HR system, supplier master | Monthly | Compliance | FRA-004, FRA-009 |
| DA-04 (Example) | Chargeback ratio and fraud rate by channel and country | Payment processor data | Weekly | Payments team | FRA-010, FRA-012 |
| DA-05 (Example) | Partner commission claims compared with sales records | CRM, commission system | Quarterly | Partnerships finance | FRA-015 |
| DA-06 (Example) | Complaint themes mentioning mis-selling, cancellation or uptime claims | Customer complaints system | Monthly | Customer service | FRA-013 |
Track a small set of outcome measures: confirmed fraud losses by category, recovered amounts, time from first indicator to detection, alert closure time and the share of cases found by controls rather than by tip-offs or chance. A falling detection rate is not proof of less fraud; it may mean controls stopped working.
11. Reasonable procedures evidence
Under section 199, it is a defence for the organisation to prove that, when the fraud was committed, it had reasonable fraud prevention procedures in place, or that it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect it to have any. The organisation carries the burden of proof. The Home Office guidance under section 204 describes six principles that should inform those procedures. The table records the evidence for each; it is not a substitute for reading the guidance.
| Principle | What the organisation does | Evidence location | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Top-level commitment | Board-approved anti-fraud policy; CEO statement; audit committee oversight | Section 2; policy POL-AF-001 (Example) | None |
| Risk assessment | This document, refreshed annually and on change | This document; workshop records | FTPF schemes added this cycle |
| Proportionate risk-based prevention procedures | Controls AFC-01 to AFC-17 matched to schemes | Section 7; risk and control matrix | AFC-13 and AFC-15 untested |
| Due diligence | Third-party onboarding for agents, resellers and partners; pre-employment screening for finance roles | Third-party register | Reseller due diligence lighter than agent due diligence (ACT-07) |
| Communication (including training) | Policy publication, role-based training, speak-up channel | Training records; compliance/whistleblowing-policy | Reseller training absent |
| Monitoring and review | Analytics, internal audit testing, incident lessons, annual review | Sections 10 and 15 | Analytics for FRA-013 new |
Keep the records that show the procedures operated during the year: training completion, due diligence files, control test results, investigations closed and changes made after incidents. The defence is judged at the time of the fraud, so evidence that is assembled after an allegation carries little weight.
12. Fraud response and investigation interface
GAO asks for a fraud response plan as part of the antifraud strategy. Summarise the plan here and
keep its procedure in the investigation template. Each allegation that reaches the speak-up
channel or a detective control should be triaged within an agreed time, assigned an investigator
independent of the area concerned and documented in a Fraud Investigation Report
(compliance/fraud-investigation-report).
Decide in advance which events trigger notification to the external auditor, the insurer, the police or a regulator, and which trigger a re-score of the affected scheme. The last step in the diagram is the one most often missed: every proven case should change at least one score, control or analytic in this assessment.
13. Action plan
| Action ID | Scheme / gap | Action | Owner | Due | Success measure | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ACT-01 (Example) | FRA-001 | Link revenue activation to signed order in billing system so manual activation needs approval | [@group-controller] | YYYY-MM-DD | No manual activation without approval in Q3 test | Open |
| ACT-02 (Example) | FRA-002 | Introduce DA-01 journal analytics with quarterly report to audit committee | [@head-of-internal-audit] | YYYY-MM-DD | Two quarterly reports issued | Open |
| ACT-03 (Example) | FRA-004 | Move supplier master maintenance to a team without invoice processing rights | [@head-of-shared-services] | YYYY-MM-DD | Access review shows no combined rights | Open |
| ACT-04 (Example) | FRA-008 | Refresh due diligence for all UK public-sector agents and add audit rights | [@group-head-of-compliance] | YYYY-MM-DD | 100% of active agents re-screened | Open |
| ACT-05 (Example) | FRA-010 | Tune risk rules and add device signals for digital credit purchases | [@head-of-payments] | YYYY-MM-DD | Fraud rate below internal target for two quarters | Open |
| ACT-06 (Example) | FRA-011 | Run executive impersonation simulation and add code-word verification for urgent payments | [@group-treasurer] | YYYY-MM-DD | Simulation completed; procedure updated | Open |
| ACT-07 (Example) | FRA-013 | Test AFC-13; extend due diligence and training to resellers; add DA-06 | [@chief-revenue-officer] | YYYY-MM-DD | AFC-13 tested effective; reseller training above 90% | Open |
| ACT-08 (Example) | FRA-015 | Exercise audit rights on top 10 partners by commission | [@head-of-partnerships] | YYYY-MM-DD | Audits completed; overclaims recovered | Open |
| ACT-09 (Example) | AFC-06, AFC-07 | Include expense and payroll controls in control testing plan | [@head-of-internal-audit] | YYYY-MM-DD | Test results recorded | Open |
Report progress quarterly. When an action closes, re-score the scheme with the new evidence; do
not lower a score on the strength of a closed action alone. Feed open actions and residual Medium
or High schemes into the enterprise Risk Register (compliance/risk-register) under a fraud risk
category, so the board sees fraud alongside other principal risks.
14. Bank variant: Fernhollow Bank
A bank uses the same method, scales and sections, but the scheme inventory is wider and customer-facing fraud dominates. Fernhollow Bank, a fictional mid-sized EU credit institution, would add schemes such as those below. Payment fraud reimbursement rules, strong customer authentication and fraud reporting duties come from payment services law and supervisory guidance in each jurisdiction; check the rules that apply to you and record them in the legal basis field of Document control.
| Scheme ID | Category | Scheme description | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| FRA-B01 (Example) | External | Authorised push payment scams where customers are manipulated into paying criminals | system-design/design-fraud-detection |
| FRA-B02 (Example) | External | Money mule accounts opened with real or synthetic identities | compliance/transaction-monitoring-scenario-spec |
| FRA-B03 (Example) | External | Loan application fraud with falsified income or collateral documents | Credit origination controls |
| FRA-B04 (Example) | Asset misappropriation | Insider moves funds from dormant accounts | Privileged access monitoring |
| FRA-B05 (Example) | Financial reporting | Staff delay loan loss recognition to protect targets | Model and provisioning governance |
| FRA-B06 (Example) | FTPF | Staff mis-sell products to meet sales targets, or misstate data in regulatory returns | Conduct risk programme |
Align customer fraud scoring with the AML Business Risk Assessment
(compliance/aml-business-risk-assessment), because mule activity is both a fraud and a money
laundering risk, and use a single customer risk view where your systems allow. Operational loss
events from fraud also feed the bank's operational risk framework
(finance/operational-risk-rcsa).
15. Reporting and review cadence
| Activity | Frequency | Owner | Audience |
|---|---|---|---|
| Full assessment refresh with workshops | Annual | Group Fraud Risk Lead | Audit committee |
| Update of Medium and High residual schemes, action status | Quarterly | Group Fraud Risk Lead | Audit committee, executive |
| Fraud incident and loss report | Quarterly | Group Fraud Risk Lead | Audit committee |
| Out-of-cycle review | On trigger | Scheme owner | Fraud Risk Lead |
| Independent review of the programme | Every [2 to 3] years | Internal audit or external reviewer | Audit committee |
Triggers for an out-of-cycle review (Example): a confirmed fraud above EUR 250 thousand; a new country, product or payment method; an acquisition; a change of ERP or payment provider; new law or guidance; a control rated ineffective in testing. Record each trigger and the resulting change in the revision history.
Provide the audit committee with a one-page summary: inherent and residual profiles, schemes above
tolerance, actions overdue, incidents and losses, and the internal audit view. Internal audit
plans can draw on this profile; see Internal Audit Charter and Plan
(compliance/internal-audit-charter-and-plan).
Glossary and references
| Term | Meaning in this template |
|---|---|
| Associated person | Employee, agent, subsidiary undertaking or other person performing services for or on behalf of the organisation (ECCTA 2023 s.199) |
| Base fraud offence | An offence listed in Schedule 13 of ECCTA 2023 that can give rise to the failure to prevent fraud offence |
| Fraud risk profile | The documented result of the assessment: schemes, scores, controls, residual risk and responses (GAO term) |
| Fraud risk tolerance | The level of residual fraud risk management is prepared to accept |
| Fraud triangle | Opportunity, motive (pressure) and rationalisation as conditions for fraud |
| FTPF | Failure to prevent fraud; used here to tag schemes intended to benefit the organisation |
| Inherent risk | Risk before considering existing anti-fraud controls |
| Management override | Senior staff bypassing or manipulating controls |
| Residual risk | Risk remaining after evidenced controls |
References (names and numbers; obtain the official texts):
- Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, sections 199 to 206 and Schedule 13 (legislation.gov.uk); offence in force 2025-09-01.
- Home Office, "Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023: Guidance to organisations on the offence of failure to prevent fraud", published 2024-11-06, last updated 2025-10-10 (gov.uk, Open Government Licence v3.0).
- US Government Accountability Office, "A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs", GAO-15-593SP, July 2015.
- US Government Accountability Office, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (Green Book), 2025 revision, GAO-25-107721, Principle 8.
- IAASB, ISA 240 (Revised), auditor's responsibilities relating to fraud, effective for periods beginning on or after 2026-12-15 (name and number only).
- COSO and ACFE, Fraud Risk Management Guide, 2nd edition, 2023 (name only).
- Related templates: Risk Register (
compliance/risk-register), ISO 37001 Anti-Bribery (compliance/iso-37001-anti-bribery), Fraud Investigation Report (compliance/fraud-investigation-report), Fraud Detection System Design (system-design/design-fraud-detection), Whistleblowing Policy (compliance/whistleblowing-policy), Risk and Control Matrix (compliance/risk-control-matrix), Journal Entry Support (finance/journal-entry-support), AML Business Risk Assessment (compliance/aml-business-risk-assessment).
Standard and licence note
Based on the GAO Fraud Risk Management Framework (GAO-15-593SP) and the GAO Green Book 2025 (US government works, not subject to copyright in the United States), the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 and the Home Office guidance on the failure to prevent fraud offence (Crown copyright, Open Government Licence v3.0), cited by section and principle and described in original wording; no text from these sources is reproduced. ISA 240 (Revised) and the COSO/ACFE Fraud Risk Management Guide are named only; no content from them is used. The template text, structure of the tables, scales and the Corvid Commerce Group and Fernhollow Bank examples are original and fictional. Check the current official versions of the law, guidance and standards before use. This is a documentation format, not legal, accounting or audit advice. Template licence: MIT.
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